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The dissertation studies two aspects of the U.S. registered investment companies. The 
first essay analyzes the ownership and organizational structure aspect while the second 
essay investigates the restructure events of those investment companies. We find sellers 
from mutual fund asset sales are mainly financial conglomerates. Funds under 
management of those conglomerates experience poor performance during the period prior 
to asset sales. On the other hand, acquirers are generally highly focused mutual fund 
companies. Funds acquired by these focused entities experience improvement in both 
fund performance and operational efficiency. From the analysis of organizational 
structure, funds managed by focused mutual fund companies demonstrate better 
performance and operating efficiency than those of diversified ones. Funds managed by 
diversified fund companies also experience performance deterioration during years 
following their IPOs, while focused counterparts encounter performance enhancement. 
From the analysis of ownership structure, funds managed by public mutual fund entities 
outperform their private competitors. Our evidence indicates that (1) organizational 
structure (level of concentration), (2) economies of scale, (3) strengthened monitoring, 
and (4) managerial ownership contribute to the superior performance and greater 
operating efficiency that occur subsequent to asset sales in the mutual fund industry. We 
propose (1) a public trade, (2) a focused business line, and (3) a large insider ownership 
to explain the outperformance and management efficiency. Our results not only 
contribute to the dynamic of mutual fund operations but also explain the evolution of 




CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
With the aid of conglomerate merger wave of the 1960s and the 1970s, the 
conglomerate model with diversified business lines became viewed as an important facet 
of American capitalism.  Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) provide evidence of the trend 
toward diversification for American companies during this period.1  Stein (1997) and 
Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) document how multinational and conglomerate can utilize 
internal capital markets to overcome imperfections in external capital market and allow 
conglomerate firms to allocate resources efficiently.  Although Maksimovic and Phillips 
(2002) using plant-level data from the U.S. census for the period 1974 to 1992, document 
that conglomerate firms are less productive than single-segment firms of a similar size, 
they find that plants of the largest segments of conglomerates with multiple segments are 
particularly efficient. 2 
 As capital markets have become more global integrated and liquid, investors can 
diversify by themselves at low cost rather than delegating this task to managers.  Most 
analysts have become hostile to the concept of  a conglomerate and have come to believe 
in the importance of focus.  Comment and Jarrell (1995) document a shift toward focus 
and find that the percentage of firms listing one business segment increased from 36.2% 
to 63.9% and that the average number of segments fell from 2.59 to 1.72.  The average 
number of SIC codes per firm fell from 4.17 to 2.95.  The buyout boom of the 1990s has 
also presented obstacles for some conglomerates and many of the major diversified 
business firms are struggling to justify their existence.  As an example on October 23, 
2005, Cendant Corporation separated into four separate entities.  The company sold three 
of the four business lines, leaving a nicely focused entity.  The Cendant name was 
completely dissolved and the company changed its name to Avis Budget Group.  Altria 
Group, the parent company of Kraft Foods and Philip Morris International, Philip Morris 
USA and Philip Morris Capital Corp spun-off all its shares in Kraft Foods, which became 
an independent firm in 2007, and has announced its intention to also spin-off its 
ownership of Philip Morris.  Tyco, a conglomerate beset by scandal that was active in 
                                                 
1 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reports the proportion of manufacturing industry acquisitions, 
characterized as purely conglomerate, rises from 5% of total assets acquired in 1950-1955, to 18% in 1956-
1963, to 36% in 1964-1972.  
2 Except for the firms of the smallest size. 
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healthcare, flow control, security, telecommunications and electronics, separated into 
three companies during the 1st quarter of 2007.  Viacom, a media power house, also 
unraveled decades of acquisitions by splitting into two separate parts.  The major 
remaining conglomerates, such as GE and its rival Honeywell, are reshaping their 
portfolios of assets in an effort to strengthen shareholder wealth.3  Conglomerates that 
will survive and prosper are likely to be those that succeed in linking their disparate 
operations through a common denominator of management and business principles.   
Within the financial sector, the U.S. Congress repealed the Glass-Steagall Act by 
passing the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA, also known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Financial Services Modernization Act) in 1999.  This legislation open up competition 
among banks, securities firms, insurance and asset management companies.  The U.S. 
joined many other countries—especially in Europe and, more recently, Japan—in 
permitting the operation of financial conglomerates, and removing some of the key 
structural barriers built into the U.S. regulatory system for many years.  The existence of 
conflicts of interest has been documented existing among financial conglomerates.  For 
example, Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2004) and Jackson (2005) argue that positive 
research recommendations are likely to generate greater brokerage revenue thus creating 
strong incentives for analyst optimism.  There is also evidence that analysts (e.g., 
Michaely and Womack (1999) and Kolasinski and Kothari (2004)) generate more 
favorable research recommendations in the hopes of generating future business for other 
divisions of the Investment Bank.  
Jensen (1986) argues that managers diversify to increase firm size and to benefit 
from the power and prestige of managing a large firm.  Shleifer and Vishny (1989), along 
the same line, argue that managers use diversification as opportunity to entrench 
themselves and extract rents from shareholders by making manager-specific investments.  
Schmid and Walter (2007) report a substantial and persistent conglomerate discount 
among financial intermediaries and conclude that it is diversification that causes the 
discount rather than troubled firms diversity into promising areas.  Although diversified 
financial institutions trade at discount as other non-financial conglomerates do, academics, 
industry practitioners, and regulators wish to know the most are whether this 
                                                 
3 Sources are from companies’ websites and an article reported by Francesco Guerrera, “Less than the sum 
of its parts? Decline sets in at the conglomerate”, on Feb 2nd, 2007 from Financial Times.   
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conglomerate discount reflect the fact that the informational advantages of large financial 
institutions are out weighted by the impact 0f conflicts of interest activities.   
Conflicts of interest in the financial services are well documented.  Financial 
conglomerates have also been found to profit from the asymmetry information which 
benefits their shareholders.  Massa and Rehman (2005) investigate the flow of 
information within financial conglomerates by focusing on the effect that the lending 
behavior of affiliated banks has on the portfolio choice of the mutual funds belonging to 
the same conglomerate.  They show that mutual funds of the conglomerate increase their 
stakes in firms that borrow from the affiliated banks in the period following the deal, 
while there is no behavior analogous for unaffiliated funds.  Using net-of-style returns, 
they show that this strategy enhances fund performance, on average, by 15 basis points 
per month (1.8% per year) relative to that of unaffiliated funds in the post-deal era.  
Funds increase (decrease) their portfolio weights in the stocks of borrowing firms which 
subsequently sustain positive (negative) abnormal returns, suggesting that the banks 
exploit inside information not available to the market.   
Alchian (1950) and Stigler (1958) argue that the competitive nature of product 
markets force firms to minimize costs and run efficiently.  Low barriers to entry have 
resulted in more than 500 financial intermediaries from around the world competing in 
the U.S. market to provide investment management services to investors.  At the end of 
2006, U.S. registered investment companies managed a record of $10.4 trillion.  Among 
the fund sponsors, independent financial advisors who manage about half of the 
investment assets, represent the majority of the U.S. market.  Banks, insurance companies, 
securities broker-dealers, and non-U.S. sponsors are other major fund and trust sponsors 
in the U.S. market place.4  Fund families play an important role in the asset management 
industry.  According to the Investment Company Institute, the top 25 fund families 
control over 71% of total industry assets.5  Fund complexes compete to offer services to 
investors, and the ease with which investors can shift assets from one entity to another 
                                                 
4  Based on the Investment Company Complexes by type of intermediary on December 2006, 59% of the 
intermediary is by independent financial advisors, 14% by Non-U.S. sponsors, 10% by insurance 
companies, 10% by banks and thrifts and 7% by brokerages. 
5  Based on the data from 2007 Investment Company Fact Book, the largest 10 mutual fund sponsors 
managed 53% of mutual fund assets in 1990 while the assets under management is relative stable and 
represents 49% in 2006.  The Herfindahl-Hirschman measure considers industries with index numbers 
below 1,000 to be unconcentrated industries while the mutual fund industry has a Herfindahl-Hirschman 
measure of around 400. 
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has contributed to competition in the industry.  Not only do fund families offer the 
economies of scale and scope, they lower search costs for investors (Sirri and Tufano 
(1998)).  However, the structure of the delegated asset management industry allows 
agency problems to arise.  Fund complexes hire fund managers (advisors) to manage their 
fund products who do not work directly for their funds’ shareholders, but rather for the 
shareholders of the fund complexes.  Consequently, a fund family may distort the 
incentives of fund managers at the expense of fund shareholders when the overall family 
stands to benefit.  Gaspar, Massimo and Matos (2006) document that mutual fund 
families strategically transfer performance across member funds within their 
organizations and recent fund scandals have triggered regulatory concerns about fund 
governance.6  
Earlier literature documents that diversified firms trade at a discount (Lang and 
Stulz (1994), and Berger and Ofek (1995)) relative to focused peers, although Campa and 
Kedia (2002) argue that the documented discount is not per se evidence that 
diversification destroys value but instead indicates a lack of control for an endogeneity 
problem.  The unique nature of mutual fund companies as corporations or business trusts 
and their stabilized business structures7 allow us to control for firm characteristics that 
affect the diversification decision, mitigating potential endogeneity and self-selection 
biases that could pervade corporate sector analysis.  We use a rich dataset of all U.S. 
registered investment companies from 2001 to 2005, consisting of nearly 3,000 firm-
years.  Since these entities hold their business lines constant,8 and their product market is 
relatively stable, the sample covers approximately 35,000 fund-years of data that is free 
of survivor bias.  This evidence affords an opportunity to analyze the issue of the 
competing literatures among focused versus diversified asset management. To our 
                                                 
6 On September 3, 2003, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer announced the issuance of a complaint 
against New Jersey hedge fund company Canary Capital Partners LLC, charging that they had engaged in 
"late trading" in collusion with Bank of America's Nations Funds.  By early November, the SEC’s 
investigations led to the resignation of the chairmen of Strong Mutual Funds and Putnam Investments, both 
major mutual fund companies. In the case of Strong, the chairman himself was charged with market-timing 
trading involving his own company's funds.  In December, Invesco (market-timing) and Prudential 
Securities (widespread late trading) were added to the list of implicated fund companies. 
7 Based on Investment Company Fact Book from 2001 to 2007, the percent of investment company 
complexes by type of intermediary has been relatively stable. Independent investment advisers represents 
around 60% while insurance companies, brokerages, and banks represent 10%, 10% and 7% respectively,  
8 We hold the business structures constant for those investment companies to mitigate any firm switch from 
a focus business line to diversified or vice versus.   
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knowledge, this is the first academic research to use mutual fund companies and their 
product markets as a basis to provide new evidence about diversification.    
By extending this unique dataset to dates as early as 1961, we can analyze issues 
that pervade the IPO literatures.  Most of the finance literature remains within the 
boundaries of public firms.  However, even in a well-developed capital market as United 
States, public firms represent less than 1% of the total population of firms.  The unique 
feature of mutual fund data allows us to measure fund performance and managerial 
efficiency even though the majority of those fund companies are private and relative 
small in asset size.  The decision to go public is one of the most well-researched 
questions in finance given that IPOs are underpriced and sustain considerable long run 
underperformance.  Ritter (1991) indicates underpricing of IPOs as short-term 
phenomenon while those IPOs underperform in the long-run.  Loughran and Ritter (1995) 
document the long-run underperformance of IPOs and conclude that the phenomenon 
cannot be well explained.  Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993), Jain and Kini (1994), and 
Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah (1995), Chemmanur, He, and Nandy (2007)9 document a 
significant decline in operating performance, market-to-book ratio, price-to-earnings ratio, 
and earnings per share subsequent to firms’ IPO, suggesting that insiders time IPOs.  
However, Stoughton, Wong and Zechner (2001) indicate firms have greater tendencies to 
go public in the industries where the firms themselves have greater confidence about their 
private information regarding their own product quality.  The product market of mutual 
fund companies allows us to observe the performance and operating efficiency surround 
the transition of fund companies from being private to go to public for a substantial 
amount of time.   
There are several advantages to using mutual fund companies and their product 
markets to study the diversification discount and post-IPO performance.  The 
transparency of mutual funds because of mandated public disclosure allows us to generate 
a sample that is composed of private companies.  It compensates prior IPO literatures 
suffered with limited number of observations which carry little data prior to their 
                                                 
9 Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) use a sample of reverse LBO firms; Jain and Kini (1994) use the U.S. 
IPO firms; Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah (1995) use Australian firms to study the post-IPO operating 
performance and ownership structures for different time frame following their IPOs.  Chemmanur, He, and 
Nandy (2007) use total factor productivity (TFP), sales growth, sales, and capital expenditures to document 
similar results.  
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publicly-traded.   Analyzing both time series and cross section from the product market of 
mutual fund companies allows us to evaluate performance and operational efficiency 
without having to utilize the more subjective accounting measures that are used in the 
corporate literature.  The publicly-disclosed data for mutual funds includes fund 
performance, expense ratios (costs), net asset under management (size), manager tenure 
(level of entrenched), and portfolio turnover.  These data allow us to analyze whether 
diversification allows management firms to utilize internal resources more efficiently to 
achieve economies of scales or allows managers to entrench themselves by developing 
into a broader conglomerate that makes it more costly for dispersed shareholders to 
monitor.  By investigating performance and operational efficiency at the fund level, we 
can contribute to an understanding of the dynamics of mutual fund operation, thus help 
















CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Diversification versus Focus 
Over the period of 1950s-1970s, Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) show a trend that 
American companies move toward diversification.  Bhide (1990) attributes the trend of 
away from diversification toward focus in the 1980s to the improved efficiency of the 
capital market.  Liebeskind (2000) argues that the value of diversification depends on 
whether internal capital markets are relatively efficient or inefficient.  Williamson (1975) 
contends that diversification allows firms to allocate their capital internally at lower cost 
that relative to banks and other financial institutions.  Along with Myers and Majluf 
(1984), Stein (1997), and Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) who argue that as a result of 
information asymmetries, diversified firms can allocate capital more efficiently than 
external capital markets.  However, academic studies and empirical evidence generally 
indicate that, far from delivering promised synergies, conglomerates display a bias 
toward plowing surplus resources into their weaker business, resulting in waste and 
inefficiency.  Wernerfelt and Montgomery (1988) and Lang and Stulz (1994) document a 
positive correlation between Tobin’s Q and firm focus .10  Findings from Lang and Stulz 
(1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Servaes (1996), and Lamont and Polk (2002) suggest 
there is a conglomerate discount of 10% to 12%, implying that internal capital markets 
are inefficient.  Comment and Jarell (1995) also find argue that diversification harms 
shareholders, documenting that there has been a trend towards more focus and that there 
is a positive relationship between focus and shareholder returns.  John and Ofek (1995) 
find that an asset sale leads to an improvement in the operating performance of the seller's 
remaining assets in each of the three years following the asset sale.  With the 
improvements concentrates in firms that increase their focus, they report that the 
announcement stock returns are greater for focus-increasing divestitures, and that the 
change in operating performance is positively related to the seller's stock return at the 
divestiture announcement.  
Lang and Stulz (1994), Maksimovic and Phillips (2002), and Campa and Kedia 
(2002) show that failure to control for firm characteristics that lead firms to diversify, and 
                                                 
10 Tobin's q is known as another measure of performance.  It is the ratio of the market value of a firm's 
assets (as measured by the market value of its outstanding stock and debt) to the replacement cost of the 
firm's assets (Tobin 1969). 
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suffer a diversification discount may wrongly attribute the discount to diversification 
instead of the underlying characteristics.  Campa and Kedia (2002) propose several 
alternatives for solving endogenous problems.  After controlling for firm characteristics, 
using the probability of diversifying as an instrument, and applying Heckman’s technique 
for controlling self-selection bias, they report that the diversification discount from earlier 
literatures either drops off or turns into a premium.  This evidence shows that the 
characteristics that cause firms to diversify also cause them to be discounted.  Similarly, 
the decision to focus can be endogenous since firms choose to refocus when the presence 
of contain firm-specific characteristics makes the benefits of refocusing greater than the 
associated costs.     
2.2 Organizational Structure 
Bogle and Twardowski (1980) examine the performance of financial institutions, 
including banks, insurance companies and mutual funds and find that banks significantly 
underperform all other categories of institutional groups, including mutual funds.  
McTague (1994) explains that bank portfolio managers have a reputation of being 
unaggressive and fail to earn large returns.  According to this argument, pension fund 
managers and other investment advisors are reluctant to invest in bank-directed funds for 
fear of mediocre returns.  Chen, Yao, and Yu (2006) examine fund performance and fund 
flows for equity funds managed by insurers or their investment subsidiaries and find that 
insurance funds also underperform non-insurance peers.  They claim insurers’ efforts to 
cross-sell mutual funds results in insurance funds attracting unsophisticated investors and 
that such investors are reluctant to cashout even when managers generate poor 
performance.  
 Knuutila, Puttonen, and Smythe (2006) document that clients value convenience 
and brand rather than past performance for bank-managed funds based on evidence from 
the European market, where compared to the U.S. mutual fund markets, banks and 
financial conglomerates play larger roles in terms of the size of assets under management.  
For example, as of 2002, approximately 70% of Finnish assets are managed by banks, 
compared to approximately 5.3% in the U.S. market.11  Based on European evidence, 
Frye (2001) concludes that investors rely mainly on marketing information and the 
general reputation of the bank in deciding to invest in bank proprietary mutual funds in 
                                                 
11 The source is from Morningstar and Knuutila, Puttonen, and Smythe (2006).  
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U.S. as well as in Europe.  Although she finds no evidence of fund differential 
performance between bank-managed mutual funds and non-bank managed mutual funds 
after controlling for different fiduciary standards, she does find that banks focus on more 
conservative investment objectives and that bank proprietary funds, on the whole, are 
managed more conservatively than non-bank funds, as evidenced by lower fund risk.     
Koppenhaver (1999) and Frye (2001) show that in the U.S., bank-affiliated mutual 
funds have significantly lower management fees relative to non-bank funds.  In contrast, 
Korkeamaki and Smythe (2004), Gil-Bazo and Martinez (2004), and Geranio and Zanotti 
(2005) show that bank funds have significantly higher expenses than non-bank funds in 
Finland, Spain, and Italy market respectively.  This result may be partially due to the size 
of assets under management in the U.S. market which is generally larger than that in 
Europe.12  Another possibility is that banks in Europe are the primary promoters and 
distributors of mutual funds.  Thus banks and financial conglomerates can capitalize on 
their monopoly-like positions and charge higher fees.13  Nevertheless, this result raises an 
interesting question.  Since the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) opened 
up competition among banks, securities firms, insurance and asset management 
companies with the goal of promoting resources utilization, we would expect operating 
improvements at financial conglomerates, as a results of increased competition. We 
investigate whether these is any difference in terms of performance and operating 
efficiency among different structures of mutual fund organization and determinant 
whether the differences, if there are any, are related to the business concentration and 
focus fund complexes.    
2.3 Markets versus Board Governance as a Source of Control 
Supporters of markets generally believe that competition keeps product markets 
efficient.  In their views, regulation and restrictions are costly and do not add value to 
society because markets are competitive and contestable.  Fama (1980) claims that firms 
are well disciplined by competition.  Competition forces the evolution of devices for 
efficiently monitoring the performance of management and individual managers.  A 
similar argument is made by Hart (1983) and Jensen and Ruback (1983) who argue that 
                                                 
12 Korkeamaki and Smythe (2004) point out asset under management for U.S. funds are 7 to 10 times larger 
than those in Europe. 
13 Otten and Shweitzer (2002) indicate 53% of the mutual funds are distributed throughout banks in Europe. 
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product markets and the market for corporate control can discipline managers to work for 
the best interests of shareholders, that is to maximize firm value.   
Low barriers of entry contributed to the rapid growth in the U.S. mutual fund 
market in the 1980s and 1990s in terms of number of fund sponsors.  Although a bear 
market, fund scandals, and the additional costs associated with new regulations caused 
some consolidation in the industry after 2001, at the end of 2006 the market still managed 
to compose more than 500 financial intermediaries from around the world competing 
against each other to provide investment management services.  This active competition 
among sponsors has helped to keep asset concentration low for many years.  Khorana 
(1996) documents an inverse relationship between managerial turnover and prior fund 
performance as evidence of the effectiveness of governance and control mechanisms in 
the mutual fund industry.  Furthermore, Khorana (2001) argues that the internal market 
for corporate control in the mutual fund industry is effective in disciplining poorly 
performing fund managers.  Through the hiring new managers, investment advisors could 
correct prior poor performance to norm.   
While supporters of markets hold that competition disciplines managers 
effectively, the SEC has proposed a series of governance reforms in the light of recent 
mutual fund scandals, involving impropriates such as market timing and late trading.  
Although the governance model of the mutual funds industry is often viewed as mirroring 
the world of non-financial corporation, there are significant structural differences that 
dilute the authority of directors.  Radin and Stevenson (2006) challenge the function of 
the board of directors in the mutual fund industry and argue that they do not utilize their 
power and influence to monitor the actions of their managers as effectively as corporate 
boards.  Kuhnen (2006) finds that fund boards award portfolio management contracts 
preferentially to advisory firms that have had more business relationships with the fund 
directors.  Moreover, advisors receive higher pay when they are more connected to the 
fund directors.  This evidence casts doubt on whether board of directors can be relied on 
to monitor agency conflicts.  
Nevertheless, academia has provided some empirical results as to whether fund 
performance and management efficiency are associated with sound governance.  Tufano 
and Sevick (1997) provide the first empirical test about the effectiveness of boards.  They 
find that smaller boards in a mutual fund organization negotiate lower fund-management 
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fees.  Similarly, Meschke (2006) finds that funds overseen by an independent chairman 
charge lower fees although the relationship between fund fees and the percentage of 
directors that are independent varies through time and measures of board independence 
do not affect fund performance in an economically meaningful way.  Del Guercio, Dann 
and Partch (2003) find that funds with relatively low expense ratios have smaller boards, 
a greater proportion of the board is independent, relatively low director compensation.  
They conclude that board independence is associated with lower expense ratios and 
value-enhancing restructuring.  Tang and Kong (2006) examine the effect of three 
governance mechanisms on fees and other measures of performance.  They conclude that 
funds with more independent boards are less efficient in terms of the performance-
expense tradeoff.  The greater the proportion of directors that are independent, a lower 
12b-1 fees and fund loads.  The above evidence shows that independent board and 
independent chairman are associated with a lower expense ratio being charged to fund 
investors.  In terms of fund performance and board indepedence, results are mixed.  Tang 
and Kong (2006) analyze fund organizations that have unitary boards.14 Surprisingly, 
their results show that unitary boards charge lower fees and display better performance.  
This point illustrates that board of directors may themselves create agency problems.   
The SEC has devoted some efforts to strengthening the internal monitoring and 
governance mechanisms in the mutual fund industry, but a federal appeals court has 
overruled the SEC’s proposed rules three times in less than a year. 15  Ding and Wermers 
(2006), who are in favor of the SEC’s proposal, conclude that the structure of the board is 
an important determinant of governance quality.  In examining the role of boards, they 
find that a greater number of independent directors predicts both better future 
performance and a higher likelihood of that an underperforming manager will be replaced.  
Khorana, Tufano and Wedge (2007) examine whether certain governance structures are 
related to the board approval of across-family fund mergers by target firms, they 
document that a larger fraction of independent trustees implies a lower tolerance of poor 
performance in the initiation across-family mergers.  This effect is most pronounced 
when all of the fund's directors are independent.  Furthermore, while boards approve 
                                                 
14 The unitary boards here are defined as one board overseeing all funds in the complex. 
15 The U.S. court rejected the proposal of 75% of a fund’s directors, including the chairman, be independent 
of the company that oversees the fund by the 3rd time on June 23 rd, 2006.  The SEC has until the end of 
2007 for the comment period. 
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across-family mergers that lead to substantial reductions in their own compensation or 
even their own firing,  more highly paid target fund boards are less likely to approve 
these mergers. 
2.4 Diversifications and Governance 
Various researchers are attempted to find various explanations for the value lost 
through diversification, based on agency considerations.  Amihid and Lev (1981) 
document that managers may diversify to reduce the risk of their undiversifiable human 
capital.  Jensen (1986) argues that managers diversify to increase firm size and to benefit 
from the power and prestige of managing a large firm.   Shleifer and Vishny (1989) argue 
that managers use diversification as an opportunity to entrench themselves and extract 
rents from shareholders by making manager-specific investments.  Other researchers 
argue that there is no clear evidence to show that governance characteristics explain the 
value loss from diversification.  Anderson, Bates, Bizjak, and Lemmon (1998) contend 
that agency costs do not provide a complete explanation for the magnitude and 
persistence of the diversification discount.  They find that CEOs in diversified firms have 
lower stock ownership and lower pay-for-performance sensitivities, relative to focused 
firms.  However, it is diversified companies that have more outside directors.  
Consequently, when evaluating independent blockholdings and sensitivity of CEO 
turnover to performance, there is no statistically significant difference between 
diversified and focused firms.  However, Jiraporn, Kim, Davidson, and Singh (2006) 
document an inverse relationship between the strength of shareholder rights and the 
probability of diversifying.  Firms with strong shareholder rights seem to prevent firms 
from diversification.  Thus, firms where shareholder rights are more limited due to 
restrictive corporate governance suffer deeper diversification discounts.  More 
specifically, they find that there is a 1.1-1.4% decline in firm value for each additional 
governance provision imposed on shareholders.  Their conclusions support the 
proposition that agency theory is an explanation for the loss of value observed at 
diversified firms while Anderson, Bates, Bizjak, and Lemmon (1998) suspect that other 
sources are needed to explain the diversification discount.  
2.5 Incentives, Insider Ownership and Performance 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that agency problems arise because contracts 
cannot be costlessly written and enforced.  Servaes (1996) and Denis, Denis, and Sarin 
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(1997) document an inverse relationship between diversification and managerial 
ownership.  They attribute to agency conflicts within a diversified firm.  The Wall Street 
Journal reports 3% of mutual funds equip incentives fee structure to compensate portfolio 
managers on April 14th, 2005.  One way to solve agency conflicts is to utilize with proper 
incentives to induce managers to behave in the interests of shareholders.  However, the 
empirical results for adopting incentives to resolve agency problems are mixed.  The Wall 
Street Journal reports that 3% of mutual funds have incentive fees.  Blake, Elton and 
Gruber (2003) conclude that mutual funds which offer incentive fees to their managers do 
not, on average, outperform their peers.  On the other hand, Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout 
and Weinbaum (2005) document that an incentive-based compensation structure for 
directors has a positive impact on fund performance and conclude that larger director 
ownership reduces agency problems between fund managers and shareholders.   
Insider ownership has been viewed as an effective signal of a firm’s quality that 
can mitigate information asymmetry and adverse selection problems.  Leland and Pyle 
(1977) propose that managers can signal the quality of firms under taking IPOs by 
retaining of equity holdings.  There are empirical evidences of a positive relationship 
between insider ownership and firm performance, implying that insider ownership serves 
as a device to mitigate conflicts of interests and agency problems.  Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) propose by establishing appropriate incentives and incurring monitoring costs can 
limit the divergent interests between agents and principals.  Consequently, managers with 
higher ownership are less likely to engage value destroying activities, and thus the cost of 
monitoring is reduced as management ownership rises.  Consistent with this convergence 
of interest hypothesis, McConnell and Servaes (1990) document that corporate value is a 
function of insider equity ownership.  Their evidence shows a significant curvilinear 
relation between Q and the fraction of shares owned by corporate insiders as well as a 
significant positive relation between Q and the proportion of shares held by institutional 
investors.  Anderson and Reeb (2003) study founding-family ownership and firm 
performance of the S&P 500 firms and find that the relation between family holdings and 
firm performance is nonlinear.  Their results show when family members serve as CEOs, 
performance is better than with outside CEOs.  This result is consistent with the argument 
that concentrated ownership is more effective than dispersed ownership.   
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Insider ownership has also been found effective in aligning conflicts of interest in 
the portfolio management industry.  Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2006) find that director 
ownership tend to be greater when the benefit from monitoring is expected to be high and 
when there is a lack of other control mechanisms.  Khorana, Servaes and Wedge (2007) 
document higher ownership by portfolio managers is associated with improved future 
performance, with performance improving by about three basis points for each basis point 
of managerial ownership.  They also find fund managerial ownership is greater in funds 
with better past performance, lower front-end loads, smaller size, funds affiliated with 
smaller families, and where the manager has managed the fund for a long period of time.  
These findings support the notion that managerial ownership has desirable incentive 
alignment effects for mutual fund investors, and indicate that the disclosure of this 
information is useful. 
While the convergence-of-interests hypothesis suggests a positive relationship, the 
entrenchment hypothesis suggests that market valuation can be adversely affected by high 
insider ownership since greater insider control allows insiders greater freedom to depart 
from value maximizing.  Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) study the relationship 
between management ownership and Tobin’s Q.  Their results show Tobin’s Q first 
increases, then declines, and finally rises slightly as insider ownership rises.  Stulz (1988) 
develops a model that analyzes the relationship between the takeover premium and 
managerial ownership.  He argues that the takeover market disciplines corporate 
managers.  As managerial equity ownership increases, the probability of a successful 
hostile takeover declines for any given premium, furthering management entrenchment.  
Slovin and Sushka (1993) examine the deaths of inside blockholders to test whether 
ownership concentration promotes managerial entrenchment or aligns insider and non-
insider interests.  Since market value falls at the death of an inside blockholder, they 
conclude that firm value is adversely affected when a single insider owns a substantial 
amount of a firm’s stock.  The market reacts to the death positively because of the 
expected reduction in ownership concentration and the greater probability of subsequent 
corporate control activities.   
Increased insider ownership concentration also permits managerial consumption 
of perquisites.  Demsetz (1983) argues that insiders in concentrated firms may choose 
non-pecuniary consumption and thereby draw resources away from profitable projects.  
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Combining ownership and control allows concentrated shareholders to exchange profits 
from private benefits.  Jensen (1986) argues that managerial moral hazard can take the 
form of excessive spending on projects that promote the careers and visibility of 
managers but are not in the best interest of shareholders.  Under the assumption that 
monitoring costs are not fully shared among shareholders, the free rider problem 
associated with monitoring is mitigated when ownership is more concentrated.  Therefore, 
concentrated ownership should entail lower expenditure on activities with high scope for 
generating managerial private benefits.  Yafeh and Yosha (2003) propose that 
concentrated shareholding is associated with lower expenditure on activities with scope 
for managerial private benefits.  DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) and Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) find that large premiums associated with superior voting shares or control 
rights provide evidence that controlling shareholders seek to extract private benefits from 
the firm.  Consequently, insider block-holders might forgo some risk diversification gains 
or promote their own interest at the expense of other shareholders.   
2.6 Existence of Institutional Shareholders and Outside Blockholders  
The results on the relationship between institutions (outside blocks) holding and 
firm value are ambiguous.  The monitoring hypothesis implies that outsiders will monitor 
managers and reduce agency problems.  Holderness and Sheehan (1985) and Mikkelson 
and Ruback (1985) both document equity value increases with the announcements of 
block purchases by corporations and corporate raiders.  Demsetz (1986) argues that 
nonmanagement insiders with large shareholders are effective monitors of firm activities.  
Their arguments are consistent with the large shareholder monitoring hypothesis of 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) who predict that the presence of a large blockholder will have 
a positive effect on the market value of the firm.  Large shareholders reduce the free-rider 
problem in takeovers.  The potential takeover threat that large blockholders present can 
also serve as an effective device for monitoring management.   
There is evidence on how block-holders can prevent value destroy or management 
entrenchment from their voting powers.  Jarrell and Poulson (1987) document that firms 
with larger insider holdings and lower institutional holdings adopt the most harmful 
antitakeover amendments.  Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) indicate that institutional 
investors and other blockholders vote actively on antitakeover amendments, especially 
when the proposal appears to harm shareholders.  Institutions that are less subject to 
 
 16
management influence, such as mutual funds, foundations, and public-employee pension 
funds, are more likely to oppose management than banks, insurance companies, and trusts, 
which frequently derive benefits from lines of business under management control.  We 
will empirically test how the presence of outside shareholders influences management 
performance and operational efficiency and examine how different fund complexes are 
affect by such block-holders.  Agarwal and Mandelker (1990) examine the role of large 
shareholders in the attempts of entrenched managers to adopt anti-takeover provisions to 
empirically test two competing hypotheses, active monitoring hypothesis and passive 
voting hypothesis.  Their results imply that the existence of large shareholders leads to 
better monitoring of managers.  Barclay and Holderness (1991) find similar results 
documenting that there are significant and positive effects at the announcement of an 
outsider’s acquisition of a large equity position, but these gains persist only if a takeover 
or other corporate restructuring follows.  Moreover, Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1994) 
further analyze a large sample of management-sponsored anti-takeover amendments and 
conclude that shareholder voting is important.  Pagano and Roell (1998) argue that the 
presence of large outside shareholders can reduce the probability of controlling 
shareholder wealth expropriation.  Demsetz (1983), Shleifer and Vishny (1986), and 
Pound (1988) report evidence that is consistent with the positive relation between 
corporate value and institutional share ownership. 
However, research indicates that the presence of large blockholders has little 
influence on firm values.  McConnell and Servaes (1990) do find no correlation between 
firm value and the presence of a block holder or the fraction of equity owned by 
blockholders.  Moreover, Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) argue that dispersed 
outside ownership can be beneficial because it enhances managerial discretion, in 
contradiction to the monitoring hypothesis.  Although tight control by outside 
shareholders may be ex post efficient, ex ante it imposes an expropriation threat that 
reduce managerial initiative.  Even if managerial discretion is detrimental to shareholders 
ex post, it can be beneficial ex ante because it induces greater firm-specific investment on 
managers, like searching for new investment projects.  The manager is less likely to show 
such initiative when large shareholders are likely to interfere, where as the monitor 
hypothesis argues that large shareholders constrain managers from expropriating wealth.  
Thus there might be a trade-off between the gains from blockholder monitoring and the 
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loss of managerial initiative induced by a blockholder.  From this perspective, a firm’s 
ownership structure can act as a commitment device in delegating a certain degree of 
control to management.  Consequently, a dispersed ownership structures assures the 
manager that shareholders will interfere little, inducing him to show greater initiative.  In 
contrast, a concentrated ownership structure induces high levels of monitoring and 
control but results in less management initiative so that the ownership structure can serve 
as an instrument to solve the trade-off between control and managerial initiative.  
2.7 IPOs of Mutual Fund Complexes 
There is relatively little literature addressing the question of why companies go 
public.  Pagano (1993) points out the possibility that a small stock market may represent a 
“bad equilibrium” in which no entrepreneur goes public, due to the failure of 
entrepreneurs in such an economy to internalize the positive externality arising from the 
increase in the diversification available to investors in public companies.  Pagano, Panetta, 
and Zingales (1998) study the issue of why companies go public by using both ex ante 
and ex post information on their characteristics and performance.  Their analysis shows 
greater investment is needed in sectors with higher growth opportunities result an IPO.  
However, investment and profitability declines after the IPO, indicating entrepreneur’s 
attempt to time the market.  In addition, going public provides a benefit to company to 
borrow more cheaply.   
In the asset management industry, only a limited number of firms go public.  For 
example, out of nearly 600 U.S. registered investment management companies in 2001, 
only 26 firms are public companies.  Even counting those investment companies that are 
divisions of public companies, the number of firms would only increase to 107.  Most of 
the investment companies in the U.S. are subject to the Investment Company Act of 1940 
with extensive disclosure.  The industry is widely recognized as highly competitive since 
its low barriers to entry.  Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) argue an entrepreneur has 
private information about his firm’s value, but outsiders can reduce this disadvantage by 
gaining information and evaluating the firm at some cost.  In equilibrium the timing of 
the going-public decision is determined by a firm’s trade-off between reducing the 
duplication in information production by outsiders (which is unavoidable in the IPO 
market, but is mitigated by a publicly observable share price) and avoiding the risk-
premium demand by venture capitalists and other private investors.  Thus, the additional 
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cost for outsiders to evaluate investment companies might be lower given the fact of their 
transparency.  The trade-off for management considering IPO might is somewhat 
different because the cost of losing control and ownership might outweigh the benefits 
from liquidity and diversification.   
Brau and Fawcett (2006) survey 336 chief financial officers to compare practice 
to theory in the areas of initial public offerings with respect to motivation, timing, 
underwriter selection, underpricing, signaling, and the decision to remain private.  They 
find the most important positive signal for going public is past historical earnings, 
followed by underwriter certification.  The primary motivation for firms going public is 
to facilitate acquisitions, while the main reason firms remain private to preserve decision-
making control and ownership.  They find there are four key motivations for going public.  
One is for managers to use their private information (Myers and Majluf (1984)).  Zingales 
(1995) argues that IPOs are followed by abnormally high turnover in control, evidence of 
insiders cashing out.  A third explanation as offered by Zingales (1995) is that an IPO can 
serve as a first step toward having a company taken over at an attractive price. The fourth 
one is that an IPO is served as strategic moves.  For example, Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter 
(2003) document analyst recommendations are largely biased upward after an IPO.  The 
asset management industry, relative to other industries, has not experienced large 
consolidation in the 1990s, even though some consolidation took place in the early 2000s 
as a result of fund scandals and bearish market conditions.  A majority of the mutual fund 
companies go public are founding-family firms which retain large holding of shares after 
their IPOs.  This factor suggests that the motivations and decisions for investment 
companies going public might be different from that of non-financial firms.   
Pagano (1993) and Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner (1994) both point out the 
diversification and liquidity benefits to firms from having access to the capital market.  
Trading in a liquid market also benefits in lowering firms’ cost of capital.  Zingales (1995) 
argues that the going public decision is based upon initial owners’ decision in balancing 
maximizing cashflow rights by giving up the control rights.  Whether a company should 
be private or public depends on the particular combination of majority control and 
dispersed ownership which maximizes owners’ wealth.  Boot, Gopalan and Thakor (2006) 
argue that managers need decision-making autonomy to optimally manage the firm while 
investors need liquid ownership stakes.  With diffused ownership, investors rely on 
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corporate governance to impose generic exogenous controls so the manager may not be 
able to attain the desired trade-off between autonomy and the cost of capital.  The benefit 
of private ownership is that the manager can attain the precise trade-off through privately-
contracting between few large investors.   
Some scholars explain an IPO is used as a signaling device used when there exist 
important differences between expected product qualities.  Leland and Pyle (1977) 
conclude that entrepreneur can signal project quality through retaining a significant 
ownership of the firm.  After controlling for insider ownership, Jain and Kini (1994) 
conclude that there is a significant positive relation between post-IPO operating 
performance and equity retention by the original entrepreneurs.  Stoughton and Zechner 
(1998) conclude that the value of a firm’s IPO is determined by the ownership structure 
resulting from the offering mechanism given that investors are not homogeneous in their 
ability to monitor management of the newly public firm.  Monitoring activities are 
difficult to observe and to contract on since a free-rider problem exists.  The existence of 
this agency problem creates a tension between risk-sharing and information production, 
and these two goals are traded-off against one another.  As a result, the optimal offering 
process will give favored treatment to the large investor class.  Schipper and Smith (1983, 
1986) use corporate spin-offs and carve-outs to document that public trading in subsidiary 
stock provides a better medium for managerial compensation as well as for the 
acquisition of the subsidiary by another firm.   
2.8 Post-IPO Performance 
The notion that managers time the market for filing for IPO is found in early 
literature, implying that firms signal the market with their overvaluation.  Thus, issuing 
stock immediately reveals information about the true state to the market so that the 
market discounts such firms.  More formally, Myers and Majluf (1984) assume managers 
know more than the market does about the future prospects of the firm, and that managers 
acting in the best interests of existing shareholders issue stock when the market 
overvalues the firm.  Stein (1989) uses a signal-jamming model to show that myopic 
behavior like window-dressing may persist even in efficient capital markets.   
Consistent with this argument, Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) study reverse 
LBO firms and find they underperform in the post-IPO period, arguing IPO firms also 
experience deteriorating operational performance following their IPOs.  Jain and Kini 
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(1994) investigate the change in operating performance of firms that go public and find a 
significant decline in operating performance, market-to-book ratio, price-to-earnings ratio, 
and earnings per share subsequent to the IPO.  However, they document a significant 
positive relation between post-IPO operating performance and equity retention by the 
original entrepreneurs, consistent with Leland and Pyle (1977).  Mikkelson, Partch, and 
Shah (1995) examine ownership structure and operating performance after the IPOs of 
Australian firms.  They also find deteriorating operating performance over the first 4 
post-listing years and a positive relationship between insider ownership and firm 
performance after the IPO.  There is a positive relation between institutional ownership 
and performance, but only in the latter part of a 5-year post-listing window, and find 
some evidence that independent board leadership is associated with better operating 
performance.   
Kaplan (1989) and Smith (1990) document the superior operating performance of 
firms that make the transition from public to private ownership through leverage buyouts 
(LBOs) and management buyouts (MBOs), consistent with the fact that the concentration 
of ownership intrinsic to LBOs and MBOs eliminates conflicts of interests between 
managers and shareholders.  However, other literature such as Stoughton, Wong and 
Zechner (2001) finds that IPO firms experience performance improvement.  They argue 
that firms signal product quality through IPOs, especially when there exist great 
differences between expected product qualities.  Thus, industries where firms have 
greater confidence about their private information regarding their own product quality are 
more likely to go public. 
  Based on the competing literature about the quality of IPO firms, we formulate 
hypotheses to test the performance and management efficiency surrounding IPOs of 
mutual fund companies.  Most importantly, we would like to test whether firms’ 
organization structure with respect to focus versus diversification generates differences 
surrounding IPOs and whether those differences are related to insider holdings, outside 
blocks ownership, and governance structures.   
2.9 Fund Characteristics and Fund Performance 
 In documenting how ownership structure and governance is related to fund 
performance and operational efficiency, we will control for other variables that affect 
fund performance and efficiency.  Some literature argues that fund size and performance 
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are related.  Chen, Hong, Huang and Kubik (2004) document that fund performance 
declines with fund size but increases with the size of the other funds in the family.  In 
most fund families, major decisions are decentralized so that fund managers select stocks 
without substantial coordination.  Thus a family is an organization that credibly commits 
to letting each of its fund managers conduct their own stock selection.  Being part of a 
family generates economies of scales with respect to the fixed costs of marketing, 
research, and back office capacity.  Indeed, a key feature of large fund organizations is 
that the family can hire a pool of analysts whose time and talents are then shared by 
various fund managers in the organization.  Thus if a large fund is organized like a fund 
family with different managers running smaller pots of money, then scale can enhance 
efficiency just as family size has a favorable effect on fund performance.   
Other literature documents fund performance and operating efficiency is related to 
management risk incentives and the resulting management fees.  Carhart (1997) identifies 
a negative relationship between fees and performance, and portfolio turnover and 
performance.  The increasing public attention, competition, and recent settlements in the 
industry have contributed to the reduction in the fee structures of the U.S. mutual fund 
market.  Bris, Gulen, Kadiyala, and Rau (2007) study a pool of funds closed for new 
investment and document a negative relationship between fees and size of funds under 
management.  Ding and Wermers (2006) find that the presence of managerial 
entrenchment in the asset-management industry but that experienced managers of smaller 
funds underperform their less-seasoned counterparts.   
We will tests by controlling various fund characteristics, such as size, turnover, 
expense ratios, and manager tenure to analyze whether ownership and governance 
structures affect fund performance and management efficiency, and whether good 
performance is related to being structure of fund complexes being focused or diversified.   
We also address issues as to whether managers’ initiatives and motivations of going 
public reflect market timing and analyze performance and management efficiency 









CHAPTER 3 HYPOTHESES, SAMPLE, AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Hypotheses  
3.1.1 Focused versus Diversified  
Given that Lang and Stulz (1994); Berger and Ofek (1995); Servaes (1996); 
Lamont and Polk (2002) argue that diversified firms or conglomerates trade at a 10% to 
12% discount relative to the focused peers while Stein (1997), and Desai, Foley and 
Hines (2004) claim that as a result of information asymmetries, diversified firms can 
allocate capital more efficiently than external capital markets to achieve economies of 
scales and scopes, we formulate the following central hypotheses for empirical tests. 
3.1.1.1 Null Hypotheses 
H01: Funds managed under focused mutual fund companies perform as well as those 
under diversified fund complexes. 
H02: Funds managed under focused mutual fund companies achieve management 
efficiency that is similar to those under diversified fund complexes. 
3.1.1.2 Alternative Hypotheses  
H11: Funds managed under focused mutual fund companies perform better or worse than 
those under diversified fund complexes. 
H12: Funds managed under focused mutual fund companies show better or worse 
management efficiency than those under diversified fund structures. 
3.1.2 Governance and Diversification 
The governance literature has provided some evidence that fund performance and 
management efficiency (fees) are associated with size and the independence of the board 
(Tufano and Sevick (1997); Meschke (2006); Del Guercio, Dann and Partch (2003); Tang 
and Kong (2006); Ding and Wermers (2006)) and that managers use diversification as an 
opportunity to entrench themselves and extract perks from shareholders by making 
manager-specific investments (Amihid and Lev (1981); Jensen (1986); Shleifer and 
Vishny (1989)).  Thus, the next hypothesis to be tested is related to the level of 
diversification of fund complexes and their governance structures.  
3.1.2.1 Null Hypothesis 
H03: Focused mutual fund companies have size and independency of board members that 
is similar to diversified fund complexes. 
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3.1.2.2 Alternative Hypothesis  
H13: Focused mutual fund companies are smaller (or larger) in size and have greater (or 
lower) independency of board members than diversified fund companies 
3.1.3 Ownership and Performance 
The literature documents an inverse relationship between diversification and 
managerial ownership within a diversified firm (Servaes (1996); Denis, Denis, and Sarin 
(1997)), and insider ownership has been documented to be an effective device to mitigate 
information asymmetry (Jensen and Meckling (1976); Leland and Pyle (1977); 
McConnell and Servaes (1990); Anderson and Reeb (2003); Chen, Goldstein and Jiang 
(2006); Khorana, Servaes and Wedge (2007)).  However, other literature suggests that 
market valuation can be adversely affected by insider ownership either (Jarrell and 
Poulson (1987); Stulz (1988); Slovin and Sushka (1993); Yafeh and Yosha (2003); 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985); Shleifer and Vishny (1997)), implying entrenchment.  
Based on the competing hypotheses of convergence of interests versus 
entrenchment hypothesis, we formulate a hypothesis as to which entrepreneurs who 
maintain large ownership of outstanding shares signal the good quality of their firms’ 
superior subsequent performance and operating efficiency of their mutual fund operations.   
3.1.3.1 Null Hypothesis 
H04: Focused mutual fund companies with similar insider ownership show no difference 
in fund performance and operation efficiency relative to diversified fund complexes. 
3.1.3.2 Alternative Hypothesis  
H14: Focused mutual fund companies with larger insider ownership generate superior fund 
performance and operation efficiency relative to diversified fund complexes. 
3.1.4 Existence of Outside Blockholders  
Empirical evidence on the relationship between institutional (outside blocks) 
holdings and firm value are mixed.  The monitoring hypothesis implies that outsiders 
form a monitor mechanism that reduces agency problems (Holderness and Sheehan 
(1985); Mikkelson and Ruback (1985); Demsetz (1986); Shleifer and Vishny (1986); 
Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988); Agarwal and Mandelker (1990); Barclay and 
Holderness (1991); Pagano and Roell (1998)).  However, others evidence indicate that the 
presence of large blockholders has no influence or may reduce managerial initiative, 
lowering firm values (McConnell and Servaes (1990); Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi 
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(1997)). Given the different in organization structure and manager holding between 
focused and diversified mutual fund complexes, we propose the following hypotheses.  
3.1.4.1 Null Hypotheses 
H05: An increase in share holdings of outside blockholders has no impact on fund 
performance and operation efficiency for focused fund complexes. 
H06: An increase in share holdings of outside blockholders has no impact to fund 
performance and operation efficiency for diversified fund complexes. 
3.1.4.2 Alternative Hypotheses  
H15: An increase in share holdings of outside blockholders has a positive (negative) 
impact on fund performance and operation efficiency for focused fund complexes. 
H16: An increase in share holdings of outside blockholders has a positive (negative) 
impact on fund performance and operation efficiency for diversified fund complexes. 
3.1.5 IPOs of Mutual Fund Companies 
Some researchers argue that public trading provides a better medium for 
managerial compensation (Schipper and Smith (1983, 1986)) and others suggest that 
going public enables companies to borrow more cheaply to finance their growth 
opportunities (Pagano (1993); Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner (1994); Pagano, Panetta, 
and Zingales (1998)) or signal their firm’s quality (Leland and Pyle (1977); Jain and Kini 
(1994)).  However, performance is found to be improved from the transition of public to 
private ownership (Kaplan (1989) and Smith (1990)).  Given this literatures, we propose 
that being publicly-traded can affect incentives for portfolio managers and influence 
performance.  Public tradings also enables outside shareholders to monitor their managers 
for better operation efficiency.  We propose the following hypothesis.  
3.1.5.1 Null Hypothesis 
H07: Publicly-traded mutual fund companies achieve similar fund performance and 
operational efficiency relative to privately-owned companies. 
3.1.5.2 Alternative Hypothesis 
H17: Publicly-traded mutual fund companies achieve better or worse fund performance 
and operation efficiency relative to privately-owned companies. 
3.1.6 Post-IPO Performance 
A large body of literature supports the argument that managers time the market 
and that it is in the best interests of existing shareholders to issue stock when the market 
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overvalues the firm (Akerlof (1970); Myers and Majluf (1984); Stein (1989)).  Consistent 
with this view, subsequent performance following equity issuance normally deteriorates 
(Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993); Jain and Kini (1994); Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah 
(1995)).  However, Kaplan (1989) and Smith (1990) find that performance improves in 
the transition of public to private ownership, while Stoughton, Wong and Zechner (2001) 
document that managers with favorable private information regarding their product 
quality choose to go public.  Based on this literature, we formulate a hypothesis to test 
whether managers time the market by testing the performance and management 
efficiency surrounding their IPOs.  Specifically, we would like to test whether firms’ 
organization structure affects product market performance and operational efficiency and 
whether the differences are related to firms’ ownership, and governance structure.  Based 
on the above arguments, we propose the following hypotheses. 
3.1.6.1 Null Hypotheses 
H08: Focused mutual fund companies perform as well as diversified ones after their IPOs. 
H09: Focused mutual fund companies encounter similar operational efficiency as 
diversified ones after IPOs.  
3.1.6.2 Alternative Hypotheses 
H18: Focused mutual fund companies perform better (worse) in years after firms’ IPOs 
than diversified ones. 
H19: Focused mutual fund companies perform better (worse) with respect to operational 
efficiency relative to diversified ones after IPOs. 
3.1.7 Ownership and Organizational Structure  
Our final hypothesis relates to whether an organization is focused or diversified 
and whether it is publicly-traded or privately-owned.  
3.1.7.1 Null Hypothesis 
H010: Publicly-traded focused mutual fund companies perform as well as diversified 
privately-owned fund complexes. 
H011: Diversified, publicly-traded mutual fund companies perform as focused, privately-
owned fund complexes. 
3.1.7.2 Alternative Hypothesis 
H110: Publicly-traded focused mutual fund companies perform better (worse) than 
diversified, privately-owned fund complexes. 
 
 26
H111: Diversified, publicly-traded mutual fund companies perform better (worse) than 
focused, privately-owned fund complexes. 
3.2 Sample and Methodology 
We focus our work on the post Glass-Steagall Act of 1999 period when financial 
institutions were free to compete.  Competition among banks, securities firms, insurance 
and asset management companies allows the operation of banking conglomerates and a 
study of how organization and ownership structure among mutual fund companies 
influences fund performance and operational efficiency.  We select our sample from all 
U.S. registered investment companies from January 2001 to December 2005 which 
covers 3,000 firm-years and more than 35,000 fund-years.  We include equity and bond 
funds, and both live and dead funds.   
One major disadvantage in studying whether diversification destroys value is the 
endogeneity problem.  Lang and Stulz (1994), Maksimovic and Phillips (2002), and 
Campa and Kedia (2002) point out the characteristics that cause firms to diversify, also 
cause them to be discounted.  Similarly, the decision to refocus can be endogenous since 
firms choose to refocus when the presence of firm-specific characteristics makes the 
benefits of refocusing greater than the costs.  Failure to control for firm characteristics 
that lead firms to diversify and be discounted may wrongly attribute the discount to 
diversification instead of the underlying characteristics.   
The unique nature of mutual fund companies structured as corporations or 
business trusts, and their relatively stabilized business structures16 allow us to control for 
firm characteristics that affect the diversification or focus decision, mitigating the 
potential endogeneity and self-selection bias that pervases the non-financial corporate 
literature.  Rather than controlling for firm characteristics, using the probability of 
diversifying as an instrument, and applying Heckman’s estimate technique to control for 
self-selection bias, as Campa and Kedia (2002) suggest, we manually classify all U.S. 
registered investment companies annually from 2001 to 2005 to label their organization 
structure as focused or diversified mutual fund companies.  After controlling for firm 
characteristics, we retain fund companies that maintain their organization structure as 
focused or diversified during the sample period from 2001 to 2005 and eliminate those 
                                                 
16 Based on Investment Company Fact Book from 2001 to 2007, the percent of investment company 
complexes by type of intermediary has been relatively stable. Independent investment advisers represents 
around 60% while insurance companies, brokerages, and banks represent 10%, 10% and 7% respectively,  
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companies that switch from a focused mutual fund company to a diversified financial 
institution or vice versus to eliminate endogeneity problems.   
Several databases carry names of mutual fund management companies.  However, 
none of those databases is bias free or providing long tracking record of data.  For 
example, Thomson Financial CDA/ Spectrum 13F Institutional Holding database 
provides names of mutual fund management companies.  However, the data only contains 
companies with over $100 million of securities under management.  Moreover, 
Thomason Financial mislabeled management company category after 1998.17  The CRSP 
Survivor-Bias Free US Mutual Fund Database provides a selection and survivorship bias 
free data.  However, family level data, such as fund family name and fund family code, is 
not reported in the database until July 2003.  Morningstar Principia Database has a data 
point of registered name and family name to identify specific mutual fund companies 
which provides a list of all mutual fund companies with the exception of dead funds and 
their families.  Thus the dataset suffers survivorship bias.  To get a complete list of all 
public and private mutual fund companies, we merge CRSP and Morningstar database by 
using the numerical identifier from Standard & Poor reported in CRSP tape for the 
management company to identify the specific management company without sacrificing 
survivorship bias.  This data point also allows us to put funds into specific families even 
when funds have gone through name changes and acquisitions.  To further identify the 
organization structure, parent-subsidiary affiliation, and other business partnership 
relationship, we manually refer to Mergent Bank and Finance Manual and News 
Reports18 cross checking with SEC filings, company websites, and financial statements so 
as to be able to label each ownership and organizational structure into 5 categories: banks, 
insurance companies, mutual fund advisors, brokerage firms, and conglomerates (or 
others) to manually construct the database. 
After identifying and grouping fund families and their product market of mutual 
funds based on their organization and ownership structure, adjusting for mergers, name 
                                                 
17 The Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum 13F Instituional Holding database labels their mutual fund 
companies based on their ownership structure to (1) banks, (2) insurance companies, (3) investment 
companies and their managers (mutual funds), (4) independent investment advisors (mostly brokerage 
firms), and (5) others (mostly pension funds and university endowments).  
18 The manual, which was formerly Moody’s Bank and Finance Manual, coverage of more than 3,000 
banks, savings and loans, mutual funds, insurance companies, real estate investment trusts, and 6,500 unit 
investment trusts and their subsidiaries 
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changes, and survivorship bias, we further break down mutual fund companies into two 
subgroups, public and private.  We use Global New Issues from the SDC Platinum 
Database to identify public fund companies and extract the specific IPO date.  We cross 
check with SEC filings, SIC code to verify whether their organizational structures are 
focused or diversified.  We label the fund companies as “Focus” if they operate as 
focused mutual fund companies.  An example would be T. Rowe Price Group, Inc.  We 
label the fund companies to be “Diversified (Non-Reg)” if those financial institutions or 
conglomerates operate multiple business lines beyond mutual fund operations and are 
exempt from Federal Reserve regulation.  An example for this group would be AIM 
Investment, a wholly owned subsidiary of AMVESCAP PLC, a non-bank public financial 
institution primarily based in London.  We label the fund companies as “Diversified 
(Reg)” if the financial institutions operates in banking and is subject to the Fed’s 
regulations.   An example for this group would be HSBC fund, an asset management arm 
of HSBC bank USA.   
For private fund companies, we check SEC filings (fund filing) to identify their 
management companies and their organization and ownership structures.  We cross check 
with Mergent Bank and Finance Manual and News Reports to further identify parent-
subsidiary and other business partnership relationships, if there is any, to establish their 
private status.  If information is available, we further verify organization structures 
through companies’ websites and examine their history to determine their status as public 
and private mutual fund companies.  To illustrate, if a fund operation is found within an 
asset management arm or a subsidiary of a public financial institution, it is classified in 
the category of public group.  If there is no relationship to a public firm, it is classified as 
a private fund complex.   
Based on firms’ revenue sources, we group each observation into one of five 
categories: banks, insurance companies, mutual fund companies, brokerage companies, 
and conglomerates (or others).  We label the fund companies to be “M” if they operate as 
focused mutual fund companies.  An example would be Fidelity Investments.  We label 
the fund companies to be “I” if those companies with main business lines as insurance 
companies.  An example would be MassMutual Fund, a subsidiary of Mass Mutual Life 
Insurance Co.  We label the fund companies to be “B” if those companies are operating 
with main business lines in banking.  An example for this group would be Country Fund, 
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a subsidiary of Country Trust Bank.  We label the fund companies to be “b” if those 
companies with main business lines in securities and brokerage services.  An example for 
this group would be Oberweis fund, an asset management arm of Oberweis Securities Inc. 
Finally, we label the fund companies to be “C” if those companies with multiple business 
lines and categorize as conglomerates.  An example for this group would be AFBA fund, 
a division within AFBA Corp.   
There is evidence that find fund performance and management efficiency (fees) 
are affected by board governance structures (board size and independence), as 
documented in Tufano and Sevick (1997); Meschke (2006); Del Guercio, Dann and 
Partch (2003); Tang and Kong (2006); Ding and Wermers (2006)).  Jiraporn, Kim, 
Davidson, and Singh (2006) document that firms where shareholder rights are more 
suppressed by restrictive corporate governance suffer deeper diversification discounts,  
Anderson, Bates, Bizjak, and Lemmon (1998) argue that board governance does not 
provide a complete explanation for the magnitude and persistence of the diversification 
discount.  To explain performance and operational efficiency among focused and 
diversified mutual fund companies, we manually collect board governance variables from 
fund prospectus (as Form 485 APOS and 485 BPOS (for both private and public fund 
companies and their funds)) as well as DEF 14A and related SEC filings for public fund 
companies).  We collect the “number of total directors”, “number of independent 
directors”, “number of interest directors”, “ratio of independent directors” and “interest 
chairman dummy (equals one if the chairman of board of director is an interest director)” 
as variables that measures quality of board governance.   
Equity ownership of insiders has been found to affect managers’ decisions on 
organization structure.  Servaes (1996), and Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997) document an 
inverse relationship between diversification and managerial ownership.  Insider 
ownership can be an effective device to mitigate information asymmetry (Jensen and 
Meckling (1976); Leland and Pyle (1977); McConnell and Servaes (1990); Anderson and 
Reeb (2003); Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2006); Khorana, Servaes and Wedge (2007)), 
but it can also allow managers to become entrenched (Jarrell and Poulson (1987); Stulz 
(1988); Slovin and Sushka (1993); Yafeh and Yosha (2003); DeAngelo and DeAngelo 
(1985); Shleifer and Vishny (1997)).  Equity concentration in the form of outside blocks 
and institutional investors have also been found to affect managerial decisions.  
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Monitoring hypothesis implies that outsiders monitor and reduce agency problems 
(Holderness and Sheehan (1985); Mikkelson and Ruback (1985); Demsetz (1986); 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986); Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988); Agarwal and Mandelker 
(1990); Barclay and Holderness (1991); Pagano and Roell (1998)) but such interference 
can also reduce managerial initiatives (McConnell and Servaes (1990); Burkart, Gromb 
and Panunzi (1997)).  Given this literature, we manually collect ownership data for both 
insiders and outside blocks and institutions through Def 14A of SEC filings.  We include 
variables such as “insider holdings” (total percentage of share outstanding owned by 
insiders as defined by the SEC), “insider blocks” (summation of total percentage shares 
of those insiders who hold more than 1% or above shares), and “outside blocks” 
(summation of total percentage shares of those outsiders who own 5% or above shares 
outstanding) to access how ownership deviates for both focused and diversified mutual 
fund companies.    
To access fund performance and operational efficiency, we collect fee-adjusted 
raw performance, portfolio turnover (%), expense ratio (%), total net assets19 (in million 
dollars), average total net assets20 (in million dollars), and manager tenure (in months) 
from the CRSP Mutual Fund Database.  We include both live funds and dead funds in the 
sample to mitigate survivorship bias.  Performance is measured in three ways; fee-
adjusted buy and hold return (FBHR), fee and market-adjusted buy and hold return 
(FMBHR, with S&P 500 index proxy for market index for equity funds and risk-free rate 
proxy for the market index for bond funds), and the Sharpe ratio.  For robustness, we 
include three and four-factor model for calculating alphas.  We conduct difference tests 
for means (t-test) and medians (Wilcoxon sign-rank test) for the following variables: fee-
adjusted buy and hold returns (FBHR) and fee and market-adjusted buy and hold returns 
(FMBHR), Sharpe ratio, portfolio turnover, expense ratio, total net asset, manager tenure, 
and average total net asset (weighted average for multiple share class).   
To identify how differences in organizational structure affect fund performance 
and operation efficiency, we perform univariate analysis for means (t-test) and medians 
(Wilcoxon sign-rank test) for fee-adjusted buy and hold returns (FBHR) and fee and 
                                                 
19 The total net asset reports in the CRSP database is the total assets net of liability which is different from 
the total asset under management (AUM) that media reports.  
20 Total net asset sums all share classes within funds while average total net asset is a weighted average 
number of multiple share classes offered within the fund. 
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market-adjusted buy and hold returns (FMBHR), Sharpe ratio, portfolio turnover, 
expense ratio, total net asset, manager tenure, and average total net asset (weighted 
average for multiple share class).  For multivariate analysis, we use Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) Regression, Pooled Regression, Panel Regression, and Probit Regression to 
investigate differences between focused versus diversified fund complexes with respect to 
which factors contribute to fund performance and operational efficiency with respect to 
insider and outsider (blocks and institution) ownership, fund governance, and other fund 
characteristics control variables.   
To analyze the impact of focused versus diversified fund complexes with respect 
to their performance and operational efficiency surrounding their initial public offerings, 
we construct a sample for January 1961 to December 2005 of all U.S. registered 
investment companies which filed an initial public offering during this time frame.  We 
record the year that fund complexes go public and analyze their product market for up to 
five-year priors to the year of IPO to up to five-years after the IPO to examine the fund 
performance and operational efficiency of these companies surrounding their IPOs.   
We conduct difference tests for means (t-test) and medians (Wilcoxon sign-rank 
test) for the following variables: fee-adjusted buy and hold returns (FBHR) and fee and 
market-adjusted buy and hold returns (FMBHR), Sharpe ratio, portfolio turnover, 
expense ratio, total net asset, manager tenure, and average total net asset (weighted 
average for multiple share class).  We also perform an event study to test our hypothesis 
as to whether performance deteriorates after an IPO as Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) 
document or performance improves as Stoughton, Wong and Zechner (2001) predict.  We 
also analyze fund characteristics and operational efficiency to determine whether there 
are significant differences between event windows prior to and after the IPO of mutual 
fund companies.  We use Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regression, Pooled Regression, 
Panel Regression, and Probit Regression in the multivariate analysis for investigating the 
differences between focused versus diversified fund complexes on what factors contribute 
to those differences to their fund performance and operation efficiency surrounding their 






CHAPTER 4 EMPIRICAL TEST AND RESULTS 
4.1 Univariate Analysis 
Table 4.1 Panel A reports numbers of mutual fund companies and ownership 
structure for both public and private mutual fund companies, as well as levels of focus 
(diversified) for their asset management business.  The number of firms in this panel is 
reported on an annual basis during 2001 to 2005.  Among public mutual fund companies, 
our final sample contains 26 focused fund companies, 49 non-Fed regulated financial 
institutions or conglomerates involving mutual fund operations, and 32 Fed-regulated 
financial institutions managing mutual fund portfolios on an annual basis for the five-year 
intervals.  Among private mutual fund companies, our sample summarizes 431 focused 
fund companies, 10 insurance companies, 19 banks, 3 brokerages, and 3 conglomerates 
that engage in mutual fund operations on an annual basis for the five-year intervals.   
Table 4.1 Panel B reports fund performance and fund characteristics from the 
product market level of those public and private mutual fund companies.  All data 
reported in the sample contain both live and dead funds so the data are free of 
survivorship bias. Funds with public mutual fund companies entail a total of 4,921 open-
end mutual funds from a one-year (year 2005) interval, a total of 2,771 open-end mutual 
funds from a three-year (from 2003 to 2005) interval, and 1,196 open-end mutual funds in 
a five-year (from 2001 to 2005) interval.  Funds under private mutual fund companies 
contain 4,553 open-end mutual funds for a one-year (year 2005) interval, 2,761 open-end 
mutual for a three-year (from 2003 to 2005) interval, and 1,416 open-end mutual funds 
for a five-year (from 2001 to 2005) interval.   
Table 4.1 panel B reports mean, median, maximum, and minimum for fund 
performance and fund characteristics (operation efficiency) with respect to whether the 
funds are managed within public or private mutual fund companies during the sample 
period of January 2001 to December 2005.  Performance is measured in terms of fee-
adjusted buy and hold return (FBHR), fee and market-adjusted buy and hold return 
(FMBHR), and the Sharpe ratio. Considering funds across different organization structure 
with different levels of focus (diversification) of their managing companies, funds 
managed under private fund companies generate higher return in both mean and median 




Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for Public versus Private Mutual Fund Companies  
This table reports descriptive statistics for both firm level and fund level.  Data source is from merging 
CRSP Survivor-Bias Free US Mutual Fund Database, Morningstar Principia, SDC Platinum Database, 
Investment Company Fact Book, and manually cross check with SEC filing.  Panel A (firm level) reports 
number of firms in each of the category of mutual fund company per year during Jan 2001 to Dec 2005.  
Panel B (fund level) reports fund performance and fund characteristics for all open-end mutual funds under 
which are managed in the categories of “public” (public) mutual fund companies or “private” (private) 
mutual fund companies.  Performance is measured in three ways; fee-adjusted buy and hold return (FBHR), 
fee and market-adjusted buy and hold return (FMBHR, with S&P 500 index for equity funds and risk-free 
rate for bond funds), and the Sharpe ratio.  Fund characteristics are measured in portfolio turnover (%); 
expense ratio (%); total net assets21 (in million dollars); manager tenures (in months) and average total net 
assets22 (in million dollars).  Fund level data is reported in the frequency of 1-year (short-term, year 2005), 
3-year (mid-term, year 2003 to year 2005) and 5-year (long-term, year 2001 to year 2005) while both live 
funds and dead funds are included in the sample.  An example for “1” would be T. Rowe Price Group, Inc.; 
a “2” would be AIM Investment, a wholly owned subsidiary of AMVESCAP PLC based in London; a “3” 
would be HSBC fund, an asset management arm of HSBC bank USA; an “M” would be Fidelity 
Investment; an “I” would be MassMutual Fund, a subsidiary of Mass Mutual Life Insurance Co.; a “B” 
would be Country fund, a subsidiary of Country Trust Bank, a “b” would be Oberweis fund, an asset 
management arm of Oberweis Securities Inc.; a “C” would be AFBA fund, a division within AFBA Corp.   
 
  Panel A：Firm Level 
Total number of firms (N) Public Private Total 
Public companies    
Mutual fund companies are public and 
focused companies themselves (1) 26   
Mutual fund companies are wholly-owned 
(affiliated) subsidiaries or asset management 
arms of non fed-regulated public financial 
institutions or conglomerates (2) 49   
Mutual fund companies are wholly-owned 
(affiliated) subsidiaries or asset management 
arms of Fed-regulated public financial 
institutions (3) 32   
Private companies    
Focused mutual fund companies (M)  431  
Mutual fund companies are insurance 
companies (I)  10  
Mutual fund companies are banks (B)  19  
Mutual fund companies are brokerages (b)  3  
Mutual fund companies are conglomerates 
(C)   3   
Total  107 466 573 
table continued 
    
           
 
 
                                                 
21 The total net asset reports in the CRSP database is the total assets net of liability.  Consequently, this is 
different from the total asset under management (AUM) that general consensus reports.  
22 Total net asset sums all share classes within funds while average total net asset is a weighted average 
number of multiple share classes offered within the fund.  
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         Panel B：Fund Level 
 1-year 3-year 5-year 
Mean Private Public Private Public Private Public 
Performance (FBHR, %) 8.92 8.18 36.40 30.94 25.39 22.98 
Performance (FMBRH, %) 3.74 3.28 17.22 14.10 25.28 19.37 
Sharpe ratio 0.00 -0.07 0.01 -0.12 -0.05 -0.30 
Portfolio turnover (%) 89.37 74.30 99.96 76.89 92.88 67.93 
Expense ratio (%) 1.13 1.08 1.15 1.08 1.11 1.06 
Total net assets ($mn) 859.86 794.08 1,161.70 947.62 1,663.76 1,275.62 
Manager tenure (months) 71.00 67.75 77.49 71.57 80.73 76.02 
Average total net assets ($mn) 455.00 342.09 613.54 425.55 945.91 557.75 
Number of funds (N) 4,553 4,921 2,761 2,771 1,416 1,196 
    
 1-year 3-year 5-year 
Median Private Public Private Public Private Public 
Performance (FBHR, %) 5.09 4.49 25.32 16.57 22.28 19.71 
Performance (FMBRH, %) 1.75 1.14 8.63 7.56 16.01 13.58 
Sharpe ratio 0.11 0.10 0.25 0.22 0.14 0.13 
Portfolio turnover (%) 46.00 43.00 51.33 45.33 52.17 36.80 
Expense ratio (%) 1.07 1.02 1.08 1.02 1.02 1.00 
Total net assets ($mn) 137.50 208.70 166.57 283.80 217.67 355.07 
Manager tenure (months) 62.50 59.00 67.00 63.00 71.00 70.00 
Average total net assets ($mn) 71.10 81.40 94.40 118.57 132.33 157.41 
Number of funds (N) 4,553 4,921 2,761 2,771 1,416 1,196 
    
 1-year 3-year 5-year 
Maximum Private Public Private Public Private Public 
Performance (FBHR, %) 52.22 48.28 172.11 152.49 191.05 156.46 
Performance (FMBRH, %) 37.58 32.39 132.80 116.31 196.50 162.63 
Sharpe ratio 0.83 0.85 0.68 0.71 0.45 0.47 
Portfolio turnover (%) 1,005.00 590.00 1,501.00 603.00 1,206.00 633.60 
Expense ratio (%) 3.17 2.56 3.40 2.61 3.61 2.56 
Total net assets ($mn) 16,603.50 11,923.70 24,327.20 12,646.53 30,264.99 18,452.97 
Manager tenure (months) 244.00 204.00 255.00 204.00 265.00 199.00 
Average total net assets ($mn) 8,779.20 5,518.70 12,430.87 6,118.50 17,711.77 7,412.74 
Number of funds (N) 4,553 4,921 2,761 2,771 1,416 1,196 
    
 1-year 3-year 5-year 
Minimum Private Public Private Public Private Public 
Performance (FBHR, %) -22.11 -12.60 -42.65 -34.14 -68.18 -40.81 
Performance (FMBRH, %) -12.83 -10.72 -34.89 -24.03 -58.51 -34.02 
Sharpe ratio -3.71 -3.64 -4.85 -4.89 -4.19 -5.32 
Portfolio turnover (%) 0.00 0.00 0.95 0.00 1.31 0.00 
Expense ratio (%) 0.09 0.15 0.13 0.18 0.08 0.18 
Total net assets ($mn) 0.64 0.40 1.73 6.47 1.95 12.55 
Manager tenure (months) 3.00 3.00 12.00 13.20 14.40 17.40 
Average total net assets ($mn) 0.40 0.20 1.31 3.17 1.44 7.37 




Fund characteristics (operation efficiency) are measured in portfolio turnover (%), 
expense ratio (%), total net assets (in million dollars), manager tenures (in months), and 
average total net assets (in million dollars) respectively.  Both means and medians 
measures are reported in the descriptive statistics.  Funds managed under public fund 
companies have lower expense ratios, lower portfolio turnover, and lower manager tenure 
compared to funds managed under private fund companies.  All fund level data are 
reported in frequencies of one year (short-term), three years (mid-term) and five years 
(long-term).  Again, both live funds and dead funds are included in the sample. 
Table 4.2 reports descriptive statistics, means and medians for board governance 
(in Panel A) and ownership (in Panel B) variables for public mutual fund companies in 
years 2000, 2002, and 2004.  In Panel A, we observe that the number of total directors 
decreases while the ratio of independent directors increases across all focused and 
diversified public mutual fund companies for the years 2000 to 2004.  Considering the 
focused fund companies, for example, the mean (median) of number of total directors is 
9.95 (10) in 2000.  This number decreases to 9.55 (9.5) in 2002 and 9.15 (9) in 2004.  For 
conglomerate or non-Fed regulated diversified mutual fund companies, the mean (median) 
of number of total directors is of 14 (14) in 2000.  The number falls to 13.38 (13) in 2002 
and 12.85 (12.50) in 2004.  On the other hand, the mean (median) for the ratio of 
directors that are independent increases from 0.55 (0.63) in 2000 to 0.59 (0.61) in 2002 
and 0.67 (0.69) in 2004 for the focused mutual fund companies, while the ratio stays 
relatively stable around 0.75 to 0.80 for conglomerates and diversified Fed-regulated 
mutual fund companies.  Ownership variables in Panel B indicate that focused mutual 
fund companies show a steady increase in insider ownership and insider block holding 
throughout the period 2000 to 2004.  Five percent outside block data for focused mutual 
fund companies shares much larger ownership than conglomerates and diversified non-
Fed and Fed-regulated mutual fund companies, but this number remains relatively stable 
across years. Given the debates as to whether diversification destroys value (Lang and 
Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Servaes (1996), and Lamont and Polk (2002)) or 
create value (Stein (1997), and Desai, Foley and Hines (2004)), test whether funds 
managed by focused mutual fund companies perform better and have better operational 




Table 4.3 reports test results for differences in means and medians from the 
product market of public mutual fund companies by pairing focused and diversified 
mutual fund companies with respect to fund performance and fund characteristics 
(operating efficiency, defined earlier, measured in terms of portfolio turnover, expense 
ratio, total net assets, and manager tenure) to analyze whether focus versus diversification 
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics for Board Governance and Ownership among  
                  Public Mutual Fund Companies 
This table reports summary statistics (mean and median) of board governance (in panel A) and ownership 
(in panel B) in each of the category of the public mutual fund companies in the year of 2004, 2002, and 
2000 respectively.  Panel A measures board governance variables in terms of number of total directors 
(board size), number of independent directors, number of dependent directors, and the ratio of independent 
directors (board independency) to access the sound of board governance.  Data source for Panel A is from 
SEC filing 485 APOS form.  Panel B measures ownership variables in three different ways. Insider holding 
measures percentage of shares outstanding controlled by insiders (defined by SEC filing DEF 14A).  Sum 
of 1% above inside blocks measures total percentage of shares outstanding controlled by inside block-
holders who own at least 1% of shares outstanding.  Sum of 5% above outside blocks measures total 
percentage of shares outstanding controlled by outside block-holders who own at least 5% of shares 
outstanding.  Data source is for Panel B is from SEC filing DEF 14A.  “Focus” stands for mutual fund 
companies are “public” and “focused” companies”.  “Diversified (Non-Reg)” stands for mutual fund 
companies are wholly-owned subsidiaries or asset management arms (divisions) of non-Fed regulated 
public financial institutions or conglomerates. “Diversified (Reg)” stands for mutual fund companies are 
mutual fund companies are wholly-owned (affiliated) subsidiaries or asset management arms of Fed-
regulated public financial institutions.   
 
  Panel A：Board Characteristics  
  2004 
Types of fund complexes Focus Diversified (Non-Reg) Diversified (Reg) 
Descriptive statistics  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Number of total directors 9.15 9.00 12.85 12.50 14.97 15.00
Number of independent directors 6.00 5.50 9.26 9.00 11.19 11.50
Number of dependent directors 3.19 2.50 3.59 2.00 3.78 3.00
Ratio of independent directors  0.67 0.69 0.74 0.78 0.76 0.79
  2002 
Types of fund complexes Focus Diversified (Non-Reg) Diversified (Reg) 
Descriptive statistics  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Number of total directors 9.55 9.50 13.38 13.00 15.68 16.00
Number of independent directors 5.32 5.00 9.19 9.00 12.03 12.00
Number of dependent directors 4.27 3.50 4.24 3.00 3.65 3.00
Ratio of independent directors  0.59 0.61 0.72 0.74 0.76 0.80
  2000 
Types of fund complexes Focus Diversified (Non-Reg) Diversified (Reg) 
Descriptive statistics  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Number of total directors 9.95 10.00 14.00 14.00 16.03 17.00
Number of independent directors 5.33 5.00 9.81 10.00 12.69 14.00
Number of dependent directors 4.67 4.00 4.28 3.00 3.34 3.00





Panel B：Ownership  
  2004 
Types of fund complexes Focus Diversified (Non-Reg) Diversified (Reg) 
Descriptive statistics  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Insider holding 0.20 0.14 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.01
Sum of 1% above inside blocks 0.16 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01
Sum of 5% above outside blocks 0.26 0.15 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.06
  2002 
Types of fund complexes Focus Diversified (Non-Reg) Diversified (Reg) 
Descriptive statistics  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Insider holding 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.02
Sum of 1% above inside blocks 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01
Sum of 5% above outside blocks 0.26 0.15 0.15 0.09 0.07 0.07
  2000 
Types of fund complexes Focus Diversified (Non-Reg) Diversified (Reg) 
Descriptive statistics  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Insider holding 0.15 0.13 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.02
Sum of 1% above inside blocks 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01
Sum of 5% above outside blocks 0.29 0.17 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.07
 
of fund companies affects product market performance and operational efficiency.  Panel 
A1 and A2 pair focused and diversified (non-Fed regulated mutual fund companies or 
financial conglomerates) for equity funds (Panel A1) and domestic equity funds (Panel 
A2).  In Panel A1, the differences for fee-adjusted buy and hold returns, fee and market-
adjusted buy and hold returns, and the Sharpe ratio are all statistically significant at the 
1% level between focused and diversified (non-Fed regulated mutual fund companies or 
financial conglomerates) mutual fund companies, whether measured across one, three, 
and five year intervals.  Funds managed under focused mutual fund companies 
outperform diversified (non-Fed regulated mutual fund companies or financial 
conglomerates) ones by approximately 200 basis point for a one-year interval (year 2005), 
600 basis point for a three-year interval (years 2003 to 2005), and 1,000 basis point for a 
five-year interval (years 2001 to 2005) using fee-adjusted buy and hold returns and fee 
and market-adjusted buy and hold returns.  The Shape ratio also reveals that funds under 
focused fund companies outperform the diversified ones by a range of 0.03 to 0.08 
throughout the three different time interval measures. In Panel A2, differences in fee-
adjusted buy and hold returns, fee and market-adjusted buy and hold returns, and the 
Sharpe ratio are all statistically significant at the 5% level or better for focused versus 
diversified (non-Fed regulated mutual fund companies or financial conglomerates) 
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mutual fund companies across one, three, and five years interval.  The results indicate 
that funds managed under focused mutual fund companies outperform those in the 
diversified (non-Fed regulated mutual fund companies or financial conglomerates) ones 
by an economically meaningful amount. For the fund characteristics (operational 
efficiency) measured in Panel A1 and A2, funds managed under focused mutual fund 
companies demonstrate lower portfolio turnover, lower expense ratio, higher manager 
tenure, and higher total net asset (average total net asset) when compared with funds 
managed under diversified (non-Fed regulated mutual fund companies or financial 
conglomerates) ones.  For example, the expense ratio shows that a fund managed under a 
focused fund company posts an 8 basis point lower expense ratio than a diversified (non-
Fed regulated mutual fund companies or financial conglomerates) rival for a one-year 
interval and 15 basis point lower over a three-year time frame.     
Panels B1 and B2 report test results for differences in means and medians for fund 
performance and fund characteristics (operation efficiency) for focused and diversified 
(Fed-regulated financial institutions that also manage mutual funds) mutual fund 
companies.  Differences between fee-adjusted buy and hold returns, fee and market-
adjusted buy and hold returns, and the Sharpe ratio of funds managed between focused 
and diversified (non-Fed regulated mutual fund companies or financial conglomerates) 
mutual fund companies are also statistically significant across one, three, and five-year 
intervals.  Funds managed under focused mutual fund companies outperform those 
diversified (Fed-regulated financial institutions that also manage mutual funds) ones by 
more than 100 basis points at a one-year interval (year 2005), 800 basis points at a three-
year interval (year 2003 to 2005), and 1,000 basis points at a five-year interval (year 2001 
to 2005), using fee-adjusted buy and hold returns and fee and market-adjusted buy and 
hold returns as a measure.  The Shape ratio also indicates that funds under focused fund 
companies outperform diversified ones by a range of 0.02 to 0.08 throughout the three 
different time frames.  
For the fund characteristics (operational efficiency) reported in Panel B1 and B2, 
it is clear that funds managed under focused mutual fund companies consistently 
demonstrate lower portfolio turnover, higher manager tenure, and higher total net assets 
(average total net assets) than diversified (Fed-regulated financial institutions that also 
manage mutual funds) ones.  However, the expense ratio, previously documented as 
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being lower in funds managed under focused mutual fund companies is higher when 
compared to Fed-regulated diversified financial institutions that also manage mutual 
funds.  Thus, operational efficiency is higher for funds managed under focused mutual 
fund companies than diversified (non-Fed regulated mutual fund companies or financial 
conglomerates) ones, a banking structure apparently enhances efficiency for mutual fund 
activities.  
With respect to the last point about the difference generating by bank related 
mutual fund companies, we test differences in means and medians for fund performance 
and fund characteristics (operational efficiency) in Panel C1 and C2.  Not surprising, most 
Table 4.3: Test among Public Mutual Fund Companies 
This table reports test statistics for differences in means and medians of performance and fund 
characteristics for equity funds and domestic equity funds for the public mutual fund companies.  Sample 
ranges from Jan 2001 to Dec 2005 and reports in the frequency of 1-year (year 2005), 3-year (year 2003 to 
year 2005) and 5-year (year 2001 to year 2005) while both live funds and dead funds are included in the 
sample.  Results are winsorized to 98%.  “Focus” stands for mutual fund companies are “public” and 
“focus” companies”.  “Diversified (Non-Reg)” stands for mutual fund companies are wholly-owned 
subsidiaries or asset management arms (divisions) of non-Fed regulated public financial institutions or 
conglomerates. “Diversified (Reg)” stands for mutual fund companies are mutual fund companies are 
wholly-owned (affiliated) subsidiaries or asset management arms of Fed-regulated public financial 
institutions.  Performance is measured in three ways; fee-adjusted buy and hold return (FBHR); fee and 
market-adjusted return (FMBHR), and the Sharpe ratio. Fund characteristics are measured in portfolio 
turnover (%); expense ratio (%); total net assets (in million dollars); manager tenures (in months) and 
average total net assets (in million dollars).  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
level respectively. 
 
Panel A1  
“Focus” subtracts 
“Diversified (Non-Reg)” 1-year 3-year 5-year 
Equity Funds Mean Median Mean Median Mean  Median  
Performance (FBHR, %) 2.10 *** 1.93 *** 17.20 *** 6.25 *** 16.96 *** 10.34 ***
Performance (FMBHR, %) 2.95 *** 1.99 *** 9.47 *** 6.53 *** 16.34 *** 12.03 ***
Sharpe ratio 0.04 *** 0.04 *** 0.08 *** 0.04 *** 0.03 *** 0.05 ***
Portfolio turnover (%) 0.58  -6.64  -10.12 ** -15.67 *** -4.50  -20.57 ** 
Expense ratio (%) -0.08 ** -0.09 *** -0.15 *** -0.18 *** -0.03  -0.11  
Total net assets ($mn) 596.53 *** 126.30 *** 408.59 *** 48.70  216.87  6.59  
Manager tenure (months) 4.59 ** 0.86 ** 5.49 ** 0.00 * 8.58 ** 3.56 ** 
Average total net assets ($mn) 309.57 *** 37.98 *** 318.01 *** 24.83 ** 293.31 *** 40.39   










Panel A2  
“Focus” subtracts 
“Diversified (Non-Reg)” 1-year 3-year 5-year 
Domestic Equity Funds Mean Median Mean Median Mean  Median  
Performance (FBHR, %) 1.11 ** 1.79 *** 15.56 *** 7.26 *** 17.44 ** 10.91 ***
Performance (FMBHR, %) 2.56 *** 1.92 *** 8.26 *** 5.92 *** 16.99 ** 11.28 ***
Sharpe ratio 0.03 ** 0.04 *** 0.08 *** 0.05 *** 0.03 ** 0.03 ** 
Portfolio turnover (%) -2.18  -10.60  -9.87  -16.97 *** -4.87  -16.87 ** 
Expense ratio (%) -0.08 ** -0.10 ** -0.14 *** -0.15 *** -0.10 ** -0.15 ** 
Total net assets ($mn) 633.04 *** 167.85 *** 311.72 * 36.85  -72.59  9.20  
Manager tenure (months) 6.55 *** 4.43 *** 6.72 ** 2.23 ** 12.08 *** 11.08 ***
Average total net assets ($mn) 328.61 *** 47.14 *** 312.09 *** 21.70   287.39 ** 39.58   






Panel B1  
“Focus” subtracts 
“Diversified (Reg)” 1-year 3-year 5-year 
Equity Funds Mean Median Mean Median Mean  Median  
Performance (FBHR, %) 1.84 *** 1.79 *** 19.57 *** 14.60 *** 14.83 *** 11.67 ***
Performance (FMBHR, %) 2.63 *** 2.16 *** 10.82 *** 8.83 *** 13.51 ** 11.45 ***
Sharpe ratio 0.02 ** 0.03 ** 0.07 *** 0.06 *** 0.04 *** 0.04 ***
Portfolio turnover (%) -0.53  -4.00  -3.20  -8.02  -9.09  -8.57  
Expense ratio (%) 0.12 *** 0.12 *** 0.12 *** 0.07 *** 0.03  -0.16  
Total net assets ($mn) 601.95 *** 104.10 *** 633.66 *** 69.30 *** 853.72 *** 125.87 ** 
Manager tenure (months) 6.86 *** 4.86 *** 9.64 *** 7.00 *** 13.77 *** 10.50 ***
Average total net assets ($mn) 272.22 *** 31.71 *** 330.01 *** 27.62 *** 402.13 *** 61.31 ***






Panel B2  
“Focus” subtracts 
“Diversified (Reg)” 1-year 3-year 5-year 
Domestic Equity Funds Mean Median Mean Median Mean  Median  
Performance (FBHR, %) 1.04 * 1.47 *** 17.51 *** 14.92 *** 11.81 ** 12.52 ***
Performance (FMBHR, %) 1.93 *** 1.61 *** 8.28 *** 9.23 *** 9.86 ** 10.79 ***
Sharpe ratio 0.01 * 0.04 ** 0.08 *** 0.07 *** 0.04 *** 0.04 ***
Portfolio turnover (%) 0.43  -7.13  -0.56  -12.22  -9.57  -12.35 * 
Expense ratio (%) 0.09 *** 0.07 *** 0.10 *** 0.05 ** -0.03  -0.17  
Total net assets ($mn) 631.34 *** 137.65 *** 579.33 *** 56.40 ** 703.67 *** 143.34  
Manager tenure (months) 7.36 *** 7.43 *** 8.42 *** 4.96 *** 14.28 *** 13.46 ***
Average total net assets ($mn) 281.94 *** 36.11 *** 310.64 *** 23.39 ** 354.90 *** 58.00 ** 











Panel C1  
“Diversified (Non-Reg)” 
subtracts “Diversified (Reg)” 1-year 3-year 5-year 
Equity Funds Mean Median Mean Median Mean  Median  
Performance (FBHR, %) -0.26  -0.14  2.37  8.35  -2.12  1.34  
Performance (FMBHR, %) -0.33  0.17  1.35  2.29  -2.83  -0.58  
Sharpe ratio -0.02  -0.01  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.00  
Portfolio turnover (%) -1.11  2.64  6.92  7.65 *** -4.59  12.00  
Expense ratio (%) 0.20 *** 0.22 *** 0.27 *** 0.25 *** 0.06  -0.05  
Total net assets ($mn) 5.42  -22.20  225.07 ** 20.60 ** 636.85 ** 119.27 ** 
Manager tenure (months) 2.27  4.00  4.15 * 7.00 * 5.19  6.94  
Average total net assets ($mn) -37.34 ** -6.27   12.00   2.78   108.82   20.92   






Panel C2  
“Diversified (Non-Reg)” 
subtracts “Diversified (Reg)” 1-year 3-year 5-year 
Domestic Equity Funds Mean Median Mean Median Mean  Median  
Performance (FBHR, %) -0.08  -0.32  1.95  7.65  -5.63  1.61  
Performance (FMBHR, %) -0.63 * -0.30  0.02  3.30  -7.13  -0.49  
Sharpe ratio -0.02 * 0.00  0.00  0.02  0.01  0.01  
Portfolio turnover (%) 2.62  3.47  9.31 * 4.74 ** -4.70  4.52  
Expense ratio (%) 0.17 *** 0.17 *** 0.24 *** 0.21 *** 0.07  -0.02  
Total net assets ($mn) -1.71  -30.20  267.60 ** 19.55 * 776.26 ** 134.14 ** 
Manager tenure (months) 0.80  3.00  1.70  2.72  2.21  2.38  
Average total net assets ($mn) -46.67 *** -11.03   -1.44   1.69   67.51   18.43   






of the differences in performance measures and characteristics for funds managed 
between Fed-regulated or Non-Fed regulated companies do not have significant 
difference. 
Table 4.4 reports test results for differences in means and medians for the product 
market of private mutual fund companies by pairing focused and diversified mutual fund 
companies with respect to their fund performance and fund characteristics (operating 
efficiency, as defined earlier as measured in portfolio turnover, expense ratio, total net 
assets, and manager tenure) to examine whether the results reported earlier for the 
outperformance and better operational efficiency of funds managed under public focused 
mutual fund companies also apply to funds managed under private mutual fund 




Table 4.4: Test among Private Mutual Fund Companies 
This table reports test statistics for differences in mean and median of performance and fund characteristics 
among “focus” and “diversified” fund complexes among private mutual fund companies.  Panel A reports 
the results for equity funds while panel B reports the results for domestic equity funds.  Sample ranges from 
Jan 2001 to Dec 2005 and reports in the frequency of 1-year (year 2005), 3-year (year 2003 to year 2005) 
and 5-year (year 2001 to year 2005) while both live funds and dead funds are included in the sample.  
Results are winsorized to 98%.  Among the “focus” fund complexes, “M” stands for “focused” and 
“private” mutual fund companies.  Among the “diversified” fund complexes, “B” stands for private banks 
that offer mutual fund products. “C” stands for private conglomerates that offer mutual fund products. “I” 
stands for private insurance companies that offer mutual fund products. “b” stands for private brokerages 
that offer mutual fund products.  Performance is measured in three ways; fee-adjusted buy and hold return 
(FBHR); fee and market-adjusted return (FMBHR), and the Sharpe ratio. Fund characteristics are measured 
in portfolio turnover (%); expense ratio (%); total net assets (in million dollars); manager tenures (in 
months) and average total net assets (in million dollars).  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 
10 percent level respectively. 
 
Panel A  
“Focus” (M) subtracts 
“Diversified”( B+C+b+I)  1-year 3-year 5-year 
Equity Funds Mean Median Mean Median  Mean Median  
Performance (FBHR, %) -1.90 *** -1.25 *** 21.54 *** 20.74 *** 5.24  2.84  
Performance (FMBHR, %) 1.09 *** 1.09 *** 9.76 *** 10.94 *** 3.09  1.18  
Sharpe ratio -0.06 *** -0.04 *** 0.08 *** 0.10 *** 0.02  0.01  
Portfolio turnover (%) 27.73 *** -4.30  42.21 *** -2.22  28.21 ** -8.12  
Expense ratio (%) -0.09 *** -0.11 *** -0.06  -0.03  0.00  0.04  
Total net assets ($mn) 697.83 *** -0.55  1035.83 *** 31.84 * 1342.88 *** 72.68  
Manager tenure (months) 15.71 *** 19.00 *** 10.21 *** 8.00 *** 8.91  8.13 * 
Average total net assets ($mn) 398.72 *** 21.21 *** 520.85 *** 29.38 ** 786.99 *** 25.68   
Number of funds Focus =2,503;  Diversified =484 
Focus =1,548;  
Diversified =177 
Focus =786;  
Diversified =75 
 
Panel B  
“Focus” (M) subtracts 
“Diversified” ( B+C+b+I)  1-year 3-year 5-year 
Domestic Equity Fund Mean Median Mean Median  Mean  Median  
Performance (FBHR, %) -2.54 *** -1.06 *** 17.05 *** 17.78 *** 7.09  5.14  
Performance (FMBHR, %) 0.66 * 1.02 ** 6.91 *** 8.07 *** 4.62  3.67  
Sharpe ratio -0.07 *** -0.04 *** 0.05 *** 0.08 *** 0.03 ** 0.02 * 
Portfolio turnover (%) 41.88 *** 1.76  63.66 *** 4.00  45.04 *** -5.78  
Expense ratio (%) -0.04  -0.06 ** -0.01  -0.01  0.03  0.02  
Total net assets ($mn) 638.49 *** -12.65  1112.19 *** 28.84  1386.32 *** 64.83  
Manager tenure (months) 14.20 *** 17.00 *** 9.36 ** 4.89 ** 8.06  10.33  
Average total net assets ($mn) 383.04 *** 16.13 *** 591.43 *** 26.28 ** 909.13 *** 33.84   
Average total net assets ($mn) Focus =2,102;  Diversified =397 
Focus =1,277;  
Diversified =149 
Focus =647;  
Diversified =62 
 
Panels A and Panel B pair funds managed by focused (mutual fund advisors) and 
diversified (pooling banks, brokerage firms, insurance companies and conglomerates 
together in private mutual fund companies) for equity funds (Panel A) and domestic 
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equity funds (Panel B).23  In both Panel A and Panel B, fee and market-adjusted buy and 
hold returns indicate that funds managed under focused mutual fund companies 
outperform those managed under diversified fund companies at one (year 2005) and 
three-year (year 2003 to 2005) time frames for private mutual fund companies.  However, 
the statistical significant level decreases at the five-year (year 2001 to 2005) measurement 
although the coefficient remains positive.  However, for the one-year performance 
measure of fee-adjusted buy and hold returns and the Sharpe Ratio, funds managed under 
focused mutual fund companies perform more poorly relative to diversified ones, a result 
which contradicts the findings presented earlier.  One possibility is the size factor.  We 
will further control for size and other fund characteristics when we analyze performance 
using multivariate regression.    
When we analyze fund characteristics (operational efficiency) for funds managed 
under private fund companies, we find both similar and different results relative to the 
results for public mutual fund companies.  The expense ratio is generally lower for funds 
managed under focused fund companies.  However, the significance level is weaker than 
for public mutual fund companies.  Manager tenure and total net assets (average total net 
assets) for funds managed under focused fund companies are also higher than diversified 
ones.  Unlike public fund companies, focused funds in the private fund companies report 
higher portfolio turnover, which suggests managers’ portfolio strategies are different 
among focused and diversified fund companies in those private groups.  However, the 
differences are significant only for tests of differences in means. Again, we will control 
for fund size and return to this point in the multivariate regression.     
Given that some governance literature argues that fund performance and 
management efficiency (expense ratio) are associated with the size and independency of 
the board (Tufano and Sevick (1997), Meschke (2006), Del Guercio, Dann and Partch 
(2003), Tang and Kong (2006), and Ding and Wermers (2006)), we expect the empirical 
tests to find evidence that focused mutual fund companies adopt smaller board size and 
greater independence of board members relative to diversified fund companies.   
Table 4.5 reports test results for differences in means and medians of public 
mutual fund companies by pairing focused and diversified mutual fund companies with 
                                                 
23 We have also tested funds performance and fund characteristics (operation efficiency) at each of the four 
diversified private fund companies respectively and find similar results.  For increasing the sample size and 
statistic power, we pool funds under four diversified fund companies all together.  
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respect to their firm level governance structure, measuring the number of total directors 
(board size), number of independent directors, and ratio of directors that are independent 
(board independency).  Panel A shows that focused fund companies adopt smaller boards, 
a smaller number of independent directors, and a lower percentage of independent 
directors compared to diversified (non-Fed regulated mutual fund companies or financial 
conglomerates) mutual fund companies.  Panel B shows that the results are consistent 
with Panel A.  Focused fund companies adopt smaller boards, a smaller number of 
independent directors, and a lower percentage of independent directors compared to 
diversified (Fed-regulated financial institutions that also manage mutual funds) mutual 
fund companies.  Panel C compares diversified mutual fund companies that face different 
regulatory constraints.  Non-Fed regulated mutual fund companies or financial 
conglomerates adopt smaller directors, and a smaller number of independent directors, 
but the difference in the percentage of independent directors is not significant.   
The results show that throughout three different observation periods, focused 
mutual fund companies have fewer directors when they are compared to Non-Fed 
regulated mutual fund companies, with a lower bound for the difference of 3.50 to an 
upper bound of 4.05.  This number increases to a lower bound of 5.81 and upper bound of 
7 fewer directors when compared to Fed-regulated mutual fund companies.  The figures 
are statistically significant at the 1% level across for the three different time frames of 
examination.  The board governance variables provide evidence that smaller boards 
function better at monitoring than larger boards.  This conclusion applies to focused fund 
groups.  Although focused mutual fund companies have smaller boards of directors, they 
also have a lower percentage of independent directors, which indicates poorer monitory.  
We conclude that board governance structure does not provide a full explanation for the 
differences in performance and operating efficiency that pervade focused and diversified 
mutual fund companies.   
Next, we test differences between inside and outside ownership at focused versus 
diversified mutual fund companies, expecting higher insider ownership for focused fund 
companies and lower insider ownership for diversified mutual fund companies.  With 





Table 4.5: Test for Governance at Firm Levels for Public Mutual Fund Companies 
This table reports test statistics for differences in mean and median of board governance in each of the 
category of the public mutual fund companies in the year of 2000, 2002, and 2004.  Governance data is 
collected from the end of that year from SEC filing 485 APOS form.  Since performance and fund 
characteristics are measured in the frequency of 1-year (year 2005), 3-year (year 2003 to year 2005) and 5-
year (year 2001 to year 2005), we collect governance data at 1-year prior to mitigate causality issues.  
Board governance variables include number of total directors (board size), number of independent directors, 
number of dependent directors, and the ratio of independent directors (board independency) to access the 
sound of board governance.  “Focus” stands for mutual fund companies are “public” and “focused” 
companies”.  “Diversified (Non-Reg)” stands for mutual fund companies are wholly-owned subsidiaries or 
asset management arms (divisions) of non-Fed regulated public financial institutions or conglomerates. 
“Diversified (Reg)” stands for mutual fund companies are mutual fund companies are wholly-owned 
(affiliated) subsidiaries or asset management arms of Fed-regulated publicly-traded financial institutions.  
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. 
 
Panel A 
“Focus” subtracts “Diversified 
(Non-Reg)” 2004 2002 2000 
Differences Mean Median Mean Median  Mean  Median  
Number of total directors -3.69 *** -3.50 *** -3.84 *** -3.50 *** -4.05 *** -4.00 ***
Number of independent directors -3.26 *** -3.50 *** -3.87 *** -4.00 *** -4.47 *** -5.00 ***
Ratio of independent directors  -0.07 ** -0.09 ** -0.13 *** -0.12 ** -0.18 *** -0.16 ***







“Focus” subtracts “Diversified 
(Reg)”  2004 2002 2000 
Differences Mean Median Mean Median  Mean  Median  
Number of total directors -5.81 *** -6.00 *** -6.13 *** -6.50 *** -6.08 *** -7.00 ***
Number of independent directors -5.19 *** -6.00 *** -6.71 *** -7.00 *** -7.36 *** -9.00 ***
Ratio of independent directors  -0.09 ** -0.10 ** -0.18 *** -0.19 *** -0.22 *** -0.20 ***








subtracts “Diversified (Reg)”  2004 2002 2000 
Differences Mean Median Mean Median  Mean  Median  
Number of total directors -2.12 ** -2.50 ** -2.30 ** -3.00 ** -2.03 ** -3.00 * 
Number of independent directors -1.93 *** -2.50 *** -2.84 *** -3.00 *** -2.88 *** -4.00 ***
Ratio of independent directors  -0.01  0.00  -0.04  -0.06  -0.04  -0.03  








We have the monitor hypothesis which supports outsiders will honor their 
monitoring mechanism since such reduces agency problems (Holderness and Sheehan 
(1985), Mikkelson and Ruback (1985), Demsetz (1986), Shleifer and Vishny (1986), 
Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988), Agarwal and Mandelker (1990), Barclay and 
Holderness (1991), and Pagano and Roell (1998)).  However, McConnell and Servaes 
(1990) and Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) argue that the presence of large 
blockholders (institutional investors) may harm managerial initiative and firm value. 
Table 4.6 pairs focused mutual fund companies to diversified (non-Fed regulated 
and Fed-regulated) fund companies and tests for differences in means and medians of 
ownership structure across year 2000, 2002, and 2004.  The differences in insider 
holdings between focused and diversified (non-Fed regulated) fund companies are 
statistically significant at 1% level.  Insider holding ownership for focus fund companies 
is greater than that of a diversified (both non-Fed regulated and Fed-regulated) by from 
8% to 15%.  Insider block (with a 1% or more holding) ownership also shows a 
difference between focused and diversified mutual fund companies.  The median 
difference is statistically significant at 1% level.  While insider block ownership for focus 
fund companies is greater than that of a diversified (both non-Fed regulated and Fed-
regulated) ones on an average by from 3% to 4%, those two variables are consistent with 
Servaes (1996), and Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997) who find an inverse relationship 
between diversification and managerial ownership.  Our empirical evidence indicates that 
outside block holderings (with 5% or more) are greater for focused mutual fund 
companies than for diversified (both non-Fed regulated and Fed-regulated) ones.  The 
difference (both mean and median) is positive significantly with a lower bound of 6% and 
a upper bound of 14% between focused versus non-Fed regulated mutual fund companies.   
The differences are even greater for focused versus Fed-regulated fund companies, with a 
lower bound of 8% and upper bound of 21% across three years.   
We next assess whether public trading versus a private structure affects 
performance and operational efficiency for mutual fund companies.  Firstly, we apply the 
fund performance and fund characteristics data from earlier analysis from January 2001 
to December 2005 by splitting funds into public and private fund companies and test the 




Table 4.6: Test for Ownership at Firm Levels for Public Mutual Fund Companies 
This table reports test statistics for differences in mean and median of ownership in each of the category of 
the publicly-traded mutual fund companies in the year of 2000, 2002, and 2004.  Ownership data is 
collected from the end of that year from SEC filing DEF 14A form.  Since performance and fund 
characteristics are measured in the frequency of 1-year (year 2005), 3-year (year 2003 to year 2005) and 5-
year (year 2001 to year 2005), we collect ownership data at 1-year prior to mitigate causality issues.  
Ownership variables contain, (1) Insider holding, which measures percentage of shares outstanding 
controlled by insiders (defined by SEC filing DEF 14A); (2) Sum of 1% above inside blocks, which 
measures total percentage of shares outstanding controlled by inside block-holders who own at least 1% of 
shares outstanding; (3) Sum of 5% above outside blocks, which measures total percentage of shares 
outstanding controlled by outside block-holders who own at least 5% of shares outstanding.   “Focus” 
stands for mutual fund companies are “public” and “focused” companies”.  “Diversified (Non-Reg)” stands 
for mutual fund companies are wholly-owned subsidiaries or asset management arms (divisions) of non-
Fed regulated public financial institutions or conglomerates. “Diversified”(Reg) stands for mutual fund 
companies are mutual fund companies are wholly-owned (affiliated) subsidiaries or asset management arms 
of Fed-regulated publicly-traded financial institutions.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 
10 percent level respectively. 
 
Panel A  
“Focus” subtracts “Diversified 
(Non-Reg)”  2004 2002 2000 
Differences Mean Median Mean Median  Mean  Median  
Insider holding 0.15 *** 0.13 *** 0.10 *** 0.08 *** 0.08 *** 0.11 ***
Sum of 1% above inside blocks 0.14 *** 0.04 *** 0.08 ** 0.03 *** 0.08 ** 0.03 ***
Sum of 5% above outside blocks 0.14 ** 0.07 *** 0.11 * 0.06 * 0.18 ** 0.10 ***







“Focus” subtracts “Diversified 
(Reg)”   2004 2002 2000 
Differences Mean Median Mean Median  Mean  Median  
Insider holding 0.15 *** 0.13 *** 0.09 *** 0.09 *** 0.08 ** 0.12 ***
Sum of 1% above inside blocks 0.13 *** 0.04 *** 0.08 ** 0.03 *** 0.08 ** 0.03 ***
Sum of 5% above outside blocks 0.18 *** 0.09 *** 0.19 *** 0.08 *** 0.21 *** 0.10 ** 








subtracts “Diversified (Reg)” 2004 2002 2000 
Differences Mean Median Mean Median  Mean  Median  
Insider holding -0.01  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  
Sum of 1% above inside blocks 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Sum of 5% above outside blocks 0.04 * 0.02   0.08 ** 0.03   0.03   0.01   








Secondly, we test whether public trading provides different incentives for mutual 
fund companies under different organization structure.   That is to say, we want to 
empirically test whether incentives from firms being publicly traded offset their relatively 
inefficiency and deteriorating performance that is associated with being diversified.  For 
the later point, we further track down fund companies with respect to their initial public 
offering dates for the entire CRSP Mutual Fund Database sample from January 1961 to 
December 2005.  We follow our earlier analysis of splitting firms into focused and 
diversified fund companies to study whether organizational structure affects post fund 
performance and operational efficiency after an IPO.  
Table 4.7 reports test results for differences in means and medians of fund 
performance and fund characteristics (operation efficiency) for both equity (Panel A) and 
domestic equity funds (Panel B) managed under focused mutual fund companies in the 
frequency of 1-year (year 2005), 3-year (year 2003 to 2005) and 5-year (year 2001 to 
2005) with respect to whether their management companies are public or private.   
From Panel A and Panel B, differences in fee-adjusted buy and hold returns and 
fee and market-adjusted buy and hold returns are positive and significant between public 
and private fund companies for both equity funds and domestic equity funds across one 
and three-year interval.  Numerically, the differences in fee and market-adjusted returns 
in mean have a lower boundary of 1.25% and a higher boundary of 1.84% with one-year 
horizon; 3.42% to 5.03% for three-years and 2.46% to 7.61% over a five-year horizon.  
Differences between public and private fund companies in the Sharpe ratio also 
demonstrate a statistically significant difference at the 5% level or better for one, three, 
and five-year intervals.  This result implies publicly traded fund companies provide better 
incentives for managers and generate better performance.  Funds managed in the public 
domain have lower portfolio turnover and lower manager tenure.  However, the expense 
ratio is not significantly different with respect to their fund management companies are 
public or private.  Median fund size is greater for public mutual fund companies.  Overall, 
the public mutual fund companies post better fund performance and better operational 
efficiency than those of private management, indicating that public ownership provides 
better incentives in the mutual fund industry. We next to test whether a different 
organizational structure provides different incentives for mutual fund companies 
evaluated from the perspective of the IPO process.   
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Table 4.7: Test for “Being Public” for Mutual Fund Companies 
This table reports test statistics for differences in mean and median of performance and fund characteristics 
for equity funds and domestic equity funds for those “focused” mutual fund companies. Sample ranges 
from Jan 2001 to Dec 2005 and reports in the frequency of 1-year (year 2005), 3-year (year 2003 to year 
2005) and 5-year (year 2001 to year 2005), with both live and dead funds.  Results are Winsorized to 98%.  
“Focus” stands for mutual fund companies are “public” and “focused” companies” while “M” stands for 
“focused” and “private” mutual fund companies.  Performance is measured in three ways; fee-adjusted buy 
and hold return (FBHR); fee and market-adjusted return (FMBHR), and the Sharpe ratio. Fund 
characteristics are measured in portfolio turnover (%); expense ratio (%); total net assets (in million dollars); 
manager tenures (in months) and average total net assets (in million dollars).   ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. 
 
Panel A 
“Focus” subtract “Focus (M)” 
Equity Funds  1-year 3-year 5-year 
Differences Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  
Performance (FBHR, %) 1.76 *** 1.92 *** 10.34 *** 6.54 *** 8.80 * 5.92 ** 
Performance (FMBHR, %) 1.84 *** 1.33 *** 5.03 ** 4.08 *** 7.61  6.59 * 
Sharpe ratio 0.04 *** 0.04 *** 0.06 *** 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.03 ***
Portfolio turnover (%) -31.93 *** -2.00  -49.99 *** -7.12  -44.73 *** -13.87 ** 
Expense ratio (%) 0.06 ** 0.09 *** 0.02  0.01  0.03  -0.03  
Total net assets ($mn) 52.37  160.40 *** -236.77  154.43 *** -579.49 * 206.11 ***
Manager tenure (months) -6.99 *** -8.14 *** -8.60 *** -8.00 *** -9.04 *** -6.53 * 
Average total net assets ($mn) -76.45   24.71 *** -172.01 ** 28.00 *** -496.29 *** 54.36 ** 







“Focus” subtract “Focus (M)” 
Domestic Equity Funds 1-year 3-year 5-year 
Differences Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  
Performance (FBHR, %) 1.02 * 1.41 *** 9.00 *** 6.53 *** 3.78  4.31 * 
Performance (FMBHR, %) 1.28 *** 0.93 *** 3.42 ** 4.32 *** 2.46  3.76  
Sharpe ratio 0.03 *** 0.04 *** 0.06 *** 0.04 *** 0.02 ** 0.02 ** 
Portfolio turnover (%) -42.99 *** -9.86 ** -58.46 *** -13.97 ** -54.89 *** -18.13 ***
Expense ratio (%) 0.00  0.04  -0.05  -0.05  -0.11 ** -0.08  
Total net assets ($mn) 144.48  207.55 *** -244.22  187.05 *** -646.05 * 311.16 ***
Manager tenure (months) -7.37 *** -7.57 ** -11.11 *** -11.16 *** -11.41 *** -6.38 * 
Average total net assets ($mn) -42.76   36.20 *** -210.97 ** 37.27 *** -572.77 *** 74.77 ** 






As documented earlier, we want to test whether incentives that arise from public 
trading offset the inefficiency and deteriorating performance associated with being 
diversified.  The literature on post IPO performance has generated mixed results.  We 
follow our earlier analysis by splitting the sample into focused and diversified fund 
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companies to study whether organization structure affects post fund performance and 
operational efficiency after their IPOs.  We collecting IPO dates for the entire CRSP 
Mutual Fund Database sample from January 1961 to December 2005 for this analysis 
Table 4.8 reports results for differences in means and medians of fund 
performance and fund characteristics (operation efficiency) for both domestic equity 
funds (Panel A-1, B-1, C) and equity funds (Panel A-2, B-2) managed by focused and 
diversified (both non-Fed and Fed-regulated) mutual fund companies for one, two, three, 
four, and five-year periods surrounding their initial public offering over the time period of 
January 1961 to December 2005  
From Panel A-1 and A-2, the results show that funds managed under focused fund 
companies have posted stronger performance after their companies’ initial public offering.   
The fee and market adjusted buy and hold returns for one-year post subtracts one-year 
prior of IPO dates generates a 3% to 4% difference on the mean measure.  The 
differences increase in the two, three, four, and five-year time frames although the sample 
size decreases from 116 (146 for equity funds) to 24 (27 for equity funds).  It is clear that 
the post IPO performance for both domestic equity and equity funds outperforms the 
years prior to their IPOs for the focused fund companies.   
This finding is consistent with Stoughton, Wong and Zechner (2001) who argue 
managers that conduct IPOs are confident about their product quality thus the post 
performance remains strong in the post IPO years.  Although differences for the Sharpe 
Ratio post a negative figure from three, four and five-year time frames, this result simply 
reflects the negative returns earned during those down terms.  The negative raw returns 
are still better than the market index.  In terms of fund characteristics (operational 
efficiency), better performance is associated with an increase expense ratio.  Consistent 
with reputation capital hypothesis, a higher fee is charged in reflecting higher quality 
service.  Managerial tenure posts a positive number among several observation periods.  
However, in comparing managerial tenure for focused mutual fund companies (Panel A-1, 
A-2) relative to non-Fed regulated diversified (B-1, B-2), companies we find that 
managers are more entrenched in the diversified fund companies, particularly given their 
poor fund performance.  
Panel B-1 and B-2 report that funds managed under non-Fed regulated mutual 
fund companies have show deteriorating performance after their companies’ initial public 
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Table 4.8: Test for Performance and Operation Efficiency surrounding the IPOs of Mutual Fund Companies 
This table reports mean and median test for fund performance (fee and market-adjusted buy and hold returns (FMBHR)), the Sharpe ratio, portfolio turnover, 
expense ratio, total net assets, and manager tenure from 5 (4) years prior and 5 (4) years post of the years of IPOs of different level of focused (diversified) 
publicly-traded mutual fund companies.  (-1, +1) stands for the results from one year post of IPOs subtracts one year prior of IPOs.  Panel A reports the fund 
complex in the category of “Focus” fund companies.  Panel B reports the fund complex in the category of “Diversified (Non-Reg)”, those wholly-owned 
subsidiaries or asset management arms (divisions) of non-Fed regulated public financial institutions or conglomerates.  Panel C reports the fund complex in the 
category of “Diversified (Reg)”, those wholly-owned (affiliated) subsidiaries or asset management arms of Fed-regulated publicly-traded financial institutions.  
Sample covers from January 1961 to December 2005. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.  
 
Panel A-1：Domestic Equity Funds in “Focus” Fund Company 
Year Range (post subtracts prior) (-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-3, +3) (-4, +4) (-5, +5) 
Test for differences Mean Median Mean Median Mean  Median Mean Median Mean Mean  
Performance (FMBHR, %) 3.36* -0.61 12.54*** 9.70*** 20.06*** 8.61*** 29.34*** 14.90** 31.43** 4.98* 
Sharpe ratio -0.05 -0.25 0.02 -0.07 -0.40*** -0.58*** -0.53*** -0.64*** -0.35*** -0.41***
Portfolio turnover (%) 0.14*** 0.00 0.24*** -0.01* 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.63*** 0.59*** 0.78*** 0.71***
Expense ratio (%) 0.03* 0.00 0.04** 0.01** 0.10*** 0.04*** 0.11*** 0.07*** 0.11*** 0.09***
Total net assets ($mn) 94.01*** 13.18*** -33.90 4.50 99.17** 7.92 83.78** 21.66 130.84** 24.79 
Manager tenure (months) 21.76*** 24.00*** 19.41*** 32.00*** 21.23*** 22.67*** 26.64*** 20.75*** 30.53*** 24.60***













Panel A-2：Equity Funds in “Focus” Fund Company 
Year Range (post subtracts prior) (-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-3, +3) (-4, +4) (-5, +5) 
Test for differences Mean Median Mean Median Mean  Median Mean Median Mean Mean  
Performance (FMBHR, %) 4.24 *** 0.12 14.77*** 12.15*** 26.30*** 27.44*** 38.55*** 18.36 *** 41.24 *** 15.49 ** 
Sharpe ratio 0.04 -0.10 0.08 0.05* -0.35*** -0.54*** -0.50*** -0.59 *** -0.32 *** -0.41 ***
Portfolio turnover (%) 0.15 *** 0.01 ** 0.27*** -0.01*** 0.58*** 0.52*** 0.74*** 0.67 *** 0.85 *** 0.96 ***
Expense ratio (%) 0.02 0.00 0.04** 0.01*** 0.12*** 0.05*** 0.10*** 0.07 *** 0.10 *** 0.08 ***
Total net assets ($mn) 38.84 5.76 ** -122.34* -0.49 75.07** 1.64 65.84* 7.03  106.93 * 12.98  
Manager tenure (months) 17.36 *** 24.00 *** 16.20*** 32.00*** 23.17*** 28.00*** 25.38*** 20.25 *** 29.15 *** 18.80 ***
Number of funds 146  146  117  117  58 58  37  37  27   27   
 
   Panel B-1：Domestic Equity Funds in “Diversified (Non-Reg)” Fund Company 
Year Range (post subtracts prior) (-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-3, +3) (-4, +4) 
Test for differences Mean Median Mean Median Mean  Median Mean Median
Performance (FMBHR, %) -6.65 *** -3.01*** -16.79*** -7.73 *** -14.24** -10.33*** -1.12 -4.52 
Sharpe ratio -0.24 *** -0.25*** -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.05* -0.11 ***
Portfolio turnover (%) 0.04 -0.02 -0.06 -0.14 -0.32*** -0.14*** -0.57*** -0.23 ***
Expense ratio (%) 0.07 0.00 -0.07 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.03 -0.01 
Total net assets ($mn) -23.86 -11.70*** -25.35 -5.05 ** -26.93 -9.48** -112.25* -37.92 ***
Manager tenure (months) 20.64 *** 24.00*** 27.10*** 36.00 *** 36.12*** 48.00*** 43.52*** 48.50 ***
Number of funds 86  86  69  69  53  53  35 35  
                                                                                                                                                                                                       table continued 








Panel B-2：Equity Funds in “Diversified (Non-Reg)” Fund Company 
Year Range (post subtracts prior) (-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-3, +3) (-4, +4) 
Test for differences Mean Median Mean Median Mean  Median Mean Median
Performance (FMBHR, %) -1.29*** -2.41*** -9.86*** -2.25*** -1.82** -5.97** -1.73* -6.72 
Sharpe ratio -0.19*** -0.20*** -0.05* -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06** -0.11** 
Portfolio turnover (%) 0.13*** 0.07*** 0.01 -0.08 -0.23 *** -0.13*** -0.48*** -0.23***
Expense ratio (%) 0.13*** 0.05*** -0.01 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.06 
Total net assets ($mn) -42.56 -11.61*** -56.16 -10.03*** -52.63 -16.42*** -123.60** -37.92***
Manager tenure (months) 15.95*** 24.00*** 24.06*** 36.00*** 32.79*** 48.00*** 39.64*** 48.75***
Number of funds 110 110 83 83 66 66 45 45 
    
   Panel C：Domestic Equity Funds in “Diversified (Reg)” Fund Company 
Year Range (post subtracts prior) (-1, +1) (-2, +2) (-3, +3) (-4, +4) (-5, +5) 
Test for differences Mean Median Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean Median Mean Mean  
Performance (FMBHR, %) -4.87 *** -3.25*** -3.44 -2.74** 16.52*** 13.78** 23.17** 18.17** 50.43*** 45.29** 
Sharpe ratio -0.09 ** -0.24* 0.01 0.04 -0.22*** -0.21*** -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.34*** -0.34*** 
Portfolio turnover (%) 0.14 *** 0.03* 0.14 *** 0.03* 0.05 0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.01 -0.01 
Expense ratio (%) -0.04 ** 0.00 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.06* 0.10*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 
Total net assets ($mn) -132.17 *** -6.80*** -166.20 *** -9.34*** -264.10*** -33.41*** -339.09*** -122.21*** -211.91 -51.73 
Manager tenure (months) 5.26 ** 24.00** 9.55 *** 30.00*** 6.44 2.33 13.15* 10.83* 34.75*** 50.00*** 
Number of funds 154  154  131  131  51  51  33  33  16  16  
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offering.  The fee and market adjusted buy and hold returns generate a negative figure of 
3% to 6% relative to domestic equity funds and a negative 1% to 2% on mean and 
median measures respectively for the one-year post period less the period prior to the IPO 
date.  The difference gap increases in the two and three-year measure while statistical 
significance decreases after four-year interval.  The Sharpe ratio is also strong negative in 
the one-year time frame for both domestic equity funds and equity funds.  Unlike the 
findings for the focused fund companies, the results of deteriorating performance from 
diversified groups are consistent with the argument of Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) 
and others who suspect that managers time the market.    
For fund characteristics (operation efficiency) variables, we observe that a public 
offering from the managing companies is not accompanied by more fund flows.  Total 
assets under management continuously deteriorate throughout these years.  As 
documented earlier in the focused groups, manager tenure in this diversified fund 
companies show more towards entrenched.  The decrease in total assets and performance 
along with increased managerial tenure indicates that funds managed under non-Fed 
regulated mutual fund companies are not as efficiently managed as those under focused 
ones.   
Panel C posts different results than those non-Fed regulated mutual fund 
companies from Panel B.  Fee and market adjusted buy and hold returns show a U-shape 
pattern.  Performance deteriorates at the first two-year then increases after three, four, and 
five-year intervals. This result is similar to Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) and others 
who suspect that managers time the market and engage in window dressing, at least up to 
two-year time frame.  Our results do not support McTague (1994) and Frye (2001) who 
argue that bank proprietary funds as more conservatively managed than non-bank funds.  
Portfolio turnover increases in the first two years after their managing companies’ IPOs.  
Total assets under management, on the other hand, is consistent with the non-fed 
regulated mutual fund companies experiencing deteriorating performance during the post 
IPO dates.  Overall, we conclude that there is better fund performance and higher 
operational efficiency for funds managed under focused fund companies around the time 
of their IPOs.  Diversified companies show some evidence of deteriorating performance 
and operational efficiency surrounding their IPOs, suggests market timing.    
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We further test fund performance with respect to whether they earn positive or 
negative alphas surrounding their initial public offering between focused versus 
diversified groups.  We have shown earlier that funds managed under focused fund 
companies demonstrate better performance and operation efficiency when compared to 
those diversified ones (in Table 4.3, 4.4).  We have also shown earlier (in Table 4.9) that 
funds managed under focused mutual fund companies outperform in the post IPO time 
frame while funds managed under diversified ones experience performance deteriorating. 
Table 4.9 reports test results for Fama and French (1993) three factors performance 
measures.24  For this robustness test, we address two questions.  First, do funds managed 
under focused fund groups earn positive alphas in the post IPO years compared to the 
years prior to the IPO?  Second, how long do funds managed under focused fund groups 
earn positive alphas compared to the diversified counterparties?  Panel A-1 and A-2 show 
test results for alpha for both domestic equity funds and equity funds managed under 
focused, non-Fed regulated and Fed-regulated mutual fund companies for a two-year 
interval of their initial public offering.  Domestic equity funds (Panel A-1) in focused 
fund companies have positive alphas (0.14% in mean and 0.06% for median) in the first 
year after their IPOs, consistent with our prior findings and the results from Stoughton, 
Wong and Zechner (2001).  On the other hand, both the domestic equity funds of non-Fed 
regulated and Fed-regulated diversified mutual fund companies earn negative alphas (-
0.30% to -0.33% for mean and -0.07% to -0.29% for median) during the one year after 
their managing companies’ IPOs.  The differences between post and prior on the first 
year are statistically significant at 1% level for domestic equity funds in the diversified 
fund companies.  In Panel A-2, equity funds have a similar result.  Funds managed under 
diversified mutual fund companies have negative alphas (-0.47% and -0.26% for mean 
and -0.07% and -0.27% for median) for the first year after their managing companies’ 
IPOs.  The differences for equity funds under focused management companies from the 
one year post period less the one year prior are positive and significant.   
Panel B-1 and B-2 extents the test to a two-year interval.  Consistent with our 
earlier findings for the one-year span, both domestic equity funds (B-1) and equity funds 
                                                 
24 For limiting space, we do not report momentum four-factor test results.  However, those results are 
similar to the three-factor ones.   
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(B-2) managed under diversified fund companies earn negative alphas (-0.20% and -
0.17% mean and -0.09% and -0.10% median for domestic equity funds and -0.40% and -
0.14% mean and -0.14% and -0.05% median for equity funds) the two-year post period 
less prior two-years.  Equity funds post positive and significant differences for the two-
year post relative to the period two-year prior.  This result is consistent with our earlier 
findings that funds managed under focused fund companies experience improved 
performance while funds managed under diversified fund companies encounter the 
opposite result during their managing companies’ initial public offerings.  When we 
extend this measure to three-year and four-year time span, funds in the diversified fund 
companies constantly earn negative alphas.  Funds in the focused fund companies also 
turn negative.   
4.2 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
In this section, we report tests using multivariate regression analysis for clarifying 
earlier concerns from the univariate analysis.  We investigate differences in performance 
and operating efficiency among focused and diversified mutual fund companies by 
controlling for fund characteristics and other dummy variables.  We first examine the 
relationship of fund performance and level of focus (diversification) by pooling the data 
into one-year, three-year, and five-year spans respectively.  Rather than constructing 
pooling OLS or panel data, using data through different years allows us to further 
investigate changes throughout those years with respect to how the level of diversification 
affects firm performance and efficiency overtime. 
Table 4.10 Panel A and Panel B pool equity funds and domestic equity funds from 
public mutual fund companies for one, three, and five-year, records respectively with 
respect to their managing companies being focused (a dummy equals 1 if a managing 
company is focused) versus diversified (non-Fed-regulated in Panel A and non-Fed-
regulated in Panel B) together with other control variables such as a one year lag of 
turnover, expense ratio, nature log of total net asset, and manager turnover.  Panels A and 
B show that funds managed under focused fund companies have better fund performance 
throughout one, three, and five-year spans across equity funds and domestic equity funds, 




Table 4.9: Robustness Test for Performance surrounding the IPOs of Mutual Fund  
      Companies 
This table reports robustness check for performance measure by using Fama and French’s three factors to 
evaluate up to four years prior and four years post of the IPOs for different level of focused (diversified) of 
the public mutual fund companies.  Alpha is reported in percentage.  (-1, +1) stands for the results from one 
year post of IPOs subtracts one year prior of IPOs.  Panel A, B, C, D reports one, two, three, and four years 
prior and post surrounding the IPOs year respectively.  Sample covers from January 1961 to December 
2005.  Among those Fund Categories, “Focus” stands for “public” and “focused” fund companies.  
“Diversified (Non-Reg)” stands for mutual fund companies are wholly-owned subsidiaries or asset 
management arms (divisions) of non-Fed regulated public financial institutions or conglomerates.  
“Diversified (Reg)” stands for mutual fund companies are wholly-owned (affiliated) subsidiaries or asset 
management arms of Fed-regulated financial institutions.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 
and 10 percent level respectively. 
 
 Panel A-1 
Fund Category Focus Diversified (Non-Reg) Diversified (Reg) 
Domestic Equity Fund Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  
1 years prior IPO (-1, 0) 0.05 -0.09 0.41*** 0.25*** 0.06 -0.02 
1 years after IPO ( 0,+1) 0.14** 0.06** -0.33*** -0.07*** -0.30*** -0.29***
Differences of  (0,+1) subtract (-1, 0) 0.09 0.19 -0.74*** -0.20*** -0.36*** -0.16***
Number of funds 116 116 86  86  154  154  
 
Panel A-2 
Fund Category Focus Diversified (Non-Reg) Diversified (Reg) 
Equity Fund Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  
1 years prior IPO (-1, 0) -0.20 *** -0.23 *** -0.14  -0.01  -0.17 * -0.13 ** 
1 years after IPO ( 0,+1) 0.04  0.05  -0.47 *** -0.07 *** -0.26 *** -0.27 ***
Differences of  (0,+1) subtract (-1, 0) 0.24 *** 0.29 ** -0.33 * -0.06  -0.09  -0.03  
Number of funds 146  146  110  110   188   188   
 
        Panel B-1 
Fund Category Focus Diversified (Non-Reg) Diversified (Reg) 
Domestic Equity Fund Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  
2 years prior IPO (-2, 0) -0.17*** -0.11 *** 0.66*** 0.39 *** 0.04 0.01 
2 years after IPO ( 0,+2) -0.04 -0.06  -0.20*** -0.09 *** -0.17*** -0.10 ***
Differences (0,+2) subtract (-2, 0) 0.13 0.03  -0.86*** -0.43 *** -0.21** -0.02 
Number of funds 93  93   69  69  131  131  
 
Panel B-2 
Fund Category Focus Diversified (Non-Reg) Diversified (Reg) 
Equity Fund Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  
2 years prior IPO (-2, 0) -0.25 *** -0.12*** 0.39 *** 0.16 *** 0.11 0.04 
2 years after IPO ( 0,+2) -0.02 -0.04 -0.40 *** -0.14 *** -0.14*** -0.05 ***
Differences (0,+2) subtract (-2, 0) 0.23 ** 0.05* -0.79 *** -0.43 *** -0.25*** -0.04 ** 
Number of funds 117  117  83  83  160  160  







         Panel C-1 
Fund Category Focus Diversified (Non-Reg) Diversified (Reg) 
Domestic Equity Fund Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  
3 years prior IPO (-3, 0) 0.02 0.05 0.56*** 0.30*** 0.04 0.06 
3 years after IPO ( 0,+3) -0.25 *** -0.20*** -0.12** -0.10** -0.23*** -0.19***
Differences of (0,+3) subtract (-3, 0) -0.27 *** -0.26*** -0.69*** -0.47*** -0.27** -0.14* 
Number of funds 48  48  53  53  51  51  
 
Panel C-2 
Fund Category Focus Diversified (Non-Reg) Diversified (Reg) 
Equity Fund Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  
3 years prior IPO (-3, 0) 0.00 0.02 0.32*** 0.22*** 0.02 0.04 
3 years after IPO ( 0,+3) -0.26 *** -0.20*** -0.28*** -0.12*** -0.18*** -0.15***
Differences of (0,+3) subtract (-3, 0) -0.26 *** -0.27*** -0.60*** -0.47*** -0.20 -0.15 
Number of funds 58  58  66  66  66  66  
 
         Panel D-1 
Fund Category Focus Diversified (Non-Reg) Diversified (Reg) 
Domestic Equity Fund Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  
4 years prior IPO (-4, 0) 0.11 ** 0.08* 0.39 *** 0.10*** 0.00 -0.05 
4 years after IPO ( 0,+4) -0.20 *** -0.15*** 0.00 0.00 -0.19*** -0.15 ***
Differences of  (0,+4) subtract (-4, 0) -0.31 *** -0.15*** -0.39 ** -0.15** -0.19* -0.25 
Number of funds 33  33  35  35  33  33  
 
Panel D-2 
Fund Category Focus Diversified (Non-Reg) Diversified (Reg) 
Equity Fund Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  
4 years prior IPO (-4, 0) 0.03 0.03 0.20 * 0.08 -0.12 -0.10  
4 years after IPO ( 0,+4) -0.30 *** -0.19 *** -0.10 -0.02 -0.05 -0.12  
Differences of (0,+4) subtract (-4, 0) -0.33 *** -0.16 *** -0.30 ** -0.15** 0.08 -0.10  
Number of funds 37  37  45  45  46  46   
 
Panel C pools all private fund companies from one, three, and five-year periods 
respectively with respect to their managing companies being focused (a dummy equals 
“M” if a managing company is focused) and diversified mutual fund companies 
(aggregating banks, insurance companies, brokerage companies, and conglomerates) 
together with other control variables such as one year lag of turnover, expense ratio, 
nature log of total net asset, and manager turnover.  Panel C shows that funds managed 
under focused mutual fund companies demonstrate better performance (for models 1, 3, 4, 
and 6) and a lower expense ratio (mostly at the 1% significant level).  Although the 
results are weaker for private fund companies, in general, funds managed under focused 
fund companies have better performance throughout the different time frames.  
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These findings are consistent with prior corporate literature (Lang and Stulz 
(1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Servaes (1996)) which argues that conglomerates trade 
at discount due to their inefficiency and agency problems. 
Table 4.10: Regression for “Focused” versus “Diversified” of Mutual Fund  
        Companies 
This table uses OLS regression to examine the relationship between fee and market-adjusted buy and hold 
returns (FMBHR) for the past one, three and five-year to the different type of mutual fund companies to 
study the effect of being “focused” and “diversified”. Sample ranges from Jan 2001 to Dec 2005 and 
reports in the frequency of 1-year (year 2005), 3-year (year 2003 to year 2005) and 5-year (year 2001 to 
year 2005), with both live and dead funds.  “Focus” stands for mutual fund companies are “public” and 
“focused” companies”.  “Diversified (Fed-Reg)” stands for mutual fund companies are wholly-owned 
subsidiaries or asset management arms (divisions) of non-Fed regulated public financial institutions or 
conglomerates. “Diversified (Reg)” stands for mutual fund companies are mutual fund companies are 
wholly-owned (affiliated) subsidiaries or asset management arms of Fed-regulated publicly-traded financial 
institutions.  “Focus (M)” stands for “focused” and “private” mutual fund companies. “B” stands for private 
banks that offer mutual fund products. “C” stands for private conglomerates that offer mutual fund products. 
“I” stands for private insurance companies that offer mutual fund products. “b” stands for private 
brokerages that offer mutual fund products.  EF stands for equity funds and DEF stands for domestic equity 
funds based on the definition of fund objective from CRSP tape. The dependent variable is fee and market-
adjusted buy and hold returns (FMBHR) for a pool of “Focus” and “Diversified (Non-Reg)” (in panel A), 
“Focus” and “Diversified (Reg)” (in panel B), and “Focus (M)” and “Diversified (B+C+b+I)” (in panel C). 
The independent variables contain: a “focused public (in Panel A and B) or private (in Panel C) mutual 
fund company” dummy which equals one if a fund is managed by “focus” companies; an annual portfolio 
turnover ratio from previous year; an annual expense ratio from previous year; a logarithm total net asset 
from previous year; a manager’s tenure from previous year. Coefficients of portfolio turnover, total net 
asset and manager tenure have been multiplied by 100 for report purposes. The standard errors are 
heteroskedasticity-robust. The p-values are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. 
 
Panel A：“Focus” & “Diversified (Non-Reg)” 
1-year 3-year 5-year Dependent Variable： 
Ret i,t Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 EF  DEF  EF  DEF  EF  DEF  
Intercept -0.3533  1.8503 -23.7228** 3.4285  -36.4724*** 19.8802 
 (0.8766)  (0.5130) (0.0120) (0.7583)  (0.0049) (0.1748) 
Dummy of being "1" i,t 3.6595 *** 3.1996** 15.4468*** 12.2828 ** 32.4299*** 19.1135*** 
 (0.0032)  (0.0335) (0.0018) (0.0255)  (0.0000) (0.0095) 
Turnover i,t-1  -0.2618  -0.2379 -1.4818 3.6998  -13.7441*** -12.7482** 
 (0.6820)  (0.7405) (0.6700) (0.3258)  (0.0088) (0.0124) 
Expense i, t-1 1.6553  -0.6120 27.0484*** 0.7512  42.9847*** 0.9660 
 (0.1305)  (0.6791) (0.0000) (0.9100)  (0.0000) (0.9120) 
Log TNA i, t-1 -0.0049  0.0136 -0.0709 -0.0250  -0.0904 -0.1540** 
 (0.8685)  (0.7072) (0.5583) (0.8456)  (0.2293) (0.0216) 
Manager Tenure  i, t-1 3.4702 ** 1.7979 8.4299 1.6052  7.9626 7.0702 
 (0.0236)  (0.3281) (0.1992) (0.8253)  (0.3550) (0.3500) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0112   0.0034  0.087  0.0043   0.3121  0.1408  

















Panel B：“Focus” & “Diversified (Reg)”  
1-year 3-year 5-year Dependent Variable： 
Ret i,t Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 EF  DEF  EF  DEF  EF  DEF  
Intercept 1.6394 ** 3.0646*** -4.2930 7.6044 ** -20.3755* 16.7298 
 (0.0305)  (0.0000) (0.2619) (0.0137)  (0.0670) (0.1585) 
Dummy of being "1" i,t 2.2101 *** 1.6735*** 12.0656*** 8.2184 *** 13.2580* 12.3346* 
 (0.0000)  (0.0006) (0.0000) (0.0001)  (0.0599) (0.0549) 
Turnover i,t-1  0.3073  0.5081* -1.5266 0.7561  -19.9371*** -13.2634*** 
 (0.2904)  (0.0667) (0.3449) (0.5717)  (0.0001) (0.0086) 
Expense i, t-1 2.1441 *** 0.2711 20.2295*** 4.9293 ** 48.1294*** 13.8521* 
 (0.0000)  (0.5448) (0.0000) (0.0148)  (0.0000) (0.0648) 
Log TNA i, t-1 0.0021 0.0200 -0.2203** -0.0795  -0.3741** -0.5967*** 
 (0.8779)  (0.1441) (0.0346) (0.3595)  (0.0314) (0.0013) 
Manager Tenure  i, t-1 0.6346 -0.6961 0.4666 -2.5893  17.4995* 11.2100 
 (0.2974)  (0.2163) (0.8873) (0.3190)  (0.0510) (0.1484) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0342  0.0139  0.1463  0.0388   0.2702  0.0993  














Panel C：“Focus (M)” & “Diversified (B+C+b+I)”  
1-year 3-year 5-year Dependent Variable： 
Ret i,t Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 EF  DEF  EF  DEF  EF  DEF  
Intercept 6.8070 *** 5.8018*** 21.1270*** 16.5251 *** 31.7115*** 21.4839** 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0008) (0.0226) 
Dummy of being "M" i,t 1.4788 ** 0.8198 9.2544*** 7.9375 *** 10.9251 16.2040* 
 (0.0131)  (0.1485) (0.0038) (0.0067)  (0.2316) (0.0795) 
Turnover i,t-1  -0.2900 *** -0.1903*** -0.9965** -0.4018  -0.6003 -0.3890 
 (0.0002)  (0.0054) (0.0115) (0.2331)  (0.2454) (0.4111) 
Expense i, t-1 -0.9967 *** -1.1920*** -1.7207* -3.2223 *** -4.4230* -5.7939*** 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0668) (0.0001)  (0.0563) (0.0068) 
Log TNA i, t-1 -0.0028  -0.0017 -0.0639*** -0.0503 *** -0.1155* -0.1188** 
 (0.4625)  (0.6197) (0.0043) (0.0088)  (0.0559) (0.0476) 
Manager Tenure  i, t-1 -0.9147 ** -1.0006** -2.0568 -0.8688  4.6115 6.6505* 
 (0.0317)  (0.0108) (0.2182) (0.5479)  (0.2198) (0.0590) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0272   0.0454  0.0145  0.0205   0.0120  0.0323  














To investigate the impact of going public and the differences in performance and 
operating efficiency for same level of organization structure but different ownership 
structure (public or private), we use multivariate regressions to examine differences and 
create a dummy variable equals one if the fund company is publicly-traded.  We pool the 
data into one-year, three-year, and five-year time frames respectively.  Table 4.11 pools 
funds from focused public and focused private fund companies together.  Models 1, 2 and 
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3 show that funds managed under focused public fund companies have better fund 
performance throughout one and three-year time spans but the significance level 
decreases over the five-year interval.  Also, we find that funds managed under public 
fund companies have lower expense ratios and have lower portfolio turnover ratios, 
evidence of better operational efficiency.   
Table 4.11: Regression for “Being Public” for Mutual Fund Companies 
This table uses OLS regression to examine the relationship between fee and market-adjusted buy and hold 
returns (FMBHR) for the past one, three and five-year to the different type of mutual fund companies to 
study the effect of being “publicly-traded”.  Sample ranges from Jan 2001 to Dec 2005 and reports in the 
frequency of 1-year (year 2005), 3-year (year 2003 to year 2005) and 5-year (year 2001 to year 2005), with 
both live and dead funds.  “Focus” stands for mutual fund companies are “public” and “focused” companies 
while “Focus (M)” stands for “focused” and “private” mutual fund companies.  EF stands for equity funds 
and DEF stands for domestic equity funds based on the definition of fund objective from CRSP tape. The 
dependent variable is fee and market-adjusted buy and hold returns (FMBHR) for a pool of “Focus” and 
“Focus (M)”.  The independent variables contain: a “focused publicly-traded mutual fund company” 
dummy which equals one if a fund is managed by “Focus”; an annual portfolio turnover ratio from previous 
year; an annual expense ratio from previous year; a logarithm total net asset from previous year; a 
manager’s tenure from previous year. Coefficients of portfolio turnover, total net asset and manager tenure 
have been multiplied by 100 for report purposes. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust. The p-
values are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level 
respectively. 
 
Focus& Focus (M) 1-year 3-year 5-year 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Dependent Variable： 
Ret i,t EF  DEF  EF  DEF  EF  DEF  
Intercept 8.1311 *** 6.5992*** 28.7143*** 24.6178 *** 38.5589*** 37.9773*** 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Dummy of being "Focus" 
i,t 1.6550 *** 1.1422** 7.9571*** 1.4003  7.7725 -0.2693 
 (0.0018)  (0.0272) (0.0020) (0.5615)  (0.2669) (0.9693) 
Turnover i,t-1  -0.2909 *** -0.1805*** -1.1835*** -0.4055  -0.7137 -0.4192 
 (0.0002)  (0.0081) (0.0038) (0.2260)  (0.1759) (0.3701) 
Expense i, t-1 -0.9630 *** -1.1869*** -0.4847 -3.2618 *** -1.5229 -5.9089*** 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.6128) (0.0001)  (0.5122) (0.0055) 
Log TNA i, t-1 -0.0033  -0.0011 -0.0631*** -0.0474 ** -0.1149* -0.1321** 
 (0.3879)  (0.7505) (0.0064) (0.0135)  (0.0647) (0.0307) 
Manager Tenure  i, t-1 -0.7513 * -1.0115*** -1.8512 -1.0628  4.5222 6.7990** 
 (0.0760)  (0.0088) (0.2778) (0.4584)  (0.2280) (0.0458) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0265   0.0461  0.0159  0.0156   0.005  0.0257  














Table 4.12: Panel Regression for Board Governance and Ownership Structures among Public Mutual Fund Companies 
 
This table reports regression results for performance to board governance and ownership structures among three categories of public mutual fund companies of 
those domestic equity funds.  Panel A reports the fund complex category “Focus”, those public and focused fund companies.  Panel B reports the fund complex 
category “Diversified (Non-Reg)”, those fund complexes which are wholly-owned subsidiaries or asset management arms (divisions) of non-Fed regulated public 
financial institutions or conglomerates. Panel C reports the fund complex category “Diversified (Reg)”, those which are wholly-owned (affiliated) subsidiaries or 
asset management arms of Fed-regulated public financial institutions.  Fund performance and fund characteristics ranges from Jan 2001 to Dec 2005 and reports 
in the frequency of 1-year (year 2005), 3-year (year 2003 to year 2005) and 5-year (year 2001 to year 2005), with both live and dead funds. The dependent 
variable is fee and market-adjusted holding period return (FMBHR) for all domestic equity funds in the fund complex. The independent variables contain an 
annual portfolio turnover ratio from previous twelve months;  an annual expense ratio from previous twelve months; a logarithm of aggregated total net asset for 
domestic equity funds within the same fund families; a manager tenure (average) at previous twelve months; “num_Tot_Director” ( total number of directors);  
“pct_indep” ( percentage of independent directors of the total number of directors in the board) ; “dummy_indep”, a dummy variable which equals one if a fund 
complex has more than 75% independent board;  “insider chairman dummy “ which equals one is a chairman is insider (dependent director); 
“Insiderhold_comm” (total percentage of holding of insiders); “Insiderblock” (5% inside block holders).  “5%_outblocks_insti” (institutional investors who own 
more than 5% shares).  Coefficients of portfolio turnover, total net asset and manager tenure have been multiplied by 100 for report purposes.  The standard 
errors are heteroskedasticity-robust. The p-values are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. 





















   Panel A 
   Fund Complex Category:  Focus, N=892  
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7  Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12  
Intercept 4.1787 *** -0.9179 4.3961*** 4.1537*** 9.6121*** 3.9544*** 4.1156 *** 4.5740*** -0.6168 0.1834 -1.6210 -0.8272
 ( <.0001) (0.4919) (0.0004) ( <.0001) (0.0036) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) (0.7863) (0.9383) (0.3261) (0.6197)
Turnover (-1) 0.2669 0.2685 0.2664 0.2673 0.2897 0.3685 0.3126 0.4358 0.6901** 0.6228** 0.6517** 0.5961** 
 (0.3144) (0.3079) (0.3155) (0.3140) (0.2753) (0.1764) (0.2512) (0.1340) (0.0190) (0.0351) (0.0262) (0.0429)
Expense (-1) -0.1297 0.3253 -0.1314 -0.1279 -0.1724 -0.2086 -0.1659 0.1467 0.4847 0.5457 0.5378 0.5791
 (0.7592) (0.4490) (0.7562) (0.7628) (0.6841) (0.6242) (0.6970) (0.7574) (0.3145) (0.2580) (0.2622) (0.2272)
Log TNA (-1)  0.2509 ** 0.2246 ** 0.2419** 0.2542** 0.2553** 0.2147** 0.2467 ** 0.3539*** 0.2256* 0.2819** 0.2035* 0.2206* 
 (0.0153) (0.0290) (0.0276) (0.0222) (0.0136) (0.0425) (0.0173) (0.0025) (0.0647) (0.0190) (0.0981) (0.0722)
Manager Tenure (-1) -0.0033 0.0006 -0.0032 -0.0034 -0.0032 -0.0038 -0.0038 -0.0080 -0.0033 -0.0027 -0.0027 -0.0019
 (0.5624) (0.9147) (0.5843) (0.5609) (0.5765) (0.5097) (0.5161) (0.2160) (0.6060) (0.6739) (0.6772) (0.7663)
Num_Tot_Director (-1)  0.3974 ***    0.4838*** 0.4608*** 0.5292*** 0.5185*** 
  ( <.0001)    ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001)
Pct_indep (-1)   -0.3250    -2.0137 -2.2294  
   (0.8043)    (0.2530) (0.2143)  
dummy_indep (-1)   0.0593   -1.6823* -2.3350** 
   (0.9363)   (0.0865) (0.0112)
Insider chairman D (-1)    -5.4464*   
    (0.0878)   
Insiderhold_comm (-1)     2.9102*  6.1904*** 4.3621* 
     (0.0962)  (0.0059) (0.0901) 
Insiderblock (-1)     1.0309 2.2672  0.9756
     (0.4581) (0.1891)  (0.5914)
5%_outblocks_insti (-1)      -3.4540*** -4.0359*** -4.6479*** -4.5482*** -5.3859*** 
          (0.0023) (0.0026) (0.0006) (0.0010) ( <.0001)
Adjusted R-squared 0.0016  0.0160  0.0011  0.0010  0.0028  0.0026  0.0014  0.0087  0.0315  0.0273  0.03276  0.03091  




    Panel B 
   Fund Complex Category: Diversified (Non-Reg), N=852 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7  Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12  
Intercept 1.5041 0.2402 2.4449 1.9521 2.9909 1.5560 1.5216 1.4172 -11.6226*** -8.8598** -2.8225 -2.3190
 (0.5406) (0.9438) (0.4661) (0.4358) (0.6277) (0.5281) (0.5375) (0.2843) (0.0014) (0.0115) (0.1007) (0.1765)
Turnover (-1) 0.0650 0.0498 0.0470 -0.0035 0.0860 0.1028 0.0868 0.9475** 0.9119** 0.9259** 0.8775** 0.9006** 
 (0.9349) (0.9504) (0.9533) (0.9965) (0.9142) (0.8975) (0.9134) (0.0310) (0.0353) (0.0331) (0.0436) (0.0387)
Expense (-1) -0.4766 -0.5473 -0.5419 -0.5678 -0.4699 -0.4164 -0.4874 0.9343 0.4534 0.5000 0.4445 0.4991
 (0.6679) (0.6247) (0.6289) (0.6114) (0.6746) (0.7098) (0.6634) (0.1017) (0.4309) (0.3863) (0.4431) (0.3901)
Log TNA (-1)  -0.1366 -0.1746 -0.1545 -0.1490 -0.1266 -0.1102 -0.1299 -0.2560** -0.3288** -0.3314** -0.3479*** -0.3468*** 
 (0.5942) (0.5174) (0.5571) (0.5634) (0.6234) (0.6698) (0.6139) (0.0389) (0.0109) (0.0106) (0.0072) (0.0075)
Manager Tenure (-1) 0.0349** 0.0374** 0.0367** 0.0403** 0.0343** 0.0358** 0.0347** -0.0258*** -0.0306*** -0.0275*** -0.0287*** -0.0258*** 
 (0.0288) (0.0263) (0.0289) (0.0175) (0.0319) (0.0258) (0.0313) (0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0044)
Num_Tot_Director (-1) 0.0924   0.5614*** 0.4633*** 0.3037*** 0.2695*** 
 (0.5868)   ( <.0001) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0026)
Pct_indep (-1) -1.3226   8.1199*** 6.0130**  
 (0.6804)   (0.0027) (0.0204)  
dummy_indep (-1) -1.5284  2.0193** 1.3763
 (0.3128)  (0.0437) (0.1630)
Insider chairman D (-1)  -1.5377  
  (0.7941)  
Insiderhold_comm (-1)   -10.1164 26.4005*** 22.1104*** 
   (0.4115) (0.0003) (0.0020) 
Insiderblock (-1)   -1.5760 31.4862***  27.7103** 
   (0.9381) (0.0052)  (0.0133)
5%_outblocks_insti (-1)   15.6550*** 9.7521* 10.9700** 8.3456* 9.8717* 
    (0.0015) (0.0531) (0.02926) (0.09446) (0.05302)
Adjusted R-squared 0.008   0.0003 0.0002 0.0007  0.0002  0.0005 0.0001 0.0379 0.0661 0.0601 0.0601  0.0559   





   Fund Complex Category: Diversified (Reg), N=1,903  
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7  Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12  
Intercept 3.0908*** 4.2263*** 2.7883 2.8468*** 2.5056*** 2.5907*** 2.5898*** 3.8225*** 4.0481 4.0667 5.1795** 5.1114** 
 ( <.0001) ( <.0001) (0.0017) ( <.0001) (0.0004) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) (0.2575) (0.2538) (0.0334) (0.0346)
Turnover (-1) 1.3046*** 1.4691*** 1.5320*** 1.5411*** 1.5061*** 1.5164*** 1.5184*** 1.5206*** 1.5077*** 1.5010*** 1.5065*** 1.5093*** 
 ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001)
Expense (-1) 0.2196 0.2954 0.2990 0.2953 0.2891 0.3100 0.3098 -0.5238 -0.5041 -0.4578 -0.4544 -0.4445
 (0.4011) (0.2477) (0.2459) (0.2516) (0.2586) (0.2269) (0.2271) (0.1753) (0.2305) (0.2662) (0.2793) (0.2794)
Log TNA (-1)  -0.0446 0.0334 0.0397 0.0398 0.0382 0.0401 0.0399 0.0255 -0.0157 -0.0202 -0.0274 -0.0296
 (0.5134) (0.6161) (0.5553) (0.5545) (0.5682) (0.5486) (0.5500) (0.7959) (0.8766) (0.8416) (0.7858) (0.7691)
Manager Tenure (-1) -0.0060 -0.0090** -0.0081** -0.0079* -0.0080** -0.0079* -0.0079* -0.0045 -0.0084 -0.0083 -0.0081 -0.0081
 (0.1427) (0.0265) (0.0482) (0.0530) (0.0497) (0.0508) (0.0507) (0.4790) (0.1883) (0.1924) (0.2044) (0.2004)
Num_Tot_Director (-1) -0.0943***  -0.3523*** -0.3558*** -0.4060*** -0.4051*** 
 (0.0038)  ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001) ( <.0001)
Pct_indep (-1) -0.1615 -0.9252 -0.9620 
 (0.8667) (0.7115) (0.6994) 
dummy_indep (-1)  -0.3106   -1.3546** -1.3377** 
  (0.4102)   (0.0499) (0.0475)
Insider chairman D (-1)  0.2043 4.6966** 4.6550** 4.3211** 4.3418** 
  (0.7036) (0.0184) (0.0190) (0.0252) (0.0239)
Insiderhold_comm (-1)  1.3853 0.2806  3.2573
  (0.2974) (0.9616)  (0.5878)
Insiderblock (-1)  1.9274  2.7915 5.0719
  (0.2651)  (0.6868) (0.4695)
5%_outblocks_insti (-1)  1.7872 10.6631** 10.6511** 9.1723** 9.3633** 
  (0.5955) (0.02413) (0.02347) (0.02568) (0.02156)




To find whether differences in fund performance and operational efficiency are 
correlated with their managing companies’ governance and ownership structure, we 
perform panel regressions. Considerable literature argues that insider ownership can 
mitigate information asymmetry (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Leland and Pyle (1977), 
McConnell and Servaes (1990), Anderson and Reeb (2003), Chen, Goldstein and Jiang 
(2006), and Khorana, Servaes and Wedge (2007)).  However, the entrenchment 
hypothesis also suggests firm value can be adversely affected by insider ownership 
(Jarrell and Poulson (1987), Stulz (1988), Slovin and Sushka (1993), Yafeh and Yosha 
(2003), DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985), and Shleifer and Vishny (1997)).   
We perform a multivariate regression to determine what affects fund performance 
and fund characteristics (operational efficiency) of focused and diversified mutual fund 
companies. To mitigate omitting potentially relevant time-invariant variables, we use 
panel regressiosn by pooling ownership and governance variables from 2000, 2002 and 
2004 while extracting performance data from 2001, 2003, and 2004.  
Table 4.12 Panels A, B and C report results for focused, non-regulated diversified 
fund companies and fed-regulated diversified fund companies for their fee and market-
adjusted performance with respect to board structure and insider and outsider ownership, 
as well as several fund-characteristic control variables.  The regressions examine how 
each of the board governance or ownership variables influences fund performance as well 
as pooling governance and ownership variables together.  Panel A reports results for 
focused mutual fund companies.  We find that fund performance is positively correlated 
with number of total directors, which is statistically significant at 1% level (in model 2, 9, 
10, 11, and 12) for focused fund companies.  It also shows a negative correlation between 
board structures with 75% above independent directors toward performance (in model 11 
and 12).   
The results are consistent with Meschke (2006) who argues that board 
independence does not affect fund performance in an economically significant way.  The 
results are also consistent with our univariate analysis which argues that governance 
structure alone does not fully explain differences between focused and diversified mutual 
fund companies.  Insider holdings, on the other hand, have a positive correlation with 
fund performance for the focused fund group (in model 6, 9, and 11) at the 10% 
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significant level.  The findings are consistent with Khorana, Servaes and Wedge (2007) 
who argue that higher ownership of portfolio managers is associated with improved 
performance.  Outside blockholder ownership, unlike insider ownership, shows a 
negative correlation with fund performance (in model 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12) and is 
statistically significant at 1% level.  This argument is consistent with Burkart, Gromb and 
Panunzi (1997) who argue that outside ownership constitutes an ex ante expropriation 
threat that reduces managerial initiative.  Performance also shows a statistically positive 
relationship with the size of funds under management of the mutual fund companies, 
consistent with the findings of Chen, Hong, Huang and Kubik (2004) who argue that 
there are economies of scale in operational efficiency.   
Panel B reports fund performance for ownership and governance variables within 
the group of non-Fed-regulated mutual fund companies.  Unlike focused fund companies, 
the percentage of independent directors (in model 9, and 10) and board structures with 
75% above independent directors (in model 11) both show a positive relationship with 
fund performance.  Board structures are relative more important in disciplining 
entrenched managers in diversified fund companies.  This result supports the findings 
Anderson, Bates, Bizjak, and Lemmon (1998) who do not find clear evidence to show 
that governance characteristics explain the value loss from diversification.  Insider 
holdings as well as insider block holdings (in model 10 and 12) have a statistically 
significant (at 1% significant level) effect on fund performance (in model 9 and 11).  
Unlike focused mutual fund companies, outside block holders have their monitoring 
capacities.  The existence of outside blockholders reduces free-rider problems in 
diversified fund companies, consistent with Demsetz (1986) and Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986).  Another interesting finding from those regressions is that manager tenure turns 
from positive to negative while portfolio turnover becomes positive correlated with fund 
performance.  This result implies the outside blockholders prevent managerial 
entrenchment in the diversified fund companies.  
Panel C reports fund performance for ownership and governance variables for the 
group of fed-regulated mutual fund companies.  Consistent with Panel B, block holder 
ownership is positively related to future fund performance within this group at 5% level 
(in model 9, 10, 11 and 12) but insider ownership loses its significance although it is still 
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positive.  Governance variables are consistent with the focused fund groups.  There is a 
negatively effect of board structures with 75% above independent directors on 
performance (in model 11 and 12) and a positive effect of insider chairman on fund 
performance (in model 9, 10, 11 and 12), consistent with Meschke (2006) who argues 
that board independence does not affect fund performance in an economically significant 
way.  The expense ratio, after adding ownership variable, turns from positive to negative.  
Although not statistically significant, there is evidence that contribute to operation 
efficiency.  Portfolio turnover is consistently positively correlated with fund performance 
across all models.    
Table 4.13: Robustness Test for “Focused” and “Public” versus “Diversified” and  
        “Private” Mutual Fund Companies 
This table reports test statistics for differences in mean and median of performance and fund characteristics 
for equity funds and domestic equity funds for those “focused” mutual fund companies. Sample ranges 
from Jan 2001 to Dec 2005 and reports in the frequency of 1-year (year 2005), 3-year (year 2003 to year 
2005) and 5-year (year 2001 to year 2005) with both live and dead funds.  Results are Winsorized to 98%.  
“Focus” stands for mutual fund companies are “publicl” and “focused” companies” while “B” stands for 
private banks that offer mutual fund products. “C” stands for private conglomerates that offer mutual fund 
products. “I” stands for private insurance companies that offer mutual fund products. “b” stands for private 
brokerages that offer mutual fund products.  Performance is measured in three ways; fee-adjusted buy and 
hold return (FBHR); fee and market-adjusted return (FMBHR), and the Sharpe ratio. Fund characteristics 
are measured in portfolio turnover (%); expense ratio (%); total net assets (in million dollars); manager 
tenures (in months) and average total net assets (in million dollars).  ***, **, and * indicate significance at 




“diversified (B+C+b+I)”  
1-year 3-year 5-year 
Equity Funds Mean Median Mean Median  Mean Median
Performance (FBHR, %) -0.14  0.66  31.88*** 27.27*** 14.04 * 8.76 ** 
Performance (FMBHR, %) 2.93*** 2.42*** 14.79*** 15.02*** 10.70 ** 7.77* 
Sharpe ratio -0.02  0.00  0.13*** 0.14*** 0.04 *** 0.03***
Portfolio turnover (%) -4.19  -6.30  -7.77  -9.33  -16.52  -21.99* 
Expense ratio (%) -0.03  -0.02  -0.03  -0.02  0.03  0.01  
Total net assets ($mn) 750.19*** 159.85*** 799.05*** 186.27*** 763.39 ** 278.80***
Manager tenure (months) 8.71*** 10.86*** 1.63  0.00  -0.10  1.60  
Average total net assets ($mn) 322.27*** 45.92*** 348.83*** 57.38*** 290.69 ** 80.04 ** 













“diversified (B+C+b+I)”  1-year 3-year 5-year 
Domestic Equity Funds Mean Median Mean Median  Mean Median  
Performance (FBHR, %) -1.51* 0.36 26.05*** 24.31*** 10.87 * 9.45** 
Performance (FMBHR, %) 1.94*** 1.95*** 10.33*** 12.39*** 7.07 ** 7.44* 
Sharpe ratio -0.04** 0.00 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.05 *** 0.04***
Portfolio turnover (%) -1.11 -8.10 5.20 -9.97 -9.85 -23.92* 
Expense ratio (%) -0.04 -0.03 -0.07 -0.05 -0.08 -0.07
Total net assets ($mn) 782.97*** 194.90*** 867.97*** 215.89*** 740.28 * 375.99***
Manager tenure (months) 6.83** 9.43*** -1.72 -6.27 -3.31 3.95
Average total net assets ($mn) 340.28*** 52.33*** 380.46*** 63.55*** 336.36 ** 108.61***






4.3 Robustness Check 
As our previous evidence shows, funds managed under focused mutual fund 
companies demonstrate superior fund performance and operating efficiency, consistent 
with literature that argues diversification destroys value.  Also, funds managed under 
public mutual fund companies have better incentives and other market discipline to 
outperform their private rivalries.  By joining those two arguments, we perform the test to 
show how a fund managed under a focused public fund company behaves relative to a 
private diversified one.   
Table 4.13 shows that differences in fee and market adjusted buy and hold returns 
are statistically significant for both equity funds (Panel A) and domestic equity funds 
(Panel B) across one, three, and five-year time span.  A fund managed under a focused 
public fund companies outperforms a fund managed under a diversified private fund 
company.  Fund characteristic (operation efficiency) variables, size of the assets under 
management, both in total net assets and average total net assets, are statistically 
significant (mostly at 1% level) for funds managed under focused public fund companies 
than those of the diversified private ones.  Differences in expense ratios are insignificant 
larger because public focused fund companies charge a higher fee for their reputation and 
services.  Fund managers take less risk at the public focused fund companies, while 
managers in diversified private fund companies have a lower portfolio turnover rate for  
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Table 4.14: Regression for “Focused” and “Public” versus “Diversified” and  
        “Private” among Mutual Fund Companies 
This table uses OLS regression to examine the relationship between fee and market-adjusted buy and hold 
returns (FMBHR) for the past one, three and five-year to the different type of mutual fund companies to 
study the effect of being “public”.  Sample ranges from Jan 2001 to Dec 2005 and reports in the frequency 
of in the frequency of 1-year (year 2005), 3-year (year 2003 to year 2005) and 5-year (year 2001 to year 
2005) with both live and dead funds.  “Focus” stands for mutual fund companies are “public” and 
“focused” companies.  “B” stands for private banks that offer mutual fund products.  “C” stands for private 
conglomerates that offer mutual fund products.  “b” stands for private brokerages that offer mutual fund 
products.  “I” stands for private insurance companies that offer mutual fund products.  EF stands for equity 
funds and DEF stands for domestic equity funds based on the definition of fund objective from CRSP tape. 
The dependent variable is fee and market-adjusted buy and hold returns (FMBHR) for a pool of “focus” 
and “diversified (B+C+b+I)”.  The independent variables contain: a “focused publicly-traded mutual fund 
company” dummy which equals one if a fund is managed by “1”; an annual portfolio turnover ratio from 
previous year; an annual expense ratio from previous year; a logarithm total net asset from previous year; a 
manager’s tenure from previous year. Coefficients of portfolio turnover, total net asset and manager tenure 
have been multiplied by 100 for report purposes. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust. The p-
values are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level 
respectively. 
 
1-year 3-year 5-year “Focus” subtracts 
“Diversified 
(B+C+b+I)  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 EF  DEF  EF  DEF  EF  DEF  
Intercept 1.4458  3.7291***     -23.8052*** 3.8578  -25.2557* 22.4009 
 (0.1591)  (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.4699)  (0.0539) (0.1358) 
Dummy of being "1" i,t 2.9666 *** 1.8588*** 16.5100*** 9.5709 *** 17.5362** 15.3171* 
 (0.0000)  (0.0026) (0.0000) (0.0016)  (0.0322) (0.0545) 
Turnover i,t-1  0.7690 ** 0.4312 1.8668 2.8360  -19.1639*** -19.3187*** 
 (0.0400)  (0.2308) (0.4363) (0.1685)  (0.0004) (0.0007) 
Expense i, t-1 1.6498 *** -0.0788 25.9775*** 3.9864  50.5106*** 8.0370 
 (0.0027)  (0.8864) (0.0000) (0.2195)  (0.0000) (0.3777) 
Log TNA i, t-1 -0.0042  0.0057 -0.0526 -0.0308  -0.1204 -0.2680** 
 (0.7936)  (0.7200) (0.5932) (0.6965)  (0.3254) (0.0267) 
Manager Tenure  i, t-1 0.3531  -0.9254 4.7788 -0.2122  5.8803 6.8546 
 (0.6394)  (0.1790) (0.2637) (0.9494)  (0.4861) (0.3585) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0390   0.0114  0.2105  0.0366   0.3185  0.1314  














the career threat for their underperformance.  To quantify, the differences in fee and 
market-adjusted returns have a lower bound of 1.94% to a upper bound of 2.93% with 
one year; a 10.33% to 15.02% in three-year; and a 7.07% to 10.70% with five-year period. 
In Table 4.14, we estimate cross section for one, three, and five-year time frames 
on both equity funds and domestic equity funds to examine the relationship between fee 
and market-adjusted buy and hold returns with respect to being a public or private and 
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organization structure, and being focused or diversified after controlling for fund 
characteristic variables.  Our results show that the focused and public dummies are 
positive and statistically significant at 1% for both equity funds and domestic equity 
funds in the panel of one-year and three-year.  The statistical significance remains at 5% 
level in a five-year period for equity funds and 10% for domestic equity funds.  This 
evidence strengthens our findings that ownership structure and organization structure 




























CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION 
 
For the past decades, the mutual fund literature has documented how fund 
characteristics contribute to differences of fund performance.  It is only recently that with 
the rise of fund scandals that mutual fund researchers have started emphasize the agency 
issues.  The passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) in 1999 opens up the 
competition among banks, securities firms, insurance and asset management companies 
and the existence of financial conglomerates.  Although the structure of financial 
conglomerates enables financial institutions to achieve economies of scales and scopes, it 
also generates conflicts interest among different participants.  This paper uses all U.S. 
registered investment companies in the post GLBA era and the ten-year even window 
surrounding their IPOs to investigate how the organizational structure of being focused 
versus diversified, and public and private affect fund performance and operating 
efficiency.  We document three important findings.  First, funds managed under a focused 
mutual fund company demonstrate better fund performance and superior operating 
efficiency relative to diversified ones.  Second, funds managed under public mutual fund 
entity outperforms private rivalries.  Third, funds managed under diversified fund 
companies experience performance deteriorates during the years following their IPOs 
while their focused counterparts generate performance enhancement.   We argue that 
publicly traded, a focused business line, and a large insider ownership explains the 
differences in performance and operational efficiency between mutual fund companies 
Using mutual fund complexes to study issues of focus versus diversification and 
subsequent performance of IPOs gives us several advantages.  Given the relative static 
nature of fund complexes, it mitigates the endogeneity problem that pervades corporate 
finance in determining whether it is firm characteristics that cause firms to diversify and 
to be traded at discounted.  With a pure product market which publicly reports 
performance and fund characteristics regardless of whether the fund complex is publicly-
traded or privately-owned, we can compare the performance and operating efficiency of 
the product markets and draw conclusions about firm operation without suffering self 
selection bias on the difficulties of using accounting measures.  Our results not only 
contribute to the evolution of mutual fund operations but have implications for regulators 




CHAPTER 6 INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1999, the U.S. Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services 
Modernization (GLBA) Act to enhance competition among banks, securities firms, 
insurance and asset management companies.  This legislation also removed some of the 
key structural barriers built into the U.S. regulatory system for many years and enhanced 
the potential for conflicts of interest in the financial services industry.  For example, 
Morgan Stanley paid $52 million in fines in November 2003 for its failure to disclose to 
investors that its brokers were paid more to sell in-house funds.  Other fund scandals such 
as market timing25 and late trading have resulted in the payment of large fines by Putnam, 
MFS, and other mutual fund companies to settle charges with their investors.  
The issue of whether a conglomerate business model enhances efficiency in 
financial services or creates opportunities for conflicts of interests remains an important 
issue under active debate.  Numerous studies report that divestitures enhance value.  The 
gain in shareholder wealth from restructuring conglomerates into focused entities has 
been documented by Comment and Jarrell (1995).  John and Ofek (1995) find that an 
improvement in operating performance for sellers of assets occurs primarily when there is 
an increase in focus.  Maksimovic and Philips (2001) point out that there is a large and 
active market for corporate assets from sales of individual plants and divisions up to sales 
of entire corporations.   Each year an average of 3.89% of large manufacturing plants 
changed ownership during 1974 to 1992.  After the passage of GLBA act, there has been 
an increasing level of acquisitions and asset sales activities including mutual funds, 
among financial institutions.    
The trend for financial conglomerates to sell-off mutual fund units is worthy of 
investigation.  For example, Citigroup sold its mutual fund unit to Legg Mason in 
December 2005.  In 2006, Merrill Lynch sold its mutual fund business to BlackRock 
reflecting the fact that Merrill Lynch, particularly in terms of bond funds, had struggled 
without gaining improved performance.  The asset acquisition has made BlackRock a $1 
trillion money-management powerhouse. 
                                                 
25 Market timing refers to rapid trades in and out of mutual funds to capture short-term market movement, 
which many funds officially prohibit since it drives up costs for average investors and makes the total 
portfolio harder to manage. 
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The latest sale of a mutual fund unit relates to Putnam.  Putnam’s total assets 
under management were ranked 4th in the industry prior to the market-timing scandals in 
2001.  Investors have since withdrawn a net of $106 billion from Putnam and assets 
under management dropped to a nine-year low before its parent Marsh and McLennan 
decided to put the unit up for sale.26 Soon after Putnam’s asset sale announcement, Sun 
Life Financial of Canada retained investment bankers to explore a sale of its mutual fund 
units, MFS Investment Management.  
Hite, Owers, and Rogers (1987) define an asset sell-off as the sale of a subsidiary, 
division, or other operating assets to a buyer for cash, securities, and/or other future 
consideration.  The literature proposes at least four motives for asset sales: (1) an exit 
strategy that entails liquidation or sale of unprofitable units (Alexander, Benson, and 
Kampmeyer (1984), Jain (1985), Brown, James, and Mooradian (1994), and Ofek (1993)); 
(2) a business strategy of restructuring a parent from a diversified to a focused structure 
(John and Ofek (1995)); (3) a source of external financing (Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz 
(1995) (the financing hypothesis), Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991), and Bates (2005)); 
or (4) a simply a reallocation of resources to higher-valued uses  (Hite, Owers, and 
Rogers (1987), (the synergy hypothesis)).  Nevertheless, information conveyed by asset 
sales is difficult to evaluate because asset sales convey news about the value of the asset 
sold, the parent’s intended use of the proceeds, and the selling firm’s value.  John and 
Ofek (1995) evaluate the seller’s profitability following the divestiture.  Maksimovic and 
Philips (2001) examine sales of individual plants and document that there is an 
improvement in the efficiency of assets after they are transferred to acquirers. 
Jayaraman, Khorana, and Nelling (2002) study the determinants and shareholder 
wealth effects of mutual fund mergers.  They conclude that acquiring fund shareholders 
suffer a significant deterioration in performances but shareholders of target funds 
experience significant improvements in postmerger performance as well as a reduction in 
expense ratios.  Since asset sell-offs represent partial acquisitions from the buyer’s 
perspective, the motivations for asset sales are broadly in common with mergers and 
acquisitions.  Thus the transition of funds from diversified to focused management 
companies via asset sales should enhance management efficiency and performance.  
                                                 
26 According to figures compiled by Bloomberg News and Financial Research Corp in Feb 2006. 
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Acquiring companies merge funds acquired through asset sales into their existing funds, 
suggesting the opportunity for an improvement of efficiency, but in practice performance 
deteriorates after acquisitions.  To clarify the performance and managerial efficiency after 
the asset sales, there is a need to divide the product market into funds that remain stand-
alone versus those funds that are merged into buyers’ existing funds. 
Unlike most of the literature which focuses on firm level transactions and 
evaluates the announcement window effects of asset sales, this paper examines the 
product market of all open-end mutual funds to investigate whether a reallocation of 
resources to higher-valued uses takes place so that fund holder gain from asset sales.  
Because of the unique regulatory environment of mutual funds, there is extensive public 
disclosure which allows us to observe fund performance and operating efficiency of the 
unit even when asset sales involve private fund companies.  Using an event window 
across 10 years, that is from 5 years prior to 5 years after an asset sale, allows us to 































CHAPTER 7 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
7.1 Asset Sales 
The divestiture literature uniformly agrees that asset sales generate gains to seller 
firms.  Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (2005) document that the means of payment in 
asset sales affects the pattern of returns.  Since equity deals are associated with the 
formation of blockholders, these result asset sales in positive returns to buyers as well as 
sellers.  Overall, they find gains for buyers which are generally insignificant or 
inconclusive for cash but strongly positive for equity.  Using an asymmetric information 
model, Hege, Lovo, Slovin, and Sushka (2007) show that there are large gains in wealth 
for both buyers and sellers in equity-based asset sales that do not involve the formation of 
corporate blockholding while cash deal generate relatively small gains that accrue only to 
sellers.  Without assessing the means of payment, other researchers generally find that 
asset sales create gains for both buyers and sellers.  For example, Alexander, Benson, and 
Kampmeyer (1984) and Jain (1985) conclude that announcements of partial sell-offs of 
operations generate positive abnormal returns on the announcement date and that sell-offs 
generally occur after a period of negative returns prior to the asset sales.  Hite, Owers, 
and Rogers (1987) find that both sellers and bidders earn small positive abnormal returns 
at the announcement of partial sell-offs.  The combined gains for buyers and sellers are 
consistent with the synergy hypothesis for interfirm tender offers proposed by Bradley, 
Desai and Kim (1983) who argue that positive returns are due to reallocation of resources 
to more efficient uses, rather than mispricing as a result of information asymmetry.   
Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995) find that there are positive returns to sellers only 
when they use proceeds to pay off debt (a financing hypothesis), contrary to the synergy 
rationale used by Hite, Owers, and Rogers (1987).  In a related study, Lang, Stulz, and 
Walkling (1991) argue that bidders with high free cash flow and poor investment 
opportunities encounter significant negative returns at acquisition announcements.  Bates 
(2005) finds that shareholder returns for firms that retain the cash proceeds from asset 
sales decisions are positively correlated with growth opportunities and benchmarked 
investment but are negatively correlated with benchmarked investment for firms with 




Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Servaes (1996), and Lamont and 
Polk (2002) find that there is conglomerate discount that is on average of 10% to 12% so 
that diversification appears to destroy shareholder wealth.  On the other hand, Williamson 
(1975) contends that diversification allows firms to allocate their capital internally at 
lower cost relative to banks and other financial institutions.  Stein (1997), and Desai, 
Foley and Hines (2004) also argue diversified firms can allocate capital more efficiently 
than external capital markets as a result of information asymmetries.  Empirically, John 
and Ofek (1995) find that asset sales lead to an improvement in sellers’ operating 
performance in the subsequent three years when there is an increase in focus for sellers.  
More broadly, Comment and Jarrell (1995) document that there is a positive relationship 
between focus and shareholder returns.  Based on these arguments above, we propose our 
testing hypothesis to be:  
H1: Funds suffer poor performance prior to the onset of asset sales.   
H2: Funds experience performance improvement and improved efficiency      
subsequent to the asset sales. 
To investigate the outcome for buyers from the asset sales, we use as a database 
of all U.S registered investment companies that voluntarily announce partial sell-offs of 
mutual fund units, document their product market performance and efficiency during the 
transition from sellers to buyers, and shed new light on the evidence about gains to 
buyers in asset sales. 
7.2 Mutual Fund Governance 
 The SEC has pursued several initiatives to strengthen internal monitoring and 
governance mechanisms in the mutual fund industry, partly as a result of scandals in the 
mutual fund industry ranging from market timing to late trading.  Among the proposed 
rules, the SEC would require that the boards of most mutual funds be comprised of at 
least 75% independent directors and have an independent chair.  On June 23 rd 2006, a 
federal appeals court overruled the SEC’s proposed rules for the third time in less than a 
year.  Specifically, the court invalidated rules requiring that the boards of most mutual 
funds be comprised of at least 75% independent directors and have an independent chair.  
The SEC has reopened the comment period regarding amendments to investment 
company governance provisions.  There have been hearings before committees in 
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Congress, with industry representatives and regulators testifying as to whether tighter 
regulations with detailed disclosures are needed, but no legislation has been passed.   
Although the SEC has not been able to enforce changes in board governance of 
mutual funds, Tufano and Sevick (1997) have documented that managerial efficiency 
with respect to fee structure, is related to board governance.  Meschke (2006), Del 
Guercio, Dann and Partch (2003), and Ding and Wermers (2006) also argue that 
managerial efficiency and performance are related to the size and independence of the 
board of directors, indicating that sound governance with independent directors provides 
more efficient monitoring and reduces agency problems.  Based on the governance 
literature for mutual funds, we propose the following hypothesis:  
H3: Fund performance and managerial efficiency (fund characteristics) is 
associated with the size of the board and the independence of the board for both 
buyers and sellers from asset sale. 
7.3 Ownership  
One possible explanation for changes in performance and operational efficiency 
after asset sales is the change in equity ownership, such as the formation of corporate 
blockholders and the associated favorable information conveyed about buyers in equity 
deals as documented in Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (2005).  Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1988) conclude that management ownership and Tobin Q have a non-linear 
relationship.  Tobin’s Q first rises, then declines, and finally rises again as ownership by 
the board of directors rises.  The positive relationship between management ownership 
and performance is consistent with the convergence of interests hypothesis (Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), Leland and Pyle (1977), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Anderson and 
Reeb (2003), Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2006), and Khorana, Servaes and Wedge (2007)) 
while a negative relationship supports the entrenchment hypothesis (Jarrell and Poulson 
(1987), Stulz (1988), Slovin and Sushka (1993), Yafeh and Yosha (2003), DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo (1985), Shleifer and Vishny (1997)).  Based on these hypotheses, we propose 
that there is a nonlinear relationship between management ownership and fund 
performance.  Our hypothesis is:  
H4: Fund performance exhibits a non-linear relationship with the changes of 
management ownership surround the asset sale. 
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The relationship between outside blockholders’ ownership and firm value can also 
be positive or negative.  A positive relationship coincides with a monitoring hypothesis, 
such as Shleifer and Vishny (1986), implying that outside shareholders perform 
monitoring duties to reduce agency problems.  However, large blockholders can reduce 
managerial initiative and firm values (Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997)).  Based on 
the available evidence, we propose the following hypothesis:  
H5: Fund performance might either increase or decrease with the changes of 








































CHAPTER 8 DATA AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTION  
8.1 Data 
 To obtain data for mutual fund asset sales, we examine asset sales agreements 
reported in LexisNexis, EBSCOhost, Dow Jones and Associated Press (Factiva) 
Databases from March 1990 to June 2007.  We identify the announcement date of each 
asset sale as the earliest date found within the collective databases.  The effective dates 
are defined as the date when the relevant mutual fund units are transferred from sellers to 
the buyers using the same sources from the above.  To be included in the sample, each 
asset sale transaction must involve at least two U.S. registered investment (mutual fund) 
companies with the seller voluntarily announcing its intent to sell a mutual fund unit to 
the buyer by transferring full ownership of the mutual fund unit from the seller to the 
buyer.  Fund performance (fee-adjusted returns) and fund characteristic variables, 
including total net assets under management, expense ratio, portfolio turnover, and 
manager tenure are extracted from the CRSP Survivor-Free US Mutual Fund Database.   
Some buyers’ fund families merge the newly-acquired funds associated with asset 
sales into their existing funds.  Consequently, we further split the sample funds into funds 
that remain stand-alone and funds that are merged after the transition from sellers to 
buyers.27  It worth noting that the merged funds in our sample might overlap with the 
cross-family fund mergers sample of Jayaraman, Khorana, and Nelling (2002) who find 
that acquiring fund shareholders suffer a significant deterioration in fund performance.  
Since an asset sell-off represents a partial acquisition from the buyers perspective, by 
splitting the data into two different sub-samples, we should be able to test whether a 
reallocation of resources to higher-valued uses can generate the efficiency gains in terms 
of product market (fund) performance from those funds that remain stand-alone after the 
asset sale.  Moreover, disaggregation of the sample might improve our understanding of 
buyers’ intent in reallocating resources after an asset sale.  Consequently, the results from 
asset sales for the two subgroups might be different.   
                                                 
27 An example for a stand-along fund would be ABN AMRO sell its US mutual fund business to Highbury 
Financial so an existing ABN AMRO fund named ABN AMRO Growth Fund will be named Aston/ ABN 
AMRO Growth Fund after the asset sale.  An example for a fund merged to the buyer’s fund would be 
Washing Mutual sold its mutual fund units to Principal Financial Group so the WF Growth Fund merged 




To evaluate the effects of fund asset sales, we create a matched sample of fund 
companies.  The matched sample is created from a matched fund family with (1) a similar 
level of family concentration that is chosen from the absolute minimum difference of 
number of styles of equity and bond funds managed by the matched family, (2) a similar 
family size which is chosen from the absolute minimum difference of total net asset 
managed under the matched families, and (3) a similar fund size with same management 
style that is chosen from the absolute minimum difference of total net assets for the 
particular matched fund from the matched fund family with the same Standard & Poor’s 
SI-OBJ code (fund style) at 13 months prior to the onset of an asset sale.  For example, if 
a sample fund is an “Equity USA Aggressive Growth Fund”, it will be matched to the 
same fund type from the matched fund family.  We delete those funds that do not have  
complete information on total net assets and net asset value at 24 months prior to the 
formation of the matched fund to mitigate backfill bias.   
Information on the underlying share ownership of insiders and outsiders as well as 
the board structure for buyers and sellers and matched sample fund companies is 
manually collected from proxy statements (DEF 14A) reported on the SEC EDGAR 
Database from the SEC filing for two years prior and two years after the announcement 
of the asset sale for both buyers and sellers to analyze how changes of ownership affect 
fund performance and management efficiency around the asset sale.  For private fund 
companies, board data are manually collected from Forms 485APOS and 485BPOS.  
Given that there is prior literature that argues that firm value is positively associated with 
more concentrated ownership (convergence of interests hypothesis), we collect the 
percentage of shares held by insiders (board of directors and executives as a group) 
relative to total shares outstanding (in percentage), by insider blocks, and by outsider 
blocks.  To measure other governance related effects, we collect the number of board 
members, non-independent board members, percentage of independent directors, and 
whether the chairman of the board is an inside board member. 
8.2 Sample Description 
In Table 8.1, Panel A reports the number of fund companies engaging in asset 
sales by year from 1990 through 2007.  The total sample includes 21 buyers and 21 
sellers with most of the activity clustered in 1994, 2000, 2005 and 2006.   
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Panel B reports that 62% of the sellers and 71% of the buyers are public 
companies.  Panels C and D show that diversified (banks, insurance companies) and 
conglomerate financial institutions make up 81% of the sellers.  Sixty-seven percent of 
the buyers, on the other hand, are focused mutual fund companies.  In terms of the main 
business of the asset sale investment companies, 67% of the buyers are mutual fund 
advisors while more than 80% of the sellers are banks, insurance companies and 
conglomerates.  Thus asset sales involve more assets shifting from diversified financial 
groups to more focused asset management groups. Panel E, F, G report differences for 
ownership and board governance variables between buyers and sellers of fund families at 
Table 8.1: Descriptive Statistics of Asset Sales from Mutual Fund Companies 
This table reports summary statistics of asset sales of mutual fund companies.  Data Source is from 
LexisNexis, EBSCOhost, Dow Jones and Associated Press (Factiva) Databases from March 1990 to June 
2007.  Panel A reports the distribution of those 21 events (42 mutual fund companies) and 524 funds by the 
year of announcement.28  Panel B reports the distribution of asset sales by their ownership structure of 
being public or private of those mutual fund companies.  Panel C reports the distribution of asset sales by 
their organization structure of those mutual fund companies.  Panel D reports distribution of asset sales by 
their main business of those mutual fund companies. Panel E reports ownership variables for both buyers 
(B) and sellers (S) at two fiscal years prior and two fiscal years post during the onset of asset sales.  Insider 
holding measures percentage of shares holding for board of directors and executives as defined in the proxy 
statement.  Sum of 1% above insider blocks aggregates inside blockholders who own more than 1% 
outstanding common shares of the firms.  Sum of 5% above outsider blocks aggregate institutions and non-
insiders who own more than 5% outstanding common shares of the firms.  Ownership data is collected 
from the proxy statement (DEF 14A) from the SEC filing.  Panel F reports board governance variables for 
both buyers (B) and sellers (S) at two fiscal years prior and two fiscal years post during the onset of asset 
sales.   Number of total directors measures board size.  Number of independent directors and number of 
non-independent directors measure directors who are independent from the operations of the firm or not 
associated with the firms as defined in the SEC filing.  Board governance data is collected from form 
485APOS and Form 485BPOS from the SEC filing.  Panel G reports differences in means and medians for 
board governance and ownership variables for both buyers (B) and sellers (S) by using variables from two 
fiscal years post subtract two fiscal year prior to the onset of asset sales.  Panel H reports differences on 
means and medians between sample and matched samples (M) for the  ownership variables at two fiscal 
year prior (for sellers) and two fiscal year post (for buyers) to the onset of asset sales.  The matched sample 
is created from a matched fund family with (1) a similar level of family concentration (the absolute 
minimum difference of number of styles of equity and bond funds managed by the matched family), (2) a 
similar family size (the absolute minimum difference of total net asset among matched families), and (3) a 
similar fund size with same management style (the absolute minimum difference of total net asset for the 
particular matched fund from the matched fund family with same SI-OBJ code (fund style)) at 13 months 
prior to the onset of asset sales.  Panel I reports differences on means and medians between sample funds 
(for both buyers (B) and sellers (S)) and matched sample funds (M) for the governance variables at two 
fiscal year prior (for sellers) and post (for buyers) to the onset of asset sales.  P-values are in parentheses.  
Statistical significance is indicated by * at the 10% level, ** at 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
 
table continued 
                                                 
28 Number of funds in this panel is reported base on the time of announcement.  For the assessment of fund 
performance and characteristics in the later tables, we exclude funds with missing data thus reduce the 
sample to 387 funds at the time of the announcement.   
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  Panel A：Distribution of Events and Funds at the Announcement of Asset Sales by Year  
Year of the announcement Number of events of asset sale Number of funds involved 
2007 1   66 
2006 4 135 
2005 3 113 
2004 1   21 
2003 1    8 
2002 1  33 
2000 3  40 
1997 1   2 
1996 1   7 
1994 3  68 
1993 1   7 
1990 1  24 
1990-2007 21 524 
 
Panel B：Distribution of Asset Sales by Ownership Structure of Mutual Fund Companies 
  Number of Sellers (%) Number of Acquirers (%) 
Public fund companies 13 (61.90%) 15 (71.43%) 
Private fund companies 8 (38.10%) 6 (28.57%) 
 
Panel C：Distribution of Asset Sales by Organization Structure of Mutual Fund Companies 
  Number of Sellers (%) Number of Acquirers (%) 
Focused fund companies 4 (19.05%) 14 (66.67%) 
Diversified fund companies 17 (80.95%) 7 (33.33%) 
 
Panel D：Distribution of Asset Sales by Mutual Fund (Parent) Companies' Main Business 
  Number of Sellers (%) Number of Acquirers (%) 
Mutual fund advisors 4 (19.05%) 14 (66.67) 
Banks 7 (33.33%) 3 (14.29%) 
Insurance companies 7 (33.33%) 3 (14.29%) 
Conglomerates and others 3 (14.29%) 1 (4.76%) 
Total number of firms 21 (100%) 21 (100%) 
 
Panel E：Ownership Structure between Buyers (B) and Sellers (S) 
Mean  Median 
Buyers (B) and Sellers (S) 
(B) (S) Differences (B)-(S)  (B) (S) 
Differences 
(B)-(S) 
A. Year=-2          
Insider holding 0.1019 0.0149 0.0707*  0.0405 0.0100 0.0176** 
 (0.0533)   (0.0186) 
Sum of 1% above inside blocks 0.0564 0.0102 0.0474*  0.0176 0.0100 0.0100** 
 (0.0809)   (0.0313) 
Sum of 5% above outside blocks 0.1034 0.0573 0.0571  0.0686 0.0100 0.0404* 






     
B. Year=+2     
Insider holding 0.0960 0.0225 0.0602*  0.0288 0.0130 0.0010 
 (0.0707)   (0.1377) 
Sum of 1% above inside blocks 0.0550 0.0129 0.0446*  0.0142 0.0100 0.0000 
 (0.0938)   (0.1250) 
Sum of 5% above outside blocks 0.1028 0.0529 0.0586*  0.0680 0.0560 0.0160* 
  (0.0643)     (0.0737)   
 
Panel F：Board Governance Structure between Buyers (B) and Sellers (S)  
Mean  Median 
Buyers (B) and Sellers (S) 
(B) (S) Differences (B)-(S)  (B) (S) 
Differences 
(B)-(S) 
A. Year=-2          
Number of total directors 11.6667 10.7778 0.8889  11.0000 10.0000 1.0000 
 (0.3085)   (0.2788) 
Number of independent 
directors 7.8889 8.7222 -0.8333 
 
7.5000 8.0000 -2.5000 
 (0.2762)   (0.2041) 
Number of non-independent 
directors 3.7222 2.0556 1.6667** 
 
3.0000 2.0000 1.5000*** 
 (0.0385)     (0.0061)   
Ratio of independent 
directors  0.6305 0.8212 -0.1907*** 
 
0.6458 0.8000 -0.1750*** 
  (0.0026)     (0.0027)   
          
B. Year=+2 
Number of total directors 11.1111 10.8889 0.2222  11.5000 10.0000 1.0000 
 (0.4331)   (0.3179) 
Number of independent 
directors 7.9444 8.6667 -0.7222 
 
7.5000 8.0000 -2.0000 
 (0.2911)   (0.3201) 
Number of non-independent 
directors 3.1667 2.2222 0.9444 
 
2.5000 2.0000 1.0000 
 (0.1810)     (0.1323)   
Ratio of independent 
directors  0.6771 0.8134 -0.1363** 
 
0.7143 0.8333 -0.1190* 
  (0.0453)     (0.0770)   
 
Panel G：Ownership and Governance Variables from 2 Years Post Minus 2 Years Prior for  
     Both Buyers (B) and Sellers (S)   
Mean  Median 
Buyers (B), Sellers (S) 
(S) (B)  (S) (B) 
A. Ownership structure          
Insider holding 0.0076 -0.0058  0.0030 ** -0.0061* 





Sum of 1% above inside blocks 0.0027** -0.0014  0.0000 ** -0.0015* 
 (0.0433) (0.3226)  (0.0469)  (0.0977) 
Sum of 5% above outside blocks -0.0044 -0.0007  0.0000  -0.0018 
 (0.4147) (0.4672)  (0.2734)  (0.1167) 
       
B. Board governance structure           
Number of total directors 0.1111 -0.5556*  0.0000  -0.5000** 
 (0.4162) (0.0580)  (0.4259)  (0.0435) 
Number of independent directors -0.0566 -0.0566  0.0000  0.0000 
 (0.4477) (0.4486)  (0.5000)  (0.4707) 
Number of non-independent 
directors 0.1667 -0.5556** 
 0.0000  0.0000** 
 (0.2641) (0.0185)  (0.5000)  (0.0283) 
Ratio of independent directors  -0.0078 0.0466*  0.0000  0.0448* 
  (0.3464) (0.0667)  (0.4250)  (0.0938) 
 
Panel H：Ownership Structure between Sellers (S), Buyers (B) and Matched Sample (M)  
Mean  Median Buyers (B), Sellers (S), and 
Matched (M) (S)-(M) (B)-(M)  (S)-(M) (B)-(M) 
A. Year=-2          
Insider holding -0.0913*** -0.0392  -0.0097 *** 0.0000 
 (<0.001) (0.1069)  (0.0017)  (0.2666) 
Sum of 1% above inside blocks -0.0384*** -0.0234**  -0.0015 *** 0.0000 
 (0.0016) (0.0410)  (<0.001)  (0.1782) 
Sum of 5% above outside blocks -0.0606** 0.1102***  -0.0255 ** 0.0400** 
 (0.0333) (0.0045)  (0.0156)  (0.0113) 
          
B. Year=+2          
Insider holding -0.0720*** -0.0331*  -0.0036 *** 0.0050 
 (0.0015) (0.0980)  (0.0033)  (0.3448) 
Sum of 1% above inside blocks -0.0282*** -0.0160*  0.0000 *** 0.0000 
 (0.0033) (0.0568)  (0.0035)  (0.2385) 
Sum of 5% above outside blocks -0.0367 0.1156***  -0.0005  0.0479*** 
 (0.1190) (0.0016)  (0.1963)  (0.0036) 
 
Panel I：Governance Structure between Sellers (S), Buyers (B) and Matched Sample (M)  
Mean  Median Buyers (B), Sellers (S), and 
Matched (M) (S)-(M) (B)-(M)  (S)-(M) (B)-(M) 
A. Year=-2          
Number of total directors 1.5429*** 2.7429***  1.0000 *** 4.0000*** 





Number of independent directors 1.9619*** 1.1238***  2.0000 *** 1.0000*** 
 (<0.001) (0.0076)  (<0.001)  (0.0096) 
Number of non-independent 
directors -0.4095** 1.5619*** 
 0.0000 *** 1.0000*** 
 (0.0269) (<0.001)  (<0.001)  (<0.001) 
Ratio of independent directors  0.0856*** -0.1082***  0.0833 *** -0.0667*** 
  (<0.001) (<0.001)  (<0.001)  (<0.001) 
          
B. Year=+2          
Number of total directors 1.5429*** 2.0095***  1.0000 *** 3.0000*** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001)  (<0.001)  (<0.001) 
Number of independent directors 1.7429*** 1.2857***  2.0000 *** 1.0000*** 
 (<0.001) (0.0038)  (<0.001)  (0.0028) 
Number of non-independent 
directors -0.2000 0.7238*** 
 0.0000 *** 0.0000** 
 (0.1863) (0.0033)  (0.0027)  (0.0307) 
Ratio of independent directors  0.0682*** -0.0389*  0.0692 *** 0.0000 
  (<0.001) (0.0525)  (<0.001)  (0.1539) 
 
two years prior and two years post relative to the asset sales, and the differences are also 
reported.  Buyers have a higher percentage of insiders holdings as well as a larger 
percentage of shares held by insider blocks and outsider blocks, relative to sellers at both 
2 years prior and 2 years after the asset sale (Panel E).  On the other hand, buyers have a 
higher percentage of non-independent directors (Panel F).  During the four years span 
(Panel G), buyers reduce their board size while increasing their percentage of 
independent director members.  Panels H and I compare the ownership and governance 
variables from sample fund families to matched sample’s during the two years prior and 
post of asset sales. The results show that seller fund families have a smaller percentage of 
shares held by insiders.  Seller fund families also have a smaller percentage of shares held 
by insider blocks, a smaller percentage of shares held by outsider blocks, larger boards, 
and a higher ratio of independent directors at both two years prior and two years after 
asset sales when compared to the matching fund families.  Buyer fund families have a 
larger percentage of shares hold by outsider blocks, larger boards, and a lower ratio of 
independent directors at both two years prior and two years after an asset sale when 
compared to the matching fund families.    
Table 8.2 Panels A, B, and C report descriptive statistics for fund performance and 
fund characteristics prior to the asset sales for sample, matched sample, and sample 
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minus matched sample funds.  Two asset sales announced in 2006 and one case in 2007 
are still pending, involving 90 separate funds, are not included in our sample.  The final 
sample consists of 387 open-end mutual funds with 180 domestic equity funds, 25 
international equity funds, 76 taxable bond funds, and 106 tax-free bond funds.  Prior to 
asset sales, sample funds demonstrate lower performance, larger fund size (total net asset), 
lower portfolio turnover, and higher manager tenure when compared to the matched 
funds, although the differences are not statistically significant.  The expense ratio is lower 
in domestic equity funds and tax-free bond funds prior to the asset sale.   
Table 8.2: Descriptive Statistics for Funds from Sellers of the Asset Sales 
This table compares sample (Panel A) and matched sample (Panel B) funds and reports statistics for means 
and medians (in parentheses) for each sample, matched sample, and their differences (Panel C) for all 
equity (domestic equity funds (DEF) and international equity funds (IEF)) and bond funds (taxable bond 
funds (TBF) and tax-free bond funds (TFF)) prior to the onset of asset sales of sample funds’ management 
companies.  Sample period is from March 1990 to June 2007.  Data source is from CRSP Survivor Bias 
Free US Mutual Fund Database.  The fee and market-adjusted buy and hold return (FMBHR) is calculated 
for funds over a 12 months cumulative return from 12-month prior to 1-month prior to the announcement 
date of asset sales of their fund families.  Market indices for equity funds and bond funds are S&P 500 
index and 30-day Treasury bill respectively.   Total net assets measure total assets under management net 
of liabilities.  It is reported in millions of dollars at 1-month (a monthly reported variable) prior to asset 
sales.  Expense ratio measures fund’s annual expenses as a percentage of AUM (asset under management).  
It is reported 12-months (an annual reported variable) prior to the asset sale.  Portfolio turnover is reported 
12-months (an annual reported variable) prior to the asset sale.  Manager tenure is measured 1-month (a 
monthly reported variable) prior to the asset sales.  The matched sample is created from a matched fund 
family with (1) a similar level of family concentration (the absolute minimum difference of number of 
styles of equity and bond funds managed by the matched family), (2) a similar family size (the absolute 
minimum difference of total net asset among matched families), and (3) a similar fund size with same 
management style (the absolute minimum difference of total net asset for the particular matched fund from 
the matched fund family with same SI-OBJ code (fund style)) at 13 months prior to the onset of asset sales. 
Numbers are reported in means while medians are reported in parentheses.  Statistical significance is 
indicated by * at the 10% level, ** at 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
 
Panel A：Sample  
Equity Funds Bond Funds 










FMBHR (%) t-12 to t-1 3.6955 12.8582 3.1364 -1.1240 2.8575 
 (1.3675) (5.5474) (0.6628) (-0.4985) (0.3961) 
Total net assets (millions) t-1 387.6343 226.3124 235.0692 182.0969 292.4541 
 (89.1000) (41.9000) (52.2000) (63.4000) (69.9000) 
Expense ratio (%) t-12 1.3686 1.6500 1.2150 0.9621 1.2417 
 (1.3000) (1.5600) (1.1100) (0.8700) (1.2000) 
Portfolio turnover t-12  0.7417 0.7785 1.0828 0.6394 0.7765 
 (0.6300) (0.7000) (0.7500) (0.3078) (0.5400) 
Manager tenure (months) t-1 69.6221 69.3333 57.1515 94.9036 73.2986 





Panel B：Matched  
Equity Funds Bond Funds 










FMBHR (%) t-12 to t-1 7.6348 12.0526 4.8020 -0.8094 4.8756 
 (1.9750) (7.2629) (2.5258) (-0.2132) (1.2359) 
Total net assets (millions) t-1 237.0489 234.0156 144.1021 148.0760 191.1676 
 (83.4000) (31.3540) (50.0500) (55.5500) (62.0000) 
Expense ratio (%) t-12 1.5467 1.6935 1.1867 1.1410 1.3602 
 (1.4350) (1.7500) (1.1250) (1.0200) (1.2650) 
Portfolio turnover t-12  0.7358 1.0113 0.9808 0.6965 0.7962 
 (0.5800) (0.8218) (0.5975) (0.3300) (0.5450) 
Manager tenure (months) t-1 65.2768 63.1176 62.4074 77.2917 67.9176 
 (55.0000) (62.0000) (48.0000) (72.0000) (59.0000) 
 
Panel C：Sample Minus Matched  
Equity Funds Bond Funds 










FMBHR (%) t-12 to t-1 -2.7909 4.4618 -1.1380 -0.1571  -1.2161 
 (-0.1922) (-0.9290) (-0.2756) (-0.0252)  (-0.1790) 
Total net assets (millions) t-1 47.6239 56.5144 66.3209 21.2337  44.4868 
 (1.8000)* (1.9180) (-13.4500) (-1.5000)  (0.0345) 
Expense ratio (%) t-12 -0.1978*** -0.0165 0.0567 -0.2391 *** -0.1447*** 
 (-0.1000)*** (-0.0700) (0.2350) (-0.1900) *** (-0.1300)*** 
Portfolio turnover t-12  -0.0195 -0.1655 0.1008 -0.1151  -0.0336 
 (0.0631) (-0.0248) (0.2333) (-0.0700)  (0.0000) 
Manager tenure (months) t-1 4.1792 1.6471 2.3830 11.9322  5.6201 












CHAPTER 9 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
9.1 Univariate Analysis 
Table 9.1 reports CARs for buyers and sellers over the announcement period for 
asset sales between firms listed on NYSE/ASE/Nasdaq. The buyers sustain large 
shareholder gains of 3.24% during a two-day period and 3.72% during a three-day period, 
both significant at the 1% level.  Although sellers’ excess returns are insignificant except 
for the two-day CAR of 0.32% at the 10% significant level, the combined gains are 
significant at the announcement.  Although large gains to buyers are uncommon in the 
prior asset sales literature, this result is at least partially due to the fact that means of 
payments of the mutual fund companies are largely equity-based asset sales.29  This point 
is consistent with prior literature as Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (2005), and Hege, 
Lovo, Slovin, and Sushka (2007) document that large gains are associated with equity 
deal for buyers relative to cash deal.  The increase in value is consistent with the 
hypothesis that there are efficiency gains from a reallocation of resources to higher-
valued uses, consistent with Hite, Owers, and Rogers (1987).   
Table 9.1: Excess Returns for Buyers and Sellers at Asset Sales 
This table reports two-day (-1, 0) and three-day (-1, +1), (-2, 0) average excess returns (CAR) in percentage 
at announcements of asset sales for buyers and seller mutual fund companies listed on NYSE/ASE/Nasdaq, 
using market model methodology.  T-values are in parentheses and N is number of funds during the sample 
period. Positive / Negative represents number of positive and negative observation. Statistical significance 
is indicated by * at the 10% level, ** at 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. Day 0 is the date of the 
announcement date first appeared in the LexisNexis, EBSCOhost, Dow Jones and Associated Press 
(Factiva) Databases during March 1990 to June 2007.  Market model parameters are estimated using least 
squares over the pre-event period, t= -255 to -43.   
 
Days Sellers CAR Positive /Negative Buyers CAR 
Positive 
/Negative 
(-1, +1) 0.22% 7:4 3.24% 7:4 
 (1.003)      (3.897)***  
(-1,   0) 0.29% 8:3 3.24% 8:3 
 (1.606)*      (4.760)***  
(-2,   0) 0.31% 6:5 3.72% 7:4 




                                                 
29  Six out of the eight firms with identified means of payments are associated with equity deals.  
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Table 9.2 Panels A, B, C, and D report fee and market-adjusted buy and hold 
returns and alphas from one, three, and four factor model for seller funds prior to the 
asset sales of their fund companies.  For both domestic equity funds and bond funds, we 
observe that selling funds underperform across one, two, three, four, and five-year 
periods prior to the onset of asset sales.  We conclude that prior to the onset of asset sales, 
Table 9.2: Performance (Sample Minus Matched Sample) prior to Asset Sales 
This table reports differences on sample minus matched sample funds from the sellers with four 
performance measurements (in percentage) prior to the asset sale. The results of fee and market-adjusted 
buy and hold (cumulative) returns for domestic equity funds30 and bond funds are reported in Panel A.  
Market indices for domestic equity funds and bond funds are S&P 500 index and 30-day Treasury bill 
respectively.   The results of one-factor-loading alpha (Sharpe (1964)), three-factor-loading alpha (Fama 
and French (1993)), and four-factor-loading alpha (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)) for domestic equity 
funds are reported in Panel B, Panel C, and Panel D, respectively.  The matched sample is created from a 
matched fund family with (1) a similar level of family concentration (the absolute minimum difference of 
number of styles of equity and bond funds managed by the matched family), (2) a similar family size (the 
absolute minimum difference of total net asset among matched families), and (3) a similar fund size with 
same management style (the absolute minimum difference of total net asset for the particular matched fund 
from the matched fund family with same SI-OBJ code (fund style)) at 13 months prior to the observation 
period.  The sample period is from March 1990 through June 2007 and the performance is measured from 
five fiscal years, benchmarked in year -5 to one fiscal year prior to the onset of asset sales, benchmarked in 
year -1.  The sample size (in the one year prior to the asset sale, (-1), measurement) is different from 
previous table (Table II) is due to the matched sample procedure might not exactly find a matched fund or a 
matched fund might suffer data missing during the sample period.  P-values are in parentheses and N is 
number of funds during the sample period.  Statistical significance is indicated by * at the 10% level, ** at 
5% level, and *** at the 1% level.   
 
Panel A：Fee and Market-Adjusted Buy and Hold Returns  
Year (-5, -1)  (-4, -1) (-3, -1) (-2, -1)  (-1)
A. Domestic Equity Funds 
Mean -13.6900  -6.7514  -6.5952 * -4.1852 ** -2.7909  
 (0.1237)  (0.2148)  (0.0669)  (0.0407) (0.3371)  
Median -6.5985  -2.4350  -5.3142 * -1.3258  -0.1922  
 (0.1639)  (0.2181)  (0.0505)  (0.1105) (0.7550)  
N 44  55  68  88 116  
           
B. Bond Funds 
Mean -0.5420  -0.6805  -1.8681 ** -1.0760 ** -0.5826  
 (0.6928)  (0.5422)  (0.0460)  (0.0460)  (0.1128)  
Median -0.3069  -0.7032  -0.9134 ** -0.2905 ** -0.1601  
 (0.3528)  (0.1510)  (0.0106)  (0.0385) (0.1146)  
N 61   65   77   103   136  
table continued 
                                                 
30 We exclude international equity funds from this analysis due to the limited sample size.  
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Panel B：Alpha from One-Factor Model  
Year (-5, -1)  (-4, -1) (-3, -1) (-2, -1)  (-1)
A. Domestic Equity Funds 
Mean -0.1109 -0.1191** -0.1527 ** -0.1367** -0.0942  
 (0.1555)  (0.0499)  (0.0265)  (0.0288) (0.4872)  
Median -0.1434 * -0.1008** -0.0788 ** -0.0467* -0.0148  
 (0.0699)  (0.0470) (0.0314)  (0.0842) (0.6954)  
N 44  55 68  88  116  
 
Panel C：Alpha from Three-Factor Model  
Year (-5, -1)  (-4, -1) (-3, -1) (-2, -1)  (-1)
A. Domestic Equity Funds 
Mean -0.1324 ** -0.1201** -0.1402 *** -0.1531*** -0.1696* 
 (0.0207)  (0.0124)  (0.0036)  (0.0035)  (0.0728) 
Median -0.0932 ** -0.0711** -0.1054 *** -0.0988*** -0.0632 
 (0.0218)  (0.0280)  (0.0076)  (0.0039)  (0.1405) 
N 44  55  68  88  116
 
Panel D：Alpha from Four-Factor Model  
Year (-5, -1)  (-4, -1) (-3, -1) (-2, -1)  (-1)
A. Domestic Equity Funds 
Mean -0.0843 * -0.0772* -0.1312 *** -0.1271** -0.1062 
 (0.0835)  (0.0555)  (0.0039)  (0.0115) (0.2854) 
Median -0.0768 -0.0473 -0.1038 *** -0.0904** -0.0380 
 (0.1081)  (0.1102) (0.0046)  (0.0119) (0.3371) 
N 44  55  68  88  116  
 
there is negative performance relative to competitors which is likely to be at least in part 
a reason triggering the sellers to offer their mutual fund units to the market for sale.  
Table 9.3 Panels A and B disaggregate the funds acquired by buyers into stand-
alone funds and merged funds.  We report fee and market-adjusted buy and hold returns 
for domestic equity funds and bond funds at one, two, three, and four years post minus 
one year prior to the asset sale.  Domestic equity funds in Panel A show significant 
deterioration in performance after the asset sale, particularly for merged funds.  Bond 
funds (Panel B), on the other hand, show improved performance after the asset sale.  
There is evidence of enhanced performance at three and four years when compared to the 
year prior to the asset sale.    
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Table 9.3: Performance Subsequent to Asset Sales 
This table reports fee and market-adjusted buy and hold returns (in percentage) for domestic equity funds 
(Panel A) and bond funds (Panel B) subsequent to one fiscal year prior to the onset of asset sales, 
benchmarked in year -1, over the sample period of March 1990 through June 2007.  Market indices for 
domestic equity funds and bond funds are S&P 500 index and 30-day Treasury bill respectively.  Sample is 
sub-grouped into all cases, stand-alone fund (S), fund being merged to buyers’ existing funds (M), and 
differences from (S) minus (M) during the observation period. An example for a stand-along fund would be 
ABN AMRO sell its US mutual fund business to Highbury Financial so an existing ABN AMRO fund 
named ABN AMRO Growth Fund will be named Aston/ ABN AMRO Growth Fund after the asset sale.  
An example for a fund merged to the buyer’s fund would be Washing Mutual sold its mutual fund units to 
Principal Financial Group so the WF Growth Fund merged into Principal Financial Group and renamed 
Principal Investors Large Cap Growth Fund.  Sample size reduces throughout those years is due to several 
events occurred relatively recent.  P-values are in parentheses and N is number of funds during the sample 
period. Statistical significance is indicated by * at the 10% level, ** at 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
 
Panel A：Domestic Equity Funds  
Year (-1, +1)  (-1, +2)  (-1, +3)  (-1, +4)   
A. All Cases 
Mean -11.4031 ** -10.7927*** -11.6610*** -12.9123*** 
 (0.0190)  (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Median -2.9660 *** -6.1567*** -8.1316*** -11.2552*** 
 (<0.001)  (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
N 115  62 59  50  
         
B. Stand-alone Funds after Asset Sales (S) 
Mean -10.3431  -4.2800* -4.2333 -2.5290  
 (0.2033)  (0.0902) (0.2855) (0.4624)  
Median -2.0873 *** -5.2856* -1.8488* -5.4289  
 (0.0052)  (0.0723) (0.0532) (0.5798)  
N 63  21  20 18  
         
C. Funds Being Merged to Buyers' Existing Funds (M) 
Mean -12.6872 *** -14.1285*** -15.4701*** -18.7529*** 
 (0.0044)  (<0.001) (0.0012) (<0.001) 
Median -5.6736 *** -9.7535*** -10.2697*** -18.8208*** 
 (0.0079)  (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
N 52  41  39  32 
         
D. Differences (S-M) 
Mean 2.3441  9.8485** 11.2368** 16.2239*** 
 (0.3987)  (0.0172) (0.0301) (0.0038) 
Median 3.5863  4.4680* 8.4209** 13.3919** 




Panel B：Bond Funds 
Year (-1, +1)  (-1, +2)  (-1, +3)  (-1, +4)   
A. All Cases 
Mean 1.1011  1.9049 6.6911*** 6.5857*** 
 (0.3929)  (0.1577) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Median 0.7397 ** 2.7692** 8.9941*** 6.3738*** 
 (0.0445)  (0.0216) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
N 118  65 55 53 
         
B. Stand-alone Funds after Asset Sales (S) 
Mean 1.0894  -1.5817 8.0294** 6.2773*** 
 (0.5175)  (0.6745) (0.0341) (0.0082) 
Median 1.1231 *** 1.4637 10.1508** 4.9949*** 
 (<0.001)  (0.9632) (0.0398) (0.0020) 
N 57 17  13  10 
         
C. Funds Being Merged to Buyers' Existing Funds (M) 
Mean 1.1119  3.1398*** 6.2769*** 6.6574*** 
 (0.5695)  (0.0137) (0.0013) (<0.001) 
Median -0.0400  3.2178*** 6.3453*** 7.5314*** 
 (0.8176)  (0.0020)  (<0.001) (<0.001) 
N 61   48   42  43  
         
D. Differences (S-M) 
Mean -0.0225  -4.7215 1.7525 -0.3800 
 (0.4965)  (0.1199) (0.3214) (0.4484) 
Median 1.1631 * -1.7541 3.8055 -2.5365 
 (0.0611)  (0.1498) (0.2663) (0.4955) 
 
Table 9.4 Panels A, B, and C disaggregate the funds acquired by buyers into 
stand-alone funds and merged.  We report one, three, and four factor-loading performance 
measures for domestic equity funds at one, two, three, and four years after the sale minus 
one year prior to the asset sale for a robustness check.  The funds being merged into 
buyers’ existing funds consistently demonstrate poorer performance subsequent to asset 
sale.  Stand-alone funds, on the other hand, although showing a deteriorating performance 
subsequent to the asset sale for years one and two, begin to show improved performance 
after year three and four relative to one year prior to the asset sale.  Panel B and C show 
that starting in the fourth year, performance of stand-alone funds becomes positive 
compared to one year prior to the asset sale for the three and four factor loading analysis.  
Merged funds show persistent deterioration in performance subsequent to the asset sale 
regardless of the performance measure reported.   
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Table 9.4: Factor-loading Performance Subsequent to Asset Sales 
This table reports factor-loading (one-factor, Sharpe (1964);  three-factor, Fama and French (1993); four-
factor, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) respectively in Panel A, B, and C) performance measure (in 
percentage) for domestic equity funds subsequent to one fiscal year prior to the asset sales, benchmarked in 
year -1, over the sample period of March 1990 through June 2007.  Sample is sub-grouped into all cases, 
stand-alone fund (S), fund being merged to buyers’ existing funds (M), and differences from (S) minus (M) 
during the observation period.  Sample size reduces throughout those years is due to several events 
occurred relatively recent.  P-values are in parentheses and N is number of funds during the sample period.  
Statistical significance is indicated by * at the 10% level, ** at 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
 
Panel A：Alpha from One-Factor Model   
Year (-1, +1)  (-1, +2)  (-1, +3)  (-1, +4)   
A. All Cases 
Mean -0.6708 ** -0.6706*** -0.5586** -0.6065*** 
 (0.0476)  (<0.001) (0.0104) (0.0058) 
Median -0.1377 *** -0.3844*** -0.2289*** -0.2196** 
 (0.0050)  (<0.001) (0.0046) (0.0252) 
N 115  62 59  50  
         
B. Stand-alone Funds after Asset Sales (S) 
Mean -0.6594  -0.3606* 0.1987 0.0216 
 (0.2653)  (0.0549) (0.3396) (0.9000) 
Median -0.0615  -0.1368 0.0478 -0.1439 
 (0.1664)  (0.1337) (0.3884) (0.9323) 
N 63  21  20 18 
         
C. Funds Being Merged to Buyers' Existing Funds (M) 
Mean -0.6847 *** -0.8294*** -0.9469*** -0.9599*** 
 (0.0029)  (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0030) 
Median -0.3677 *** -0.5484*** -0.5371*** -0.5825*** 
 (0.0076)  (0.0016) (<0.001) (0.0076) 
N 52  41  39  32 
         
D. Differences (S-M) 
Mean 0.0253  0.4688* 1.1456*** 0.9815*** 
 (0.4840)  (0.0619) (<0.001) (0.0032) 
Median 0.3062 * 0.4117 0.5848*** 0.4386** 












Panel B：Alpha from Three-Factor Model  
Year (-1, +1)  (-1, +2)  (-1, +3)  (-1, +4)   
A. All Cases 
Mean -0.1663  -0.1891 -0.2858* -0.1345 
 (0.1404)  (0.1715) (0.0604) (0.5075) 
Median -0.0460  -0.0470 -0.1992 -0.0386 
 (0.1226)  (0.2761) (0.1404) (0.8903) 
N 115  62 59  50  
         
B. Stand-alone Funds after Asset Sales (S) 
Mean 0.0820  -0.2144 0.0753 0.3414* 
 (0.5628)  (0.2031) (0.7112) (0.0631) 
Median 0.0045  -0.0664 0.1903 0.4755* 
 (0.8710)  (0.3168) (0.5706) (0.0987) 
N 63  21  20 18 
         
C. Funds being Merged to Buyers' Existing Funds (M) 
Mean -0.4671 *** -0.1762 -0.4709** -0.4022 
 (0.0089)  (0.3605) (0.0213) (0.1769) 
Median -0.2566 ** -0.0245 -0.3259** -0.4213 
 (0.0471)  (0.5619) (0.0345) (0.2767) 
N 52  41  39  32 
         
D. Differences (S-M) 
Mean 0.5491 *** -0.0382 0.5462** 0.7436** 
 (0.0070)  (0.4397) (0.0415) (0.0164) 
Median 0.2611 * -0.0419 0.5162** 0.8968** 





















Panel C：Alpha from Four-Factor Model  
Year (-1, +1)  (-1, +2)  (-1, +3)  (-1, +4)   
A. All Cases 
Mean -0.3520  -0.2151 -0.2680* -0.2034 
 (0.2479)  (0.1711) (0.0642) (0.2911) 
Median -0.0459  -0.0112 -0.0798 -0.1164 
 (0.2922)  (0.4555) (0.1246) (0.6375) 
N 115  62 59  50  
         
B. Stand-alone Funds after Asset Sales (S) 
Mean -0.5485  -0.1536 0.0606 0.4119** 
 (0.3087)  (0.3416) (0.7427) (0.0478) 
Median -0.0395  -0.0376 0.0834 0.4760* 
 (0.3814)  (0.4684) (0.7562) (0.0539) 
N 63  21  20 18 
         
C. Funds Being Merged to Buyers' Existing Funds (M) 
Mean -0.1138  -0.2466 -0.4366** -0.5495** 
 (0.5236)  (0.2728) (0.0268) (0.0425) 
Median -0.1061  -0.0069 -0.2526** -0.5069* 
 (0.5651)  (0.6604) (0.0414) (0.0784) 
N 52  41  39  32 
         
D. Differences (S-M) 
Mean -0.4347  0.0930 0.4972** 0.9614*** 
 (0.2212)  (0.3668) (0.0320) (0.0023) 
Median 0.0665  -0.0307 0.3360* 0.9829*** 
 (0.4430)  (0.3830) (0.0880) (0.0093) 
 
Table 9.5 Panels A and B report robustness tests comparing the sample funds 
acquired by buyers to matched sample funds at one, two, three and four years subsequent 
to the one year prior to the asset sale for fee and market-adjusted buy and hold returns, 
for one, three, and four factor models. 31   Since the earlier result of poorer post 
performance for the domestic equity funds is puzzling, we create a matched sample to 
compare performance controlling for fund style, fund size, family diversified level, and 
family asset size to reevaluate the performance subsequent to asset sales for both 
domestic equity and bond funds.  The results show that during the one year after the asset 
sale, funds acquired by the buyers generate positive returns (alphas) when compared to 
one year prior to the asset sale.  
                                                 
31 We have documented earlier how we choose matched sample fund families and their funds.   
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Table 9.5: Performance (Sample Minus Matched Sample) Subsequent to Asset  
      Sales 
This table reports differences in performance measurements (in percentage) between sample and matched 
sample funds subsequent to the asset sale.  Fee and market-adjusted buy and hold returns are reported in 
Panel A for domestic equity funds and bond funds while one-factor-loading alpha (Sharpe (1964)), three-
factor-loading alpha (Fama and French (1993)), and four-factor-loading alpha (Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993)) for domestic equity funds are reported in Panel B.  The matched sample is created from a matched 
fund family with (1) a similar level of family concentration (the absolute minimum difference of number of 
styles of equity and bond funds managed by the matched family), (2) a similar family size (the absolute 
minimum difference of total net asset among matched families), and (3) a similar fund size with same 
management style (the absolute minimum difference of total net asset for the particular matched fund from 
the matched fund family with same SI-OBJ code (fund style)) at 13 months prior to the onset of asset sales.  
The sample period is from March 1990 through June 2007 subsequent to one fiscal year prior to the onset 
of asset sales, benchmarked in year -1.  P-values are in parentheses.  Statistical significance is indicated by 
* at the 10% level, ** at 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
 
Panel A：Fee and Market-Adjusted Buy and Hold Returns  
Year (-1, +1)  (-1, +2)  (-1, +3)  (-1, +4)   
A. Domestic Equity Funds 
Mean 9.0299 * 0.6113 -3.3062 6.3213 
 (0.0824)  (0.8700) (0.4728) (0.2649) 
Median 3.1927 *** 0.1262 -1.0840 5.3757* 
 (0.0050)  (0.8100) (0.8419) (0.0769) 
B. Bond Funds 
Mean 1.4453 ** 0.5940 0.2114 -0.4302 
 (0.0101)  (0.4617) (0.7677) (0.5932) 
Median 1.0331 *** -0.0259 0.0268 -0.2486 
 (0.0048)  (0.9442) (0.7333) (0.4194) 
 
Panel B：Factor-Loading Alpha  
Year (-1, +1)  (-1, +2)  (-1, +3)  (-1, +4)   
A. One-Factor Model  
Mean 0.5485 ** -0.1286 -0.0533 0.3699 
 (0.0124)  (0.6164) (0.8900) (0.3575) 
Median 0.4589 *** -0.0502 -0.2312 0.2721 
 (<0.001)  (0.5205) (0.8249) (0.3914) 
B. Three-Factor Model  
Mean 0.1732  0.1224 0.0619 0.4276 
 (0.2504)  (0.5212) (0.8189) (0.3279) 
Median 0.1936 ** -0.0255 0.0967 0.1424 
 (0.0462)  (0.9872) (0.2251) (0.4646) 
C. Four-Factor Model 
Mean 0.3682 ** 0.3003 -0.0383 0.1340 
 (0.0458)  (0.3008) (0.8890) (0.6784) 
Median 0.2225 *** -0.1503 0.0744 0.2449 
 (0.0073)  (0.7349) (0.5335) (0.4078) 
 
 98
Table 9.6: Fund Characteristics (Management Efficiency) Subsequent to Asset  
      Sales 
This table reports the test results from subsequent fund characteristic (management efficiency) variables to 
one fiscal year prior to the onset of asset sales, benchmarked in year -1, for both domestic equity funds 
(Panel A) and bond funds (Panel B) over the sample period of March 1990 through June 2007.  For 
example, (-1, +1) denotes the changes of the average fund characteristic variable from one year post minus 
the average fund characteristic variable from one year prior of asset sales.  Data source is from CRSP 
Survivor Bias Free US Mutual Fund Database.  Total net assets (reported in million dollars) measure total 
assets under management net of liabilities of a monthly average figure during the sample period.  Expense 
ratio (reported in percentage) measures fund’s annual expense of an annual figure during the sample period.  
Portfolio turnover (reported in percentage) measures manager portfolio turnover of an annual figure during 
the sample period.  Manager tenure (reported in months) measures lengths of managers as a portfolio 
manager within this fund of a monthly average figure during the sample period.  P-values are in 
parentheses and N is number of funds during the sample period.  Statistical significance is indicated by * at 
the 10% level, ** at 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
 
Panel A: Domestic Equity Funds  
Year (-1, +1)  (-1, +2)  (-1, +3)  (-1, +4)   
A. Total Net Assets (Million Dollars)  
Mean 200.9697 *** 274.7263*** 231.7678*** 309.8315*** 
 (0.0017)  (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.0014) 
Median 8.2742 *** 50.5180*** 61.3394*** 108.0618*** 
 (<0.001)  (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
N 115  62 59  50  
         
B. Expense Ratio (%) 
Mean -0.0405 * -0.0873** -0.1056** -0.1094** 
 (0.0900)  (0.0245) (0.0101) (0.0280) 
Median -0.0000  -0.0200** -0.0500*** -0.0400** 
 (0.2325)  (0.0130) (0.0034) (0.0239) 
N 109  60 57  49  
         
C. Portfolio Turnover (%) 
Mean 0.2929 *** 0.3783*** 0.2882** 0.2853** 
 (0.0026)  (0.0084) (0.0289) (0.0137) 
Median 0.0700 ** 0.1040** 0.1780* 0.2355*** 
 (0.0249)  (0.0233) (0.0639) (0.0080) 
N 102  56 53  46  
         
D. Manager Tenure (Months)  
Mean 1.0685  4.3400 14.6366** 18.5643** 
 (0.7362)  (0.4119) (0.0121) (0.0132) 
Median 13.0000 ** 22.7500 36.0000** 36.5000** 
 (0.0111)  (0.1367) (0.0496) (0.0337) 






Panel B: Bond Funds  
Year (-1, +1)  (-1, +2)  (-1, +3)  (-1, +4)   
A. Total Net Assets (Million Dollars)  
Mean 87.1119 * 178.6101* 226.9812** 170.0249*** 
 (0.0610)  (0.0584) (0.0330) (0.0072) 
Median 0.0300  13.3838** 54.2600*** 97.9430*** 
 (0.3231)  (0.0104) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
N 118  65  55  53  
         
B. Expense Ratio (%) 
Mean -0.0027  -0.0008  -0.0185  0.0075 
 (0.8821)  (0.9797)  (0.4105)  (0.8347) 
Median 0.0000  0.0000  -0.0100  -0.0150 
 (0.9523)  (0.9434)  (0.4904)  (0.5476) 
N 113  65  55  53  
         
C. Portfolio Turnover (%) 
Mean 0.2176  0.1402  0.1834  0.1462 
 (0.2319)  (0.5792)  (0.3638)  (0.3004) 
Median -0.0700  -0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 (0.5821)  (0.7199)  (0.9264)  (0.4034) 
N 101  55  46  44  
         
D. Manager Tenure (Months)  
Mean -18.9358 *** -6.2275  7.1069  10.4118 
 (<0.001)  (0.4352)  (0.3724)  (0.1584) 
Median 13.0000 ** 22.6667  34.0000  21.5000 
 (0.0200)  (0.8812)  (0.3676)  (0.1018) 
N 113   63   53   51   
 
Table 9.6 Panels A and B report fund characteristics that include total net assets, 
expense ratio, portfolio turnover, and manager tenure (as a proxy for management 
efficiency) at one, two, three, and four years subsequent to the one year prior to asset 
sales for both domestic equity and bond funds.  Our results show that subsequent to the 
asset sales, total net assets increase both for domestic equity and bond funds.  Portfolio 
turnover increases and expense ratio decreases significantly for the domestic equity funds.  
Thus, without separating stand-alone funds or without comparing matched funds, we 
would not be able to determinant whether management efficiency has improved as a 
result of the asset sale 
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Table 9.7: Fund Characteristics (Management efficiency) Subsequent to Asset  
        Sales Stand-Alone Minus Merged Funds & Sample Minus Matched   
                  Sample Funds 
This table separates Domestic Equity funds (Bond funds) into funds being stand-alone minus funds being 
merged in Panel A1 (Panel B1) and sample fund minus matched sample funds in Panel A2 (Panel B2) to 
measure fund characteristics (management efficiency) variables subsequent to one year prior to the asset 
sales, benchmarked in year -1.  The matched sample is created from a matched fund family with (1) a 
similar level of family concentration (the absolute minimum difference of number of styles of equity and 
bond funds managed by the matched family), (2) a similar family size (the absolute minimum difference of 
total net asset among matched families), and (3) a similar fund size with same management style (the 
absolute minimum difference of total net asset for the particular matched fund from the matched fund 
family with same SI-OBJ code (fund style)) at 13 months prior to the onset of asset sales.  Sample period is 
from March 1990 through June 2007.  Data source is from CRSP Mutual Fund Database.  Total net assets 
(reported in million dollars) measure total assets under management net of liabilities of a monthly average 
figure during the sample period.  Expense ratio (reported in percentage) measures fund’s annual expense of 
an annual figure during the sample period.  Portfolio turnover (reported in percentage) measures manager 
portfolio turnover of an annual figure during the sample period.  Manager tenure (reported in months) 
measures lengths of managers as a portfolio manager within this fund of a monthly average figure during 
the sample period.  P-values are in parentheses and N is number of funds during the sample period.  
Statistical significance is indicated by * at the 10% level, ** at 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
 
Panel A1: Domestic Equity Funds (Stand-Alone Minus Merged Funds) 
Year (-1, +1)  (-1, +2)  (-1, +3)  (-1, +4)  
A. Total Net Assets (Million Dollars) 
Mean -235.5509 ** -107.8221  -188.5192** -302.7885* 
 (0.0413)  (0.2102)  (0.0419) (0.0564) 
Median -69.9707 *** -14.9394 -38.7120* -126.6378* 
 (<0.001)  (0.4881)  (0.0631) (0.0519) 
N S=63, M=52  S=21, M=41  S=20, M=39 S=18, M=32 
         
B. Expense Ratio (%) 
Mean 0.0711 * 0.1100* 0.1264* 0.0981 
 (0.0806)  (0.0607) (0.0671) (0.1693) 
Median 0.0200  0.0525** 0.1150** 0.1000 
 (0.1029)  (0.0227) (0.0161) (0.1197) 
N S=60, M=49  S=20, M=40  S=19, M=38  S=17, M=32 
         
C. Portfolio Turnover (%) 
Mean -0.4813 ** -0.4471** -0.4503** -0.3621* 
 (0.0101)  (0.0295) (0.0280) (0.0610) 
Median -0.4100 *** -0.2250** -0.3703** -0.4778** 
 (0.0072)  (0.0433) (0.0482) (0.0408) 
N S=57, M=45  S=19, M=37  S=18, M=35  S=16, M=30  
         
D. Manager Tenure (Months) 
Mean -2.7298  8.2315 13.2434 0.6228 
 (0.3420)  (0.2297) (0.1302) (0.4837) 
Median 3.0000  13.5000* 12.2500* 24.0000 
 (0.2438)  (0.0541) (0.0521) (0.1876) 




Panel A2: Domestic Equity Funds (Sample Minus Matched Sample Funds)  
Year (-1, +1)  (-1, +2)  (-1, +3)  (-1, +4)  
A. Total Net Assets (Million Dollars) 
Mean -38.0808  93.2558* 111.3776 206.5993* 
 (0.2531)  (0.0546)  (0.1836) (0.0601) 
Median -0.4333  25.8000** 48.2348** 88.6003** 
 (0.8233)  (0.0192)  (0.0365) (0.0249) 
N 70  36 30  27 
         
B. Expense Ratio (%) 
Mean 0.0118  0.0034 0.0224 -0.0219 
 (0.7293)  (0.9533) (0.7654) (0.7659) 
Median 0.0400  0.0500 0.0700 -0.0200 
 (0.2761)  (0.8412) (0.5976) (0.8517) 
N 66  36  30 27 
         
C. Portfolio Turnover (%) 
Mean 0.1010  0.1061 0.1357 0.1155 
 (0.3179)  (0.5229) (0.4370) (0.4841) 
Median 0.0600  0.1440 0.1530 0.0805 
 (0.2883)  (0.2341) (0.3229) (0.6947) 
N 56  29  26 23  
         
D. Manager Tenure (Months) 
Mean 10.9792 ** 0.8557 13.5758 -2.1240 
 (0.0164)  (0.9422) (0.3526) (0.8720) 
Median 0.0000 * 0.0000 5.7500 0.0000 
 (0.0532)  (0.8745) (0.5604) (0.6995) 
N 64  34  26 25  
 
Panel B1: Bond Funds (Stand-Alone Minus Merged Funds) 
Year (-1, +1)  (-1, +2)  (-1, +3)  (-1, +4)  
A. Total Net Assets (Million Dollars) 
Mean -137.2677 * -147.8937  -120.8029  -21.6467  
 (0.0637)  (0.1636)  (0.2615)  (0.4454)  
Median -6.8526 * 1.1838  37.5834  71.5948  
 (0.0730)  (0.4792)  (0.2929)  (0.2300)  
N S=57, M=61  S=17, M=48  S=13, M=42  S=10, M=43  
         
B. Expense Ratio (%) 
Mean -0.0060  -0.0464  -0.0115  -0.1090  
 (0.4346)  (0.2519)  (0.4149)  (0.1168)  
Median 0.0000  -0.0425  -0.0050  -0.0850  
 (0.4656)  (0.1133)  (0.3945)  (0.1505)  





C. Portfolio Turnover (%) 
Mean -0.0853  0.0935  0.2557  -0.0017  
 (0.4135)  (0.4339)  (0.2901)  (0.4981)  
Median -0.0300  0.1200  0.0700  0.1500  
 (0.4592)  (0.1452)  (0.2039)  (0.2377)  
N S=56, M=45  S=16, M=39  S=12, M=34  S=9, M=35  
         
D. Manager Tenure (Months) 
Mean -7.6551  23.2182** 15.1128  43.1073*** 
 (0.2381)  (0.0317)  (0.1435)  (<0.001) 
Median -2.3333  8.6667  18.3333  45.5000** 
 (0.1649)  (0.3018)  (0.3299)  (0.0175) 
N S=57, M=56  S=17, M=46  S=13, M=40  S=10, M=41  
 
Panel B2: Bond Funds (Sample Minus Matched Sample Funds) 
Year (-1, +1)  (-1, +2)  (-1, +3)  (-1, +4)  
A. Total Net Assets (Million Dollars) 
Mean -18.9393 ** 11.5455 118.1076* 103.7154 
 (0.0192)  (0.7001)  (0.0914) (0.1423) 
Median -3.5417 ** 5.2090 8.5744 28.4703 
 (0.0484)  (0.9128)  (0.2128) (0.2380) 
N 85  43 34  32 
         
B. Expense Ratio (%) 
Mean -0.0165  0.0095 0.0035 0.0121 
 (0.4665)  (0.8423) (0.9314) (0.8211) 
Median 0.0000  0.0300 0.0200 -0.0400 
 (0.6163)  (0.8154) (0.9927) (0.6736) 
N 81  43  34 32 
         
C. Portfolio Turnover (%) 
Mean -0.0892  0.1137 0.1319 0.0207 
 (0.4652)  (0.6132) (0.6601) (0.9509) 
Median 0.0300  0.0543 0.1250 0.0100 
 (0.5751)  (0.3966) (0.6261) (0.9854) 
N 66  31  24 22  
         
D. Manager Tenure (Months) 
Mean -23.5580 ** -14.5244 -14.4323 -11.4878 
 (<0.001)  (0.1587) (0.2144) (0.3595) 
Median 0.0000 *** 0.0000* 0.0000 -3.1667 
 (<0.001)  (0.0739) (0.3229) (0.4271) 
N 80  42  33 32  
 
Table 9.7 Panels A1, A2, B1, and B2 report fund characteristics that include total 
net assets, expense ratio, portfolio turnover, and manager tenure at one, two, three, and 
four years subsequent to the one year prior to asset sales by disaggregating funds into 
stand-alone and merged funds as well as sample versus matched sample funds.  Stand-
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alone funds have lower portfolio turnover for domestic equity funds and lower assets 
under management.  The expense ratio is higher for stand-alone funds within the group of 
domestic equity funds while lower but insignificant for bond funds.   
Table 9.8: Manager Turnover Probability Subsequent to Asset Sales Stand-Alone  
                  Minus Merged Funds & Sample Minus Matched Sample Funds 
 
This table separates domestic equity funds and bond funds into funds being stand-alone minus funds being 
merged (Panel A) and sample fund minus matched sample funds (Panel B) to measure the frequency 
whether managers are replaced in the first fiscal year subsequent to one fiscal year prior to the onset of 
asset sales,32  denoted as (-1, +1).  The matched sample is created from a matched fund family with (1) a 
similar level of family concentration (the absolute minimum difference of number of styles of equity and 
bond funds managed by the matched family), (2) a similar family size (the absolute minimum difference of 
total net asset among matched families), and (3) a similar fund size with same management style (the 
absolute minimum difference of total net asset for the particular matched fund from the matched fund 
family with same SI-OBJ code (fund style)) at 13 months prior to the onset of asset sales.   Sample period 
is from March 1990 through June 2007.  Data source is from CRSP Survivor Bias Free US Mutual Fund 
Database.  P-values are in parentheses and N is number of funds during the sample period.  Statistical 
significance is indicated by * at the 10% level, ** at 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. 
 
Panel A: Stand-Alone Minus Merged Funds 
Year (-1, +1)     
Fund Type All Cases Stand-alone Merger Difference 
Domestic Equity Funds 0.2636 0.2063 0.3404 -0.1341* 
(N=180)    (0.0582)  
     
Bond Funds 0.4513 0.4561 0.4464 0.0097  
(N=182)    (0.4592)   
 
Panel B: Sample Minus Matched Sample Funds 
Year (-1, +1)    
Fund Type Sample Funds Matched Sample Funds Difference 
Domestic Equity Funds 0.2547 0.1000 0.1094* 
(N=92)   (0.089) 
    
Bond Funds 0.4381 0.1075 0.3625*** 
(N=105)   (<0.001)   
 
When comparing the sample to matched sample funds (reported in Panel A2 and 
B2), the results show that total net assets drop in the year subsequent to the asset sale but 
start to increase afterwards.  There is no significant difference in expense ratio, portfolio 
                                                 
32 Manager turnover is an annual frequency data reported in the CRSP database.  
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turnover and manager tenure.  The increase in assets under management from year two 
after asset sales is consistent with Sirri and Tufano (1998) who argue that better 
performance leads investors to chase the funds.  Bond funds also demonstrate large 
manager turnover subsequent to asset sales when compared to matched samples.   
To further clarify whether there is greater manager turnover subsequent to asset 
sales, we report both stand-alone versus merged funds as well as sample versus matched 
sample funds in Table 9.8.  In Panel A, compared to merged funds, stand-alone funds 
among the domestic equity funds have less manager turnover.  However, when compared 
to the matched funds, there is significant manager turnover at both domestic equity and 
bond funds, suggesting that the improvement of performance subsequent to asset sales, is 
at least partially due to the manager turnover. 
9.2 Multivariate Analysis 
Table 9.9 reports logistic regression to estimate the probability of a fund being a 
target for an asset sale.  The results indicate that a fund that experiences deteriorating 
performance during the past 24 months prior to the asset sales is more likely to be the 
subject of a divestiture.  The inverse relation between performance and the probability of 
a fund being the subject of an asset sale is negative and significant at 10% (5%) level for 
domestic equity (bond) funds after controlling for fund characteristic variables.  This 
finding is consistent with Alexander, Benson, and Kampmeyer (1984) who conclude that 
sell-offs in general occur after a period of negative seller returns.  
Table 9.10 reports regression analysis that explains the differences in fund 
performance from one year prior to two year post to the asset sales.  In particular, we are 
interested in testing whether the changes in performance as a result of the transition from 
a diversified to a more highly focused fund entity is related to changes in the percentage 
of shares held by insiders, insider blocks, outsider blocks, and changes in governance 
structure after controlling for several fund characteristic variables. 
The dependent variable is the difference in fee and market-adjusted buy and hold 
returns from one year prior to the sale to two years post from sample fund.  Independent 
variables are changes in the percentage of shares held by insiders who own less than 5% 
shares, changes in the percentage of shares held by insiders who own more than 5% but 




Table 9.9: Logistic Regression for Target Funds of Asset Sales 
Logistic regressions are estimated to explain the probability of funds being chosen as asset sales target from 
a pool of sample and matched sample funds.  Panel A reports the regression coefficient and Panel B reports 
actual and implied asset sales probabilities.  Total sample in this regression includes 612 open-end equity 
and 304 bond funds for the period of 1990 to 2007. Independent variables include fee and market-adjusted 
buy and hold returns from two years prior to the asset sales; Total net assets, reported in million dollars, at 
13-month prior to the onset of asset sales; Expense ratio, reported in percentage, at 13-month prior to the 
onset of asset sales; Portfolio turnover, reported in percentage, at 13-month prior to the onset of asset sales;  
Manager tenure, reported in months, at13-month prior to the onset of asset sales.. The p-values are reported 
in the parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively. 
 
 Panel A：Regression Coefficient  
Domestic 




Funds                     Fund Type Variables N=308 N=304 N=117 N=187 
Intercept 0.5290 -0.5050 -0.1917 -0.4962 
 (0.1775) (0.2092) (0.7621) (0.3727) 
FMBHR (%) t-24 to t-1 -0.0038* -0.0289** -0.0320* -0.0569 
 (0.0727) (0.0483) (0.0636) (0.1308) 
Total net assets (millions) t-
13 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 (0.6034) (0.6175) (0.7025) (0.5704) 
Expense ratio (%) t-13 -0.1827 0.1903 0.3814 -0.0799 
 (0.3859) (0.4931) (0.3392) (0.8440) 
Portfolio turnover t-13  -0.2149 0.0963 0.0260 0.1605 
 (0.1265) (0.6175) (0.8984) (0.3527) 
Manager tenure (months) t-13 -0.0001 0.0055** -0.0011 0.0083*** 
 (0.9569)   (0.0237)   (0.8040)   (0.0065) 
Adjusted R-Square  0.0170 0.0354 0.0348 0.0620  
 
 Panel B：Actual and Implied Asset Sales Probabilities  
Domestic 




Funds                     Fund Type Variables N=308 N=304 N=117 N=187 
Actual asset sales frequency  0.5085  0.5000  0.5000  0.5000  
Mean implied probability 0.5065 0.5066 0.4957  0.5134  
Median implied probability 0.5149 0.5051 0.5016  0.5084   
 
shares held by outside blockholders, changes in the total number of directors, changes in 
ratio of independent directors, an independent chairman dummy, a dummy for the focus 
of the fund company, and control variables for the difference in total net assets, expense 
ratios, portfolio turnover, and manager tenure for the two years prior to two years after 
the sale.  Model 1 through Model 4 report the results for all (domestic equity and bond) 
funds with governance variables (Model 1 and Model 2) and ownership variables (Model 
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3 and Model 4). 
From the results of Model 1 and 2, fund performance subsequent to an asset sale 
is positively associated with the ratio of independent directors and the presence of an 
insider chairman.  The positive relationship between performance and the ratio of 
independent directors is consistent with Tufano and Sevick (1997), Meschke (2006), Del 
Guercio, Dann and Partch (2003), and Ding and Wermers (2006)) who argue that 
efficiency and performance are related to size and independence of the board of directors.  
However, the positive relationship between an insider chairman and performance 
indicates that governance structure alone does not fully explain the positive changes in 
fund performance after asset sales.  We also find that when a focus dummy is added 
(Model 2), that indicates when an acquirer of the asset is a focused mutual fund company, 
there is a positive relationship with fund performance after an asset sale.  This result is 
consistent with Comment and Jarrell (1995) who document a positive relationship 
between focus and shareholder returns. 
From Models 3 and Model 4, we find that changes in fund performance 
subsequent to asset sales are positively associated with an increase of insider ownership 
when it remains below 5% but is negatively associated with insider ownership when it is 
more than 5% (up to 25%).  This finding is consistent with Morck, Shleifer and Vishy 
(1988) who find that ownership and performance have a nonlinear relation.  The broader 
positive relationship between insider ownership and performance at low levels of insider 
holdings is consistent with the convergence of interest hypothesis from the corporate 
literature (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Leland and Pyle (1977), McConnell and Servaes 
(1990), Anderson and Reeb (2003)) as well as the mutual fund literature (Chen, Goldstein 
and Jiang (2006), and Khorana, Servaes and Wedge (2007)).  However, the results for the 
range of 5% to 25% for insider ownership support the entrenchment hypothesis (Jarrell 
and Poulson (1987), Stulz (1988), Slovin and Sushka (1993), Yafeh and Yosha (2003), 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985), Shleifer and Vishny (1997)).  Although the literature 
provides mixed evidence on institutional (outside block) holdings, our evidence seems to 
support the monitoring hypothesis (Shleifer and Vishny (1986)) rather than  Burkart, 
Gromb and Panunzi (1997) who argue that although tighter control by outside 
shareholders is ex post efficient, it imposes an ex ante threat that reduces managerial 
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initiative.  Similar to Model 2, when we add a focus dummy (Model 4) in the regression, 
it is significant at the 5% level, indicating that focused fund families are associated with 
improved performance and better managerial efficiency, consistent with Comment and 
Jarrell (1995) findings in the corporate literature.  
Models 5 through 11 disaggregate the earlier results into sub-samples as a 
robustness check.  Similar to earlier findings, the results for domestic equity and bond 
funds demonstrate that a focused fund company with an increase in insider ownership 
that remains below 5% contributes to the improvement in performance follows asset sales.  
When insider ownership increases to more than 5%, the positive relationship turns 
negative, indicating the possibility of managerial entrenchment.  Outside blockholders’ 
ownership shows a consistently positive relationship with performance for domestic 





























Table 9.10: Regression Analysis of Fund Performance Subsequent to Asset Sales 
 
Cross-sectional regressions are estimated to explain the differences in fee and market-adjusted buy and hold returns over the two years subsequent to one years 
prior to the onset of asset sales  (-1, +2).  The sample includes 1833 buyers and sellers of mutual fund companies of a total of 362 open-end domestic equity and 
bond funds for the period of 1990 to 2007.  The dependent variable is fee and market-adjusted buy and hold returns from two years subsequent to asset sale 
minus two years prior to the asset sales (-2, +2).  Independent variables include differences on board governance and ownership variables and fund characteristics 
control variables from two years subsequent to asset sale minus two years prior to the asset sales (-2, +2) are defined as follows: a dummy of focused fund “D 
focus” which equals one if a fund is managed under a focused fund company; “diff_turn” represents differences on annual portfolio turnover ratio; “diff_exp” 
represents differences on annual expense ratio; “diff_tnam” represents differences on logarithm of total net asset; “diff_tenure” represents differences on manager 
tenure (average); “diff_director” represents differences on  total number of directors; “diff_indep_ratiodifferences” represents differences on percentage of 
independent directors; “diff_chair” represents differences insider chairman dummy which equals one if a chairman is insider (dependent) director; “d1 hold” 
represents differences on total percentage of holding of insiders with 5% or less; “d2 hold” represents differences on total percentage of holding of insiders with 
5% above and 25% below; “diff_outside_block Differences” represents  differences on institutions or investors who own more than 5% shares.  Coefficients of 
expense ratio, portfolio turnover, ratio of independent director, insider and institution holding have been reported in percentage.  The standard errors are 


















                                                 




Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11          Fund Type 
Variables Total Funds Domestic Equity Funds  Bond Funds 
Intercept -5.5237*** -16.1533*** -2.7407 -2.1689 -10.5586** -24.9411** -5.9989* -7.0691** -0.5381 -1.0606 1.8210 
 (0.0070) (0.0025) (0.2808) (0.4091) (0.0126) (0.0129) (0.0586) (0.0239) (0.7219) (0.8172) (0.4434) 
D focus   25.2267**  13.0522**  35.6616*  36.6853*  1.1779*  
  (0.0298)  (0.0390)  (0.0981)  (0.0904)  (0.0904)  
diff_tnam -0.0019 -0.0039 0.0056 -0.0016 0.0024 -0.0015 -0.0018 0.0138 0.0050 0.0050 0.0096 
 (0.6369) (0.3363) (0.4536) (0.8886) (0.7125) (0.8250) (0.8627) (0.2909) (0.3272) (0.3371) (0.4007) 
diff_exp 21.0186*** 24.2236*** 25.5341*** 23.3157*** 25.3201** 29.1977*** 21.8274*** 26.7132*** 3.2944 3.5504 -25.5929 
 (0.0024) (0.0005) (0.0018) (0.0062) (0.0200) (0.0084) (0.0081) (0.0023) (0.6189) (0.6134) (0.3910) 
diff_turn -0.7369 -0.3821 0.6980 0.5259 -2.0035 -1.3202 4.8286** 5.7984*** -0.3819 -0.3614 -2.2955* 
 (0.5249) (0.7392) (0.5738) (0.6765) (0.5075) (0.6595) (0.0129) (0.0039) (0.6353) (0.6638) (0.0960) 
diff_tenure -0.0405 -0.0340 -0.0250 -0.0308 -0.1110 -0.0691 0.0697 0.0924* 0.0150 0.0145 -0.0429 
 (0.2362) (0.3130) (0.5086) (0.4248) (0.1492) (0.3837) (0.2178) (0.0970) (0.5563) (0.5781) (0.2935) 
diff_director 0.2102 0.8640*   0.6071 1.3769*   -0.0449 -0.0081  
 (0.5361) (0.0553)   (0.2389) (0.0507)   (0.8990) (0.9863)  
diff_indep_ratio 0.1829** 0.5189***   0.2795** 0.7682**   0.1574** 0.1720  
 (0.0175) (0.0028)   (0.0460) (0.0232)   (0.0144) (0.2096)  
diff_chair 12.0699*** 11.1363***   17.5948** 15.3481**   7.7185** 7.6872**  
 (0.0042) (0.0073)   (0.0183) (0.0384)   (0.0381) (0.0416)  
d1_hold    3.5666* 4.0448*   5.7517* 5.4727*   4.8676* 
   (0.0941) (0.0929)   (0.0736) (0.0698)   (0.0691) 
d2_hold    -0.8816** -0.2360   -0.5374 -2.1227**   -2.1489***
   (0.0114) (0.7727)   (0.1993) (0.0419)   (0.0011) 
diff_outside_block    0.8324* 0.8738*   1.4447** 1.3095**   -0.0818 
   (0.0916) (0.0800)   (0.0169)  (0.0215)   (0.8656) 




CHAPTER 10 CONCLUSIONS 
There is continuing discussion as to the extent to which the asset sales market 
facilitates the efficient reallocation of assets.  Maksimovic and Philips (2001) use plant-
level sales data and find that there are efficiency gains in asset sales.  Schlingemann, 
Stulz, and Walkling (2002) use accounting data to predict which firms are likely to use 
asset sales and which segments (assets) are likely to be chosen for sales.  This paper 
complements these papers by obtaining performance and efficiency measures from 
mutual fund data.  The results indicate that asset sales generate efficiency gains and an 
increase shareholder wealth, with the gains in wealth occurring to buyers.  Most 
importantly, the efficiency gains are sensitive to organization structure when there is 
concentrated ownership.  
Using unique mutual fund data and focusing on asset sales conducted by asset 
management companies, we document that at the product level there is performance 
improvement after asset sales. We assess managerial efficiency when a fund transitions 
from an inefficient diversified seller to a more efficient focused acquire.  This result 
contributes to the literature in two ways.  First, we find that sellers of these mutual fund 
assets are mainly diversified financial firms.  Funds under the management of these 
conglomerates experience poor performance during the period prior to asset sales. Second, 
acquirers are generally highly focused mutual fund companies.  The funds acquired by 
these focused entities experience significant improvement in both fund performance and 
operational efficiency.  The evidence indicates that (1) organizational structure (focus), (2) 
economies of scale, (3) strengthened monitoring, and (4) managerial ownership 
contribute to the superior performance and greater operating efficiency that occur 
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